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Abstract 
In recent years, there has been an increase in railway usage. This increase has led to the 
problem of congested railways and, as a result, increased pressure in the allocation of 
passenger traffic, freight traffic and rail maintenance. In response to this pressure, 
infrastructure owners are trying to increase the availability of the network by improving 
maintenance practises. The drive is to reduce maintenance time, maintenance frequency 
and increase reliability at the same time. Railway switches and crossings (S&C) are an 
important asset of any complex railway network and they typically account for 30% of the 
total budget spent on maintenance. 
The first part of this work researches the feasibility of automatically inspecting S&Cs in 
accordance with Network Rail inspection requirements and the likely necessary 
advancements. Current S&C inspection requirements, as well as current and developing 
inspection solutions, were analysed and categorised. This revealed the required 
technological advances and likely changes that the railway will have to adopt. As many 
S&Cs components are safety critical assets (their failure can lead to derailments), their 
inspection solutions, when used as a primary tool and not a complementary one, require a 
high Safety Integrity Level (SIL), therefore the inspection techniques require a high degree 
of accuracy, precision and reliability. Thus, some condition monitoring techniques were 
not explored as they were unable to meet this condition. 
The second part of the work researches the weakness of conventional S&C profile 
inspection practices used in industry. Analysis of recent derailments showed that current 
inspection practices to identify derailment hazards at switches can be affected by human 
error. Furthermore, the management of crossing profile was considered by senior personnel 
to be negatively affected by the variable crossing inspection practices currently used which 
are prone to human error. The work identified the main reasons that led to poor inspection 
of the S&C profile, developed a novel, automatic method to carry out the profile 
measurements which eliminated human error and identified possible improvements in the 
area of S&C profile inspection. During this research, an inspection trolley was prototyped, 
field trials were carried out, and good results were obtained. 
The increased inspection reliability can also improve repairs carried out at S&C, thus 
reducing their frequency. As a result, reliability could increase and overall maintenance 
time decrease.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
In recent years, there has been an increase in railway usage in Great Britain. As described in a 
report commissioned by the Department  for Transport (DfT), the railway accommodated an 
increase of 57% in passenger journeys and 26% in freight moved between 1996/97 and 
2009/10 [1]. If the period up to recession is instead taken (1996/97 to 2006/07), then the 
increase in freight moved would be 45% [1]. Furthermore, in 2014 the DfT forecasted that by 
2030 rail journeys will increase by a further 40% and that rail freight traffic has the potential 
to nearly double during the same period [2] 
In order to assure its availability to meet rail traffic demand, the railway infrastructure is 
maintained periodically. The availability of the railway is shared between passenger 
transportation, freight transportation and, not least, maintenance and renewal. With the 
increase in both passenger and freight traffic, the allocation of time for maintenance has 
become increasingly challenging. 
Current practice in Great Britain includes “working on a line open to traffic”, commonly 
known as working in a red zone, in order to carry out short maintenance operations (e.g. 
inspections). However, due to safety concerns, this practice is being discouraged leading to a 
further possible reduction of access to the infrastructure assets [3]. 
1.2 Railway vision towards 2040 
As described in the infrastructure section of the Industry’s Rail Technical Strategy 2012, the 
vision for the upcoming period to 2040 supports the use of automated inspection systems as 
trainborne inspection systems which can provide accurate and timely information [4]. 
Network Rail (NR), as an infrastructure owner, has also expressed interest in the use of 
automatic track inspection techniques in order to maintain their infrastructure [5]. The use of 
automatic inspection can provide more timely and precise information in part due to frequent 
automatic measurements being carried out without human intervention. 
The ability to know the state of the infrastructure can be used to identify and monitor failing 
assets and therefore schedule on-condition maintenance tasks. The scheduling of on-
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condition maintenance tasks is a widely accepted maintenance plan and in the second edition 
of “Reliability Centred Maintenance”, Moubray describes it as the preferred option in the 
context of a reliability-centred maintenance plan [6]. 
The use of automatic inspection techniques to support on-condition maintenance tasks has the 
potential to: 
• decrease or eliminate inspection time; 
• reduce or eliminate safety risks faced by railway workers; 
• increase inspection accuracy, precision and reliability; 
• increase the safety of rail operations; 
• decrease maintenance time by adopting a condition based maintenance approach; 
• decrease the need for human resources and consequently money spent on wages and 
other administrative costs, and; 
• provide up to date information on the state of the infrastructure. 
Thus, such advancements have the potential to deliver various advantages including increased 
availability which can reduce the pressure on traffic allocation and help meet forecasted 
freight traffic demands and overall operational demands [4]. 
1.3 Consideration of switches and crossings (S&C) 
Railway S&Cs (i.e. turnouts or switches) are a common mechanical installation found in 
railway systems that are used to safely guide trains from one track to another; they are 
commonly found in complex railway networks. In comparison to plain line S&C design is 
more complex and they are exposed to higher forces which make them more susceptible to 
damage, despite the continuous efforts to improve their design and reliability. Thus, as stated 
by the International Union of Railways (UIC) in a report concerning S&Cs, their maintenance 
takes up a considerable amount of money from the total maintenance budget: “Switches and 
crossings (S&C) are a serious cost driver and take up about 25% to 30% of the total 
maintenance and renewal budget each year” [7]. Thus, S&Cs are an important asset in any 
complex railway network and their management is important towards achieving the goals and 
vision as described in the previous section. 
Another important aspect of S&Cs is their safety level. The maintenance of S&Cs is very 
important in the context of a safe railway infrastructure. In 2002 seven people were killed and 
many others were injured when a train derailed while it was approaching Potters Bar train 
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station [8]. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) concluded that the main cause of the 
accident was “the failure of the support system within points 2182A to retain the right-hand 
switch rail in the open position during the passage of the train over the points” [8]. Just five 
years later a similar accident occurred at Grayrigg, where eighty percent of the passengers 
that were travelling were injured to some extent [9]. The cause of the accident was the poor 
condition of the switch at the moment of the accident [9]. During the last 10 years NR have 
experienced a number of derailments due to poor switches [10–14], all of which had less 
serious consequences than the Potters Bar and Grayrigg derailments. Thus, S&Cs are safety-
critical assets and must be well maintained in order to assure the safe operation of railways 
and avoid damage and injuries. Figure 1-1 shows a diagram of a common S&C design 
(movable parts are in red). The S&C has a straight path and a diverging (curved) path. 
 
Figure 1-1 Diagram of a common S&C design 
The main components of an S&C are: 
• the “switch”, which comprises of switch rails, stock rails, and other parts (not shown 
on the diagram) and is responsible for safely changing the path of the train; 
• the “crossing”, which includes the wing rail and provides support for the train wheel 
where two rails intersect paths, and; 
• the “points” which are used to move and lock the switch rails in place. 
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The “points” are comprised of: 
• point machine, which generates the force that moves the switch rails and locks them 
in place; 
• point fittings, the mechanical parts that connect the point machine to the switch rails 
(stretcher bars, lock stretcher bar, drive rod, lock rods and associated bolts, nuts and 
brackets) 
• mechanical supplementary drive (optional), which are similar with the point fittings 
but drive the rear end of the switch rails, and; 
• switch rollers (optional). 
It should be noted that certain point machines are designed to be installed in the four-foot (i.e. 
the area between the two stock rails). 
1.4 Research aim and objectives 
This research project has two aims and thus the work was carried out in two stages. The first 
research aim was led by the increasing difficulty in allocating maintenance time for S&C in 
GB. The hypothesis of the aim is to identify whether or not current technologies can be used 
to automatically fully inspect S&Cs in GB by eliminating the need for human inspection. In 
the case that fully automatic inspection of S&Cs is not possible using current S&C inspection 
technologies, the research then identifies the likely necessary technology advances that are 
required to achieve automatic inspection of S&Cs in GB. 
The objectives associated with this aim are: 
1. to identify and categorize the NR S&C inspection requirements (sections 2.1 and 2.2); 
2. to identify commercial and research level solutions for the automatic inspection of 
S&Cs (sections 2.3 and 2.4); 
3. to identify whether or not S&Cs could be automatically inspected using current 
technologies (section 2.5), and; 
4. if applicable, to identify the main challenges and required advances in order to 
achieve a “self-inspecting” S&C, as well as any changes that would be vital to the 
achievement (section 2.5). 
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As S&Cs are safety-critical components and the research evaluates the feasibility of replacing 
manual inspection with automatic and/or remote inspection, in section 2.3 an important 
comparison between condition monitoring and automatic inspection is discussed. 
During the first part of this research it became evident that railways have a history of S&C 
failures, some of which had led to derailments. In Britain, certain derailments were caused by 
a failure to accurately inspect the S&C in accordance with the NR/L2/TRK/0053 [15] 
inspection standard. Furthermore, during a meeting with senior NR personnel (January, 2012) 
it was asserted that NR was seeking to have better management over the profile of crossings, 
as current crossing profile inspection, as defined in the NR/L2/RK/1054 [16] inspection 
standard, is affected by human error and this reduces the effectiveness of the whole 
maintenance process. Thus, the second aim of this research is to improve a weakness in the 
current S&C inspection regime practised in GB. 
The aim is best expressed as a set of 3 individual objectives: 
• to identify whether or not the use of current S&C profile inspection methods, as 
defined by the NR/L2/TRK/0053 and NR/L2/TRK/1054 inspection standards, can 
lead to considerable measurement errors and the source of those errors; 
• to identify if possible and to develop alternative automatic inspection methods can be 
used to replicate the current S&C profile inspection tasks as defined by the 
NR/L2/TRK/0053 and NR/L2/TRK/1054 inspection standards whilst eliminating 
human errors; 
• to identify whether or not improvements on the developed S&C profile inspection 
methods could reduce the systematic errors of inspecting S&Cs. 
Due to compatibility, integration and safety issues, the system must replicate the manual 
measurements as they are. The system should work on all standard right-hand and left-hand 
S&Cs for which the NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard is applicable. For safety reasons, 
the system should also be transparent in the way in which the results are calculated.  
1.5 Scope 
The research is primarily focused on inspection standards and maintenance practices in Great 
Britain. 
AUTOMATION OF RAILWAY SWITCH AND CROSSING INSPECTION: RAIL 
PROFILE INSPECTION CASE STUDY 
 
Page 6 of 199 
 
However, due to the following reasons, inspection requirements and maintenance practices 
from other countries have also been consulted: 
• to gain an overview of the inspection tasks that are common across different European 
countries and those that are different; 
• to learn from other countries practices; 
• novel inspection solutions are more valuable when they address an issue experienced 
across Europe rather than only country wide, and; 
• standardization between countries can bring beneficial effects. 
Because of the poor availability of information relating other countries, inspection 
requirements and maintenance practices from other countries have been considered to a lesser 
extent. 
1.6 Methodology 
The first stage of this research is described in Chapter 2 can be summarised as three main 
steps, as shown in Figure 1-2. 
The first step consisted of the identification, categorization and recording of S&C inspection 
requirements. Railway inspection standards and relevant documents applicable to S&Cs in 
Great Britain, Germany and Netherlands were consulted. The relevant S&C inspection tasks 
have been classified and recorded in an Excel® spreadsheet file. The first step is described in 
sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
During the second step an effort was made to identify inspection solutions that can or have 
the potential to automatically and/or remotely inspect S&Cs in accordance with the 
inspection standards. Inspection solutions practiced in the current GB railway industry, other 
railway industries, commercially available products and solutions at low and medium 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) were considered. The work was not meant to provide an 
index of every possible solution, but at least one from each promising technology. The 
second step is described in sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
During the third step, gaps in the S&C inspection solutions and some of the most promising 
technologies that need to be (re)developed had become evident. The third step is described in 
section 2.5. 
AUTOMATION OF RAILWAY SWITCH AND CROSSING INSPECTION: RAIL 
PROFILE INSPECTION CASE STUDY 
 
Page 7 of 199 
 
 
 
 
As the above diagram suggests, the process was executed working up and down between the 
steps, while continuously revising towards the end goal. 
The second stage of this research considers the issue of derailments at S&Cs due to failure to 
comply with the NR/L2/TRK/0053 [15] inspection standard as well as the issue of accurately 
inspecting crossing profiles as per NR/L2/TRK/1054 [16] inspection standard. 
In Chapter 3 the problem is defined and a set of system level requirements was established, 
further refined by lower level requirements. 
In order to achieve the second objective of this stage, a laser-based profile inspection trolley 
was developed to accurately measure the profile of rails in S&Cs. The development process 
is described in Chapter 4. 
The methodology to achieving the second objective of this stage is summarised in Figure 1-3 
as three steps. 
Step 1: Identification, 
categorization and recording of 
S&C inspection requirements 
Step 3: Identification of 
technology gaps where research 
could improve the inspection 
process 
Step 2: Identification of 
available solutions that have the 
potential of carrying out any of 
the S&C inspection tasks 
Figure 1-2 Methodological summary of first stage 
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As the inspection process of switches differs significantly in comparison to the inspection 
process of crossings, the two are discussed in separate chapters. Chapter 5 researches the 
issues related to the inspection of switches and Chapter 6 the issues related to the inspection 
of crossings. However, each of the two chapters individually accomplishes, step by step, all 
three objectives of the second stage of the research as defined in section 1.4. 
Chapter 7 compares the advantages and disadvantages of using a laser-based S&C inspection 
system in various inspection solutions ranging from dedicated measurements trains to hand 
gauges. 
In Chapter 8 a range of conclusions are drawn. 
1.7 Extracurricular work 
The work and findings of this research have also fed into Work Package 3 of the European 
FP7 project AUTOMAIN (Augmented Usage of Track by Optimisation of Maintenance, 
Allocation and Inspection of railway Networks, http://www.automain.eu/). 
 
  
Step 1: Requirements 
identification 
Step 3: Verification of solution 
Step 2: Development of 
inspection solution 
Figure 1-3 Methodological summary of second objective of the second stage 
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2 RESEARCH ON STATE OF THE ART SWITCH 
INSPECTION STANDARDS, MAINTENANCE 
PRACTICES AND INSPECTION SOLUTIONS 
The objective of this chapter is to identify the main challenges and areas of research that are 
necessary in order to develop and support a maintenance strategy that does not require the 
scheduling of manual inspection of S&Cs in Britain. This is achieved through a step-by-step 
process which as described in Figure 1-2. Although the scope is limited to the inspection of 
S&Cs within Britain, the investigation also considered overseas practices and inspection 
solutions. 
2.1 Current standards for switch inspection 
The railway infrastructure is commonly maintained through the use of inspection standards 
which help infrastructure managers to adequately assess their infrastructure against wear and 
damage and identify the required actions. In Network Rail these standards are classified as 
Level 2 standards, standards which “outline business processes, assurance systems and 
controls” [17]. 
Commonly, inspection standards contain, but are not limited to, the following: 
• a name/description of the inspected asset; 
• a description of the tools required for inspection; 
• a inspection procedure; 
• a method for interpreting the inspection results, and; 
• a list of post-inspection required actions. 
The NR switch inspection standards have been identified and then by focusing on a “key 
standard” and exploring all the standards that are referred to by the “key standard”. These 
standards refer to other standards, which were also inspected, and this process was repeated 
while assigning each standard a letter (or group of letters) as follows: 
• L, for live standard in which case all references from that standard were inspected; 
• NA, for not applicable in which case the standard was irrelevant and it was not 
inspected; 
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• D, for dead standard in which case it was not inspected, and; 
• R, for repeated standard for standards that have already been inspected. 
The methodology of inspecting standards was adopted from Roberts et al. [18]. The most 
important leads tables are shown in APPENDIX B: LEADS TABLES. 
2.1.1 Great Britain railway standards 
The main railway infrastructure owner in Great Britain is Network Rail. Whilst a key 
standard issued for the inspection of S&Cs (i.e. complete turnout) was not identified, the 
“NR/L2/TRK/001” was identified as a key group standard for the inspection of switches, 
crossings and related track components and “NR/L3/SIG/10663” for the inspection of points. 
Figure 2-1 shows the NR S&C inspection standards tree (live and applicable standards only). 
 
Figure 2-1 NR S&C inspection standards (tree) 
Table 1 shows the titles of all NR S&C inspection standards that have been found relevant 
towards this work. 
Table 1 NR S&C inspection standards (listed) 
NR/L2/TRK/001 Inspection and Maintenance of Permanent Way [19] 
NR/L2/TRK/001/A01 Inspection and maintenance of permanent way – Inspection [20] 
NR/L2/TRK/001/B01 Inspection and maintenance of permanent way – Rail management 
[21] 
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NR/L2/TRK/001/C01 Inspection and maintenance of permanent way – Geometry and 
gauge clearance [22] 
NR/L2/TRK/001/D01 Inspection and maintenance of permanent way – Specific 
requirements for switches and crossings [23] 
NR/L2/TRK/001/E01 Inspection and maintenance of permanent way – Installation 
requirements, maintenance limits and intervention limits [24] 
NR/L2/TRK/1054 Inspection, Maintenance and Repair Procedures for Cast, Welded 
and Fabricated Crossings in the Track [16] 
NR/L2/TRK/0053 Inspection and Repair to Reduce the Risk of Derailment at Switches 
[15] 
NR/SIG/10663 Signal Maintenance Specifications (SMS) [25] 
NR/SMS/PA11 Point Inspection [26] 
NR/SMS/PB11 Clamp Lock Hydraulic Points [27] 
NR/SMS/PC05 Point Machine HW Style [28] 
NR/SMS/PF01 Point Fittings [29] 
NR/SMS/PF02 Mechanical Supplementary Drives [30] 
NR/SMS/PF03 Point Fittings: Switch Rollers [31] 
 
Network Rail maintenance standards include a section titled “reference documentation” 
which contains a list of all referenced documents within the standard. The section was found 
to be beneficial towards assuring completeness of the results. 
2.1.2 European railway standards 
In the case of European standards, the work provides an overview of European inspections 
(and practices) that supplements the British inspection requirements and is not meant to 
achieve perfect completeness and accuracy of recorded information. Thus, the adopted 
procedure of inspecting standards was not carried out in the case of European standards. 
The following three documents were used to collect information about inspection 
requirements and practices around Europe: 
1. Regelwerk Oberbau, Richtlinienfamilie 821 „Oberbau inspizieren“ [32], which 
defines inspection requirements and procedures within DB Netz, the main 
infrastructure owner in Germany; 
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2. UIC Working Group Switch & Crossings, Questionnaire – Maintenance 
Specifications S&C [33], a questionnaire about the maintenance specification of S&C 
within Prorail, the main infrastructure owner in Netherlands, and; 
3. UIC Project Switches & Crossings, Inspection of Switches & Crossings, State of the 
Art Report [7], which, among other content, reports on the maintenance requirements 
and practises of several European countries. 
In the case of European inspection standards, the author made use of the best information that 
was available at the time of carrying out the work and the completeness and accuracy of the 
gathered inspection tasks is therefore limited. 
2.2 Overview of railway inspection requirements 
In order to facilitate the entire process (inspection tasks identification, solution identification 
and technology gap identification), the gathered inspection tasks were collated and organised 
in an .xlsx inspection template. Each identified inspection task was categorized along with 
the following information (whenever possible): country of application, source of information, 
inspection frequency, current inspection method(s) and other remarks. 
During the collation and categorization of the inspection requirements it was found that the 
diversity of the gathered data was great as switches are complex parts of the infrastructure 
(with dozens if not hundreds of failure modes); there are variances between them (within the 
same country as well as between different countries) and variances between how they are 
maintained across different countries. 
Thus, an effort was made to maintain a balance between gathering detailed information and 
working with a manageable amount of information. 
During this process, it was decided that the optimum classification method was a combination 
of classification by current/potential inspection method and classification by inspected part. 
The first adopted level of classification is based on the broad type of the inspection: visual 
inspection or measured inspection. The second level of classification is based on the type of 
the inspected part. 
Throughout this work, visual inspection tasks refer to those tasks where physical contact with 
the infrastructure is generally not required. As an example, the inspection of a stretcher bar 
through the application of a small force using a crow bar (to check its rigidity) is not 
considered a visual inspection task. However, all tasks where contact is made with the 
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inspected part solely due to cleaning purposes, are still considered visual inspection tasks. 
Where contact is required for a different reason, the task is classified as a measured 
inspection task no matter the purpose of the contact. 
It has become clear that there are several broad S&C inspection topics which are addressed 
by current technology and which can be further researched and redeveloped. These topics can 
together tackle three quarters (or even more) of the total inspection requirements and they are 
as follows: 
1. Visual inspection tasks; 
2. Inspection of shape, size and position of switch rails, stock rails, crossing, wing rails 
and check rails; 
3. Geometry measurements (gauge, cant, twist, alignment and levelling); 
4. Measurement of cracks in rails and crossing; 
5. Tightness checks; and 
6. Point machine inspections. 
The classification can be seen in Figure 2-2. 
 
Figure 2-2 Overview of inspection requirements 
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Because of the following reasons, the point machine (not to be confused with “points”) 
inspection tasks have been classified separately instead of being considered a part of either 
visual inspection or instrumented inspection: 
• inspection of point machines can require their cover to be removed prior to carrying  
out the inspection tasks; 
• the inspection tasks are highly dependent on the type of the point machine; 
• some inspection tasks includes maintenance tasks such as adding grease or oil, and; 
• the inspection of some point machines require a functional test to throw the point 
machine in both the extended and retracted state. 
The “other inspections” category contains inspection tasks that could not be included in any 
of the other categories. Examples of such tasks include checking rail isolation and the 
inspection of vegetation along the walking path. 
It was concluded that, due to the railway infrastructure having similar designs across different 
European countries and generally the assets suffer from similar failure mechanisms, similar 
measurement and inspection techniques are used. However, the method of inspection 
(including the equipment used), intervention limits and maintenance strategies vary between 
different railway industries. 
The .xlsx sheet containing the collated inspection tasks and related information is available in  
APPENDIX C: SWITCH INSPETION REQUIREMENTS. 
It was also concluded that failure to correctly inspect S&C components within any of the 
mentioned categories, excluding the “visual inspection tasks” category and “other inspection” 
category, can lead to significant damage and/or injuries. Failure to inspect the switch rail 
fittings and their fastenings and joints can lead to catastrophic accidents, Grayrigg [9]. Both 
the shape and position of switch rails are a safety concern as several rail accidents have 
demonstrated [9–12]. Continuous growing cracks within the rails and crossing can lead to 
abrupt rail breaks [14]. Track twist can be a major contributor to train derailments in both 
S&Cs and plain line, as happened in one of the most recent derailments in the north-west of 
London [34]. Malfunctions in the point machine can undoubtedly leave it in an unsafe state, 
which again can cause a derailment. 
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Agreeing with Whalen, in that the incorrect operation of a safety-critical asset “could lead to 
loss of life, substantial material or environmental damage, or large monetary losses” [35], 
S&Cs have safety-critical components within almost all mentioned inspection categories. 
Therefore, when considering new methods for S&C inspection, inspection accuracy, 
precision and reliability have a key role in assuring railway safety. Due to this, inspection 
systems and condition monitoring systems that are not able to meet this requirement are 
considered unsuitable for the purpose of this chapter. 
2.3 Difference between condition monitoring and automatic inspection 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Recently there have been many technological advances in the area of railway inspection and 
condition monitoring. Many researchers, as well as companies, are now trying to develop 
innovative methods that are able to inspect and monitor the railway infrastructure rapidly, 
automatically, remotely and with a reduced number of staff. Many of these advancements 
have been in the area of condition monitoring techniques. Condition monitoring can greatly 
improve the maintenance of assets and it is the solution that many researchers choose to take 
forward. This section aims to detail the differences and similarities between condition 
monitoring and inspection. As Groom [36] mentioned in a paper, it is difficult to fully define 
what condition monitoring is; it is no different here, but the best effort at a description was 
made. 
2.3.2 Comparison between condition monitoring and inspection 
Objectives of condition monitoring 
Condition monitoring techniques can be used as a tool to achieve in the broadest sense what it 
promises (i.e. to monitor the condition of assets). However, when publications are consulted 
from the speciality literature, despite the large volume of information and diverse techniques 
presented [37–40], it is clear that the scope of condition monitoring is focused on faults wtih 
the aim of preventing impending failure. Thus, the scope of condition monitoring techniques 
can be summarized by a set of three objectives as follows: 
1. Fault detection, which is the ability of a system to detect if a fault is present in an 
asset; 
2. Fault isolation and identification, which is the ability of a system to tie a fault to a 
certain part of the monitored asset and/or determine the nature of the fault, and; 
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3. Fault prediction, which is the ability of a system to predict future faults in the 
monitored asset. 
The latter two objectives are also commonly referred to as fault diagnosis and prognosis, 
which represent the main aims of condition monitoring systems. Most often, the research and 
development of condition monitoring systems is also driven by other aims which make them 
efficient in the context of real applications: 
• Low production cost of the monitoring system; 
• Easy to retro-fit on existing assets; 
• Low operating and maintenance cost; 
• High reliability (avoiding false negatives and false positives); and 
• Minimal or no influence over the monitored system. 
Measured parameters of condition monitoring 
In general, condition monitoring techniques do not measure the parameters that define the 
fault(s). Instead, most condition monitoring systems rely on the dependence between the fault 
and one or several effects that they produce. Thus, many condition monitoring systems 
measure one or several of the following broad categories of effects: dynamic, particle, 
chemical, physical, temperature, and electrical [6]. 
As an example, most bearing condition monitoring techniques are based on dynamic effects, 
in particular vibration or acoustic analysis. The fault itself which could be, for example, a 
deformed shape or cracks in the bearing components is not measured directly [41]. In some 
cases, including this example, accurate measurement of the fault itself (deformed shape or 
cracks) is not even of interest; instead a quantization of the extent of the fault(s) is desired. As 
a second example, Asada [42] developed a condition monitoring algorithm which was tested 
on railway AC point machine actuators. By measuring the active power used by the actuator 
(AC motor), he successfully identified different severity levels of overdriving and 
underdriving faults which are millimetric misalignments in the mechanical assemblies. 
Thus, in general, condition monitoring systems usually measure parameter(s) which: 
• Can be measured using inexpensive sensors; 
• Can be easily accessed, and (as a consequence); 
• Are not the fault itself but are influenced by the fault. 
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Measurement accuracy and reliability of condition monitoring 
The accuracy of condition monitoring techniques varies greatly depending on their 
performance. For example, fault detection monitoring systems can provide as little as a pass 
or fail indication. At the other end of the range, fault prediction monitoring systems generally 
have good accuracy. Even so, many condition monitoring techniques are not able to measure 
the actual fault at high accuracy (for example in the case of faulty bearings, accurate 
measurement of deformation and cracks of the individual faults in the bearings). In the case 
of point machine condition monitoring, the mentioned algorithm is not able to accurately 
measure the millimetric misalignment. 
Measurement reliability is still a limitation of current condition monitoring systems. In 
particular, reliable measurements independent of the variations in the monitored assets and 
while operating in a real environment are more difficult to achieve than reliable 
measurements from a single system running in a laboratory environment. 
Inspection systems 
Generally, the purpose of inspection systems is to measure or assess certain properties (e.g. 
mechanical, electrical, chemical, etc) of the inspected asset. Most often, the measurements of 
inspection systems are within certain accuracy and precision limits which are set by the 
manufacturer. Thus, to achieve this, most inspection systems measure the parameter of 
interest directly whenever possible. Due to the direct measurement, their reliability seldom 
requires improvement. However, for the same reason the use of such systems can be more 
expensive and invasive, as they need access to the measured parameters unlike many 
condition monitoring systems, which measure affected parameters and not the parameter 
itself. 
Conclusion 
Due to their relatively low cost, ease of installation and continuous measurements, condition 
monitoring systems can be used to maintain assets in a cost effective way (most often using a 
condition based maintenance strategy). However, their limited accuracy, precision and 
reliability can be insufficient to replace more traditional inspection processes, especially 
when the asset is a safety-critical component and an inspection failure can lead to a 
substantial loss of assets and/or injuries.  
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Thus, in this chapter condition monitoring techniques are considered, but, where their 
reliability is limited, they are not considered for inspection of safety-critical assets. 
2.4 Commercially available and potential turnout inspection solutions 
After the inspection of relevant standards, the research continued with the investigation of 
available and potential S&C inspection solutions. Therefore, the market for inspection 
technologies for switches and crossings was researched and relevant available technologies 
were mapped in the spreadsheet file in a separate column. 
The following section describes off-the-shelf and research-level solutions that have the 
potential to replace manual inspections on S&C components. 
2.4.1 Train borne inspection solutions including rail vehicles and robots 
1. Switch Inspection & Measurement (SIM) wagon from Eurailscout 
In 2005, Eurailscout, a German-Dutch joint venture, developed their own solution to S&C 
inspection, “Switch Inspection & Measurement” (SIM), which was a vehicle based S&C 
inspection system. This was later redeveloped to become what is today the SIM11 and 
SIM12 [43]. While the predecessor was a locomotive with inspection systems, the later 
SIM11 and SIM12 are wagons that can be pushed or pulled by a locomotive. These have a 
“switch inspection system” and a “switch measurement system”. 
The switch inspection system has 8 CCD cameras which are used to synchronously record 
video footage of the S&C at different angles. The footage can be manually inspected offline 
from a desk in an office and it is claimed that certain faults can be automatically identified 
through image processing such as missing fastening devices depending on the type, 
crumbling of concrete rail sleepers affecting safety, cracks in the concrete rail sleepers 
affecting safety, which can be detected with 0.5 mm accuracy, and ballast deficit/surplus. 
The switch measurement system includes a laser measurement system which uses the 
triangulation principle [44] and an inertial measurement unit (IMU). The lasers measure the 
profile of the rail every 20 mm while the wagon is pushed or pulled at 40 km/h. The 
following can be calculated: track gauge, flangeway gap, and horizontal and vertical wear. 
An IMU, optimised for short and medium wavelengths, is mounted on the switch 
measurement system and allows for geometry measurements to be taken. It is advertised that 
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the following parameters can be delivered: track width, shift, height, transverse gradient, and 
all derived parameters. 
The SIM needs to be scheduled in the train timetable in order to carry out the necessary 
inspections. However, once this is achieved, no possessions are required (unless detailed 
inspection needs to be arranged), which increases asset availability as well as safety and 
eliminates time spent travelling between sites and office. 
 
Figure 2-3 Switch Inspection & Measurement (SIM) wagon 
Courtesy and Copyright Eurailscout 
Currently, this technology is proven on the Dutch rail network. It is advertised that in 
Amsterdam, the SIM is capable of inspecting 100 S&Cs (both paths) in less than 6 hours 
[43]. In 2013 the SIM was trialled in Germany and the results were favourable towards its use 
there [45]. 
2. RILA-system, Fugro 
The RILA-system, initially developed by Raildata, is a compact measurement system that can 
be easily attached to the end of passenger trains and is able to measure the absolute track 
geometry even when running over S&Cs. The system uses a combination of sensors 
including GPS, accelerometers and line lasers and it is claimed that all required geometry 
parameters can be made available at reasonably high accuracy. The system was first operated 
in 2009 in Netherlands and in 2013 it had been successfully trialled on the railway in Britain 
[46]. 
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Figure 2-4 RILA-system mounted on a passenger train 
Courtesy and Copyright Fugro 
It is worth mentioning that there are known limitations of the RILA system such as: inability 
to work in bright daylight (due to the limitations of the lasers used) and limitations surveying 
certain parts within S&Cs (due to the geometry), however these issues could be overcome. 
3. Automatic Switch Inspection Vehicle (ASIV) from ZETA-TECH 
ZETA-TECH, a US based rail consultancy firm,  have developed a rail vehicle (ASIV) [47] 
which is able to survey the physical dimensions of a switch in a similar manner to the SIM 
wagon manufactured by Eurailscout. 
 
Figure 2-5 Automatic Switch Inspection Vehicle (ASIV) 
Courtesy and Copyright ZETA-TECH 
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The ASIV is equipped with a pair of Optical Rail Inspection and Analysis (ORIAN™) units 
[48], a laser-based system produced by KLD Labs. It is claimed that the system is able to 
measure various S&C parameters as described in Table 2. 
Table 2 Summary of potential measurements using the ASIV vehicle 
Rail Type Measurement 
Stock rail opposite a switch rail: Vertical wear 
Gauge side wear 
Field side wear 
Gauge face angle 
Gauge corner radius 
Switch rail: Gauge face angle 
Breaking or chipping 
Gauge corner radius 
Stock and switch rail: Vertical height difference 
Lateral gap width 
Wheel contact point through switch point 
Closure rails: Vertical wear 
Side wear 
Frog: Frog flangeway gap width 
Frog nose and wing rail: Relative height of nose and wing rail 
Wear/batter on wing rail 
Batter/damage to frog 
Surface damage: batter, chipping 
Wheel contact through frog 
Wing rail profile (within field of view) 
 
It must be noted that although the word batter does not have a well defined scientific 
definition, it is widely used to express a type of damage to S&Cs and thus, is also used in this 
thesis as well. Rail batter is a type of wear which generally occurs due to impact forces, 
around an area of wheel transfer. The result is a flattening of the crossing nose and wing rails 
at crossings and rail ends at rail joints. Sometimes it can be accompanied by metal breakage. 
The damage is generally higher on heavy haul railways. 
ZETA-TECH reported successful switch inspection trials in both British and US railways. 
Although the profile measurements have been claimed to have better accuracy (due to the 
presence of acute angles in the rail profile) when compared with the industry’s leading rail 
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profile measurement system MiniProf [47], no information was found regarding the accuracy 
and precision of the specific rail measurements (as defined in Table 2) or their reliability. 
4. Loccioni’s FELIX robot 
Loccioni, an Italian-based company founded in 1968, have developed an S&C inspection 
robot named FELIX [49]. The robot is capable of measuring the profile of rails (and crossing) 
as well as the geometry of the switch. The robot weights around 150 kg when assembled and 
the heaviest part when disassembled is 47 kg. Thus, it is brought to the railway site in parts 
and assembled there. The robot can be controlled remotely from a short distance and its 
autonomy is 6 hours. The measurements are taken at around 5 km/h. 
 
Figure 2-6 Felix robot 
Courtesy and Copyright Loccioni 
The robot was initially designed for the Italian railway and is further developed for usage on 
various European railways. It is claimed that the robot can measure most rail parameters 
including rail wear, flangeway gap and track gauge with good accuracy. The manufacturer 
states a resolution of 0.1 mm. 
2.4.2 Line-side monitoring and inspection solutions 
1. POSS monitoring system, Strukton 
Strukton is a Dutch rail company which produced a number of technical solutions for the 
railway industry, including S&C inspection and monitoring systems. In 2012 they expressed 
their vision of a switch inspection system [50]. They believe a switch is best inspected using 
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a combination of a wagon based inspection system (SIM, or similar) and a condition 
monitoring system for the point machine. 
They developed a condition monitoring system called Preventive Maintenance and Fault 
Diagnosis System (abbreviated POSS) which can monitor several railway assets including 
point machines. The monitoring of the point machine is non-intrusive as it uses current 
transducers which are installed in the proximity of the point machine. The analogue signal is 
fed to a box through a DB9 connector, as shown in Figure 2-7, where it is digitised and 
transmitted wirelessly over GPRS or Ethernet to the POSS cloud from which it can be 
accessed using an internet browser. 
The monitoring system can generate alerts if the current consumption of the point machine 
falls outside predefined limits during any of the point machine phases (e.g. locking, 
unlocking, throwing, etc). It is relatively easy to obtain installation approval as there is no 
electrical connection between it and the monitored switch. Thus there are a limited number of 
wires to be installed as the data can be sent wirelessly. 
 
Figure 2-7 POSS monitoring unit 
Courtesy and Copyright Strukton 
However, Strukton does not claim to be able to identify and diagnose subtle changes in the 
current. Subtle changes in the current can provide early signs of incipient point machine 
failure but fairly complex algorithms are required, as simple thresholding techniques are not 
sufficient [51]. 
The POSS monitoring system has been successfully installed on many railway networks 
across Europe and Australia. 
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2. Current research in point machine condition monitoring 
Recently, much research has been carried out on condition monitoring of various mechanical 
systems including Single-Throw Mechanical Equipments (STME), such as railway point 
machines. Condition monitoring of Britain point machines is generally aimed towards 
prediction of adjustment faults (i.e. misalignment within various rods connecting the point 
machine to the switch rails) [42,51]. Although considerable progress had been achieved in 
this area, there are still challenges to be addressed, such as assuring a high level of confidence 
for a large number of point machines (>10.000) and in various weather conditions. 
3. Fixed asset monitoring system, Voestalpine  
Voestalpine is a steel-based technology group operating on all five continents which 
developed an asset monitoring system called VAE ROADMASTER 2000. The system comes 
in three versions: light, advanced and pro. The pro system is able to monitor the condition of 
S&Cs through the installation of a wide range of sensors as shown in Figure 2-8. 
 
Figure 2-8 Voestalpine's switch monitoring capabilities 
Courtesy and Copyright Voestalpine 
It is advertised that the evaluation of the measured data will be done using intelligent 
algorithms which take into account the variation of weather related parameters in order to 
accurately decide whether or not to generate an alarm. The system is also advertised to 
“recognize all initiating errors”. 
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4. Vossloh’s sensory capabilities 
Vossloh, a German company supplying infrastructure and rolling stock assets to the rail 
industry, has over 10 years of S&C monitoring experience. Table 3 shows Vossloh’s sensory 
capabilities in S&C inspection and condition monitoring and has been reproduced from a 
unpublished report in 2008 [52]. 
Table 3 Vossloh’s sensor capability in S&C monitoring 
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Distance between 
stock rail and switch 
blade at the point 
      X   
Distance between 
stock rail and switch 
blade at the flangeway 
       X  
Distance between the 
frog and the check rail     X     
Maximum throwing 
force (for switch and 
movable frog) 
  X       
Throwing rod out of 
adjustment   X   X    
Problem in locking 
device X  X   X    
Obstruction X X X   X X X  
Problem in the 
detection circuit  X    X X X  
Level of tamping    X      
Weather conditions         X 
 
The “X” in the table implies that there is dependence between the inspection tasks or 
condition and the reading from the sensor. However, it is unlikely that with the use of a 
sensor (e.g. PM.F or PM.C), the nature of the fault can be established. 
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Prior to installation of such systems, various issues have to be considered such as: installation 
time & requirements, compliance with railway standards (PM.F uses a load pin which can 
render the machine unusable if it breaks, EMC, tamping clearance, etc), maintenance 
requirements and reliability in a railway environment. 
5. SmartBolts, Stress Indicators 
Stress Indicators Inc., a US-based company, specialises in the design and manufacture of 
stress visual indicating devices in the form of bolts and studs. As pictured below, their 
SmartBolts give a red visual indication when a bolt is loose. 
 
Figure 2-9 The SmartBolt 
Courtesy and Copyright Stress Indicators 
The colour of the indicator changes linearly with the amount of stress in the bolt which 
allows easy identification when stress in the bolt has been significantly reduced. The 
company manufactures bolts in various steel grades ranging between 5 and 10.9. 
6. Smart Washer, Smart Component Technologies Limited 
A smart washer is a self instrumented washer that is able to wirelessly transmit information 
regarding current stress, and therefore the condition of bolted joints. Smart Component 
Technologies Limited, is a recent spin-out company from the University of Huddersfield that 
has continued to redevelop a smart washer concept. Their devices currently rely on near field 
wireless recharging technology and long life batteries. However, the company recently 
received a Technology Strategy Board (TSB) fund to research the feasibility of adding a 
vibration energy harvester to their smart washer giving the possibility of developing a true fit-
and-forget device [53]. 
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7. RotaBolt-TD, James Walker RotaBolt Ltd 
The RotaBolt-TD bolt is a join monitoring device similar to the smart washer. The sensor and 
transmitter are embedded in a bolt together with a battery which is claimed to provide 5 years 
of continuous unattended operation [54]. 
8. Tracksure locking mechanism, Wheelsure Holdings 
Wheelsure Holdings is a UK based limited company which supplies an innovative 
mechanical device for securing bolts. The device is based on the use of a reverse thread 
preceded by a normal one. Two nuts are fitted on the bolt and a cover forces them to rotate 
synchronously (i.e. in the same direction and same amount). The loosening of the nuts is 
achievable only when they rotate in opposite directions. For this to happen, significant 
damage has to occur (e.g. on the thread, cover, etc) making the mechanical device very 
resistant to loosening. 
 
Figure 2-10 Tracksure locking mechanism 
Courtesy and Copyright Wheelsure Holdings 
The Tracksure locking device, an award winning (2007 and 2008) innovation, is already in 
use in several industries including the rail industry. 
9. Multi-sensor, Vortok 
Vortok is a rail company that supplies many technical solutions to the railway industry. 
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They produced a multi-sensor which can be installed in the web of the rail as a 10 mm 
diameter bolt as shown in Figure 2-11. The multi-sensor is able to measure force (in the 
vertical or horizontal plane), acceleration (both vertically and laterally) and core temperature. 
 
Figure 2-11 The multi-sensor 
Courtesy and Copyright Vortok 
The sensor is described as compact, rugged and easy to install. Using the data provided by the 
multi-sensor, various information relating to the running of trains over the piece of rail can be 
calculated. 
10. Overhead line mounted CCD camera developed by Luleå University of Technology 
and Swedish Transport Administration (Trafikverket) 
As a response to the need for S&C inspection, Asplund [55] considered the inspection of 
railway S&Cs using a fixed CCD camera mounted on the overhead line. He concluded that 
zoom and tilt capabilities are desirable in order to record good resolution footage of various 
parts of the S&C. The types of inspection tasks carried out by such a system are mostly 
visual, while measured inspection tasks are also possible depending on the performance of 
the camera. Measured tasks may include track gauge, flangeway gap, switch toe opening and 
residual switch opening. 
AUTOMATION OF RAILWAY SWITCH AND CROSSING INSPECTION: RAIL 
PROFILE INSPECTION CASE STUDY 
 
Page 29 of 199 
 
 
Figure 2-12 Overhead line mounted CCD camera prototype (left) and sample image (right) 
Courtesy and Copyright Matthias Asplund 
The system is intended for turnouts which are heavily used, are susceptible to high failure 
rates or which would cause high disturbance to the railway timetable due to their important 
location within the railway network. In such conditions the camera has the advantage of 
facilitating the inspection more frequently than other inspection methods (e.g. trains, robots, 
trolleys, patrolling). 
2.5 Identification of gaps and research opportunities in technologies for switch 
inspection 
The last step was the identification of technology gaps where the current technology is not 
able to provide a solution. This step revealed areas of research where new innovation may 
improve the way in which inspection is carried out. 
The aim of this research is to investigate the feasibility of eliminating the need for human 
inspection of S&Cs. Thus, the scope is limited to researching alternative ways of carrying out 
the S&C inspections as required by the inspection standards, therefore, any optional 
inspection or condition monitoring solution that is not able to replace any inspection tasks as 
required by the inspection requirements is considered unhelpful towards achieving the goal of 
this chapter. Other related analysis, such as cost saving calculations are also outside the scope 
of this chapter. 
2.5.1 Inspection tasks carried out by visual inspection 
Visual inspection is one of the oldest and simplest types of inspection carried out in the 
railway industry. The visual inspection of S&Cs is usually carried out on a fortnightly to 
monthly basis. During the inspection, most parts that make up the turnout are visually 
examined to some extent to assess whether or not they are in a good condition. Thus, many 
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developing problems can be identified at an early stage by carrying out this type of 
inspection. If a problem is then identified but the extent and severity cannot be accurately 
quantified, a measured inspection can be scheduled out which will accurately determine the 
severity. 
As defined in this work, this category covers only those inspection tasks which do not imply 
the use of any measurement or inspection devices. 
The required S&C visual inspection tasks are shown in  
APPENDIX C: SWITCH INSPETION REQUIREMENTS and can be summarized as 
follows: 
• condition of switch/stock rails for wear, damage, lipping, RCF, false flange damage 
and residual switch opening; 
• condition of switch rail fittings: stretcher bars, lock stretcher bars, driving rod and 
their fastenings for bent, damage, dents, missing and cracks; 
• condition of crossing, wing rails, check rails and flangeways for wear, batter, lipping 
and cracks; 
• condition of rail fastenings, soleplates, baseplates, blocks, welds, ballast, rail joints, 
and; 
• condition of vegetation, drainage and other visual inspection tasks. 
State-of-the-art solutions 
Currently, all alternative solutions are based on the CCD camera and this is unlikely to 
change.  
The CCD cameras can be used in two ways: as line-side equipment and train-borne, both of 
which are currently under use and further development. 
Another concept of a CCD S&C inspection camera (author’s work) is the use of two fixed, 
wireless, self-powered CCD cameras in the four-foot of a switch aimed towards the tip of the 
switch rails, as shown in Figure 2-13. 
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Figure 2-13 Possible use of CCD cameras for turnout inspection (concept) 
The main drawbacks of such a system are: the challenge of maintaining the cleanliness of the 
CCD cameras, the ability of the cameras to function in such a harsh environment (due to high 
vibration forces and dust/debris), the difficulty in assuring a fixed gauge between the cameras 
and the small coverage of required visual inspection tasks. The latter drawback does not 
necessary apply in the context of condition monitoring of S&Cs. It is also noted that lineside 
equipment has to comply with a series of standards, including the railway group standard 
GC/RT5212 which defines requirements for defining and maintaining clearances. 
In Table 4, a comparison is drawn based on the inspection task coverage of the two broad 
inspection methods, vehicle-based and line-side. 
Table 4 Comparison between vehicle-borne and line-side CCD camera inspection techniques 
 
Vehicle-borne Line-side 
Percentage of 
visual inspection 
tasks that can be 
replaced using the 
CCD camera 
inspection 
technique 
Vehicle-borne CCD 
inspection systems can 
make use of multiple 
cameras installed at 
various angles taking 
close-up pictures. Due to 
this, it is possible to 
remotely carry out a high 
Line-side CCD cameras include any 
cameras that are permanently fixed on or 
near the vicinity of the S&C. Two such 
examples are CCTV cameras and the 
over-head line camera [55]. The 
percentage cannot be reasonably 
estimated as it depends on many factors 
such as the number and position of CCD 
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number of inspection tasks 
using the captured footage. 
The author estimates this 
to be in the range of 80 to 
95% depending on the 
standards of the railway 
infrastructure owner. 
cameras as well as their resolution, zoom 
and tilt abilities. However, due to the fact 
that the CCD cameras are in a fixed 
position relative to the S&C, the 
percentage of inspection tasks that can be 
covered is appreciated to be less than in 
the case of vehicle-borne CCD cameras. 
 
Although vehicle-borne CCD cameras have a greater inspection coverage, line-side CCD 
cameras have other advantages over the vehicle-borne CCD cameras (e.g. ability to inspect 
on-demand) which can make them more suitable in some specific use cases (e.g. for heavily 
used key turnouts) [55]. However, vehicle-borne cameras have better potential for achieving 
the highest inspection coverage. 
It has been concluded that the following visual inspection tasks cannot be carried out using 
vehicle-borne CCD inspection systems: 
• visual identification of cracks around the goose-neck stretcher bar bracket commonly 
used in Britain railways; certain cracks can build up on the bottom of the bracket 
which are therefore not visible unless a mirror is placed underneath; a similar 
limitation applies to the visual inspection of cracks at the bottom of crossings as this 
also requires the use of a small mirror that is placed between the ballast and the foot 
of the crossing where cracks can initiate; 
• inspection of any parts of the turnout which are covered by dirt and which require 
cleaning before a visual inspection can be carried out; 
• inspection of drainage systems, walking path; 
• difficulty in quantifying lipping on the inner faces of the stock and switch rail pair 
(i.e. the faces which meet when the switch is in the closed position); 
• difficulty inspecting the back of the switch rail for scar signs from flange contact or 
signs that it has been strike by wheel flanges, and; 
• difficulty in checking if the closure rail baseplates are pushed down into sleepers and 
if the crossing is sinking. 
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Line-side CCD cameras are also unable to carry out the above mentioned inspection tasks 
(unless CCD cameras specially designed for a specific purpose are to be used). In the case of 
the CCD camera the following adds to the list of uncovered inspection tasks: 
• difficulty in identifying small rail and crossing surface defects (e.g. wear, RCF, head-
checks, wheel burns, lipping, deformed crossing nose, weld defects, etc); 
• difficulty in identifying slide chairs, baseplates, blocks and fishplates if they are bent, 
squashed or cracked; 
• difficulty in assessing if stretcher bars, soleplates and wing rails are bent, distorted, 
squashed or cracked, and; 
• difficulty in inspecting certain bolts (e.g. horizontal bolts in fabricated crossings). 
Conclusion 
Currently, the use of CCD cameras does not offer full inspection coverage against the visual 
inspection tasks as identified in  
APPENDIX C: SWITCH INSPETION REQUIREMENTS. Vehicle-borne CCD cameras 
offer the highest inspection coverage; their limitations in visual inspection can be linked back 
to three main limitations as follows: 
1. the system can not accurately inspect any object which is far from the immediate field 
of view of the cameras (around the four-foot); 
2. the system cannot replace any visual inspection requirement which requires the use of 
mirrors, and; 
3. the system cannot inspect any parts which require cleaning prior to inspection. 
The first limitation is of less importance as the condition of assets and the environment 
sounding the S&C change at a relatively slow rate and thus frequent inspection is not 
required. 
The second limitation can be mitigated through the use of better S&C components. In fact, a 
new type of stretcher bar has recently been developed, the tubular stretcher bar [56], and has 
already been installed on some S&Cs within the NR infrastructure. Due to its complete new 
design, it is expected that it will not suffer from the same failure modes. Similarly, research 
has been carried out to improve crossings design and Hsu reported a recommendation for the 
mitigation of cracks in the foot of crossings [57]. 
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The build up of dirt on S&Cs in GB is related, in part, to the application of grease on switch 
rails. Other sources of dirt include oil from trains, filings from wheel-rail interaction, natural 
debris or even human waste from trains. During a meeting with senior NR personnel 
(January, 2012) it was understood that NR is looking at using better lubricants which have, 
among other properties, a lower viscosity thereby reducing the amount of dirt which builds 
up in and around the rails. 
With the mentioned continuous improvements it is expected that train-borne CCD cameras 
could be able to provide a means of reliable remote inspection for NR’s S&Cs without the 
development of new, innovative inspection solutions. 
Machine vision for automatic inspection of track and turnout components is another field of 
research which has the ability to remove the need for a human to manually inspect the 
footage. Although this it is outside the scope of this research, it is worth mentioning that it is 
gaining interest in the context of vehicle-borne CCD cameras [58]. 
2.5.2 Shape, size, gauge and position of rails and crossing shape 
This inspection category applies to most inspection tasks that require or relate to dimensional 
measurements of the inspected components. The tasks are grouped into two main categories: 
1. eight inspection tasks, position related: track gauge, check gauge, free wheel passage, 
flangeway gap, switch toe opening, residual switch opening, position of switch toes 
and switch rail hogging, and; 
2. five and four inspection tasks for switches, respectively crossings, profile related: 
TGP8 gauge, Gauge 1, Gauge 2, NR4, Switch Rail Radius Gauge, side wear at the 
crossing nose, batter at the rail knuckle, relative top wear between crossing nose and 
wing rail and top wear along the crossing nose. 
Most measurement solutions can be classified into two groups: contact-based solutions and 
contactless solutions. Contact-based solutions (e.g. MiniProf®, manual gauges) are generally 
slow to use and are carried out manually on site. Optical measurement solutions are used 
where speed is an important factor (e.g. SIM, RILA). However, there are two issues that need 
to be addressed. 
The first one, which has already been mentioned, is the build-up of grease and dirt. It is 
estimated that dirt and grease can compromise the accuracy of up to a third of the required 
measurements. The role of lubricants on curved rails has been long proven and research 
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continues to look at how to further reduce wear rates using lubricants [59,60]. It is also 
known that lubrication of the switch rail can mitigate the risk of derailment especially on 
recently ground switch rails [11]. Thus, it is very unlikely that NR will cease to lubricate their 
switches. However, as already mentioned NR is looking at improving S&C lubricants. Thus 
the improvement of lubricants could have a significant role in the remote inspection of 
physical dimensions and position of rails and crossings. 
It is also worth mentioning that during a meeting with senior Strukton personnel (September, 
2012), it was been understood that ProRail does not use lubricants on their S&Cs despite the 
proven benefits of switch rail lubrication. 
The second issue is the measurement of switch rail hogging. This measurement is manually 
carried out by inserting a stepped gauge between the foot of the switch rail and the slide 
chair. Currently there is no contactless solution for the measurement of this dimension, 
although it is very important, as 3 out the 5 profile switch inspections cannot be accurately 
carried out without the correct measurement of switch rail hogging. Furthermore, the three 
tasks (TGP8 gauge, Gauge 1 and Gauge 2) are part of the inspection standard for assessing 
the derailment risk at S&Cs [15]. 
Although the ASIV vehicle is advertised to be able to carry out certain measurements as 
specified in the NR/L2/TRK/0053 there is no mention of it being able to measure the 
mandatory switch rail hogging [47,61]. 
Optical measurement systems cannot be used to measure switch rail hogging where the slide 
chair is heavily greased. 
 
Figure 2-14 Voestalpine switch rollers (left); a heavy lubricated slidechair (right) 
left picture Courtesy and Copyright Voestalpine 
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As shown in Figure 2-14, the optical measurement would be affected by the build-up of dirt 
and grease on the slide chair. Furthermore, such lubricants can reflect the laser beam of 
triangulation lasers making it impossible to achieve any measurements at all. However, the 
solution can come from improved S&C components as certain S&Cs use switch rollers 
reducing the need for lubricants and maintenance while still maintaining low friction (left 
image in Figure 2-14). In such cases it is possible to measure switch rail hogging using 
optical measurements by measuring the height difference between the top surface of the slide 
chair and the top surface of the switch rail. Certainly, any tolerance within the thickness of 
the rail foot equally affects the measurement (in GB switch rail hogging is currently 
measured with a resolution of 1 mm). 
Conclusion 
In order to move towards an inspection free S&C, it is important that switch rail lubricants 
are reviewed in order to implement lubricants that do not adhere to dirt and dust and have 
negligible thickness. Furthermore, due to the difficulty in automatically measuring switch rail 
hogging, slide chair lubricants should also be reviewed. A possible alternative could be 
interflon products, which are advertised as being effective on switch rail slide chairs [62]. In 
the long term, it is expected that NR will also use improved S&C components such as the 
switch rail roller and thus the automatic measurement of switch rail hogging under difficult 
conditions would not be necessary. 
2.5.3 Tightness checks 
Current NR inspection standards require that certain torque prevailing nuts and hardlock nuts, 
as shown in Figure 2-15, within S&C assemblies are periodically checked to ensure they are 
tightened to the correct torque. This is achieved by using a calibrated 200 Nm wrench. The 
importance of this inspection has already been proven by the consequences of at least two 
fatal rail accidents [8,9] in which the loosening of bolts in turnouts played a significant role. 
This inspection topic had also been recently considered in the context of point machine 
condition monitoring, where certain parameters (current and voltage actuator, driving rod 
force and driving rod displacement) are used to collect data and diagnose the condition of the 
S&C [42,51]. 
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Figure 2-15 Inspected nuts on a GB NR turnout 
With the use of train-borne CCD cameras, the tension of Smartbolts® bolts can be remotely 
inspected without the need for physical access to S&Cs. However, there are three drawbacks 
to using these bolts on a railway S&C: 
1. certain components within the turnout require the installation of bolts in specific ways 
that do not permit the torque indicator to be visible (e.g. bolts in the switch rail) and 
therefore the torque’s bolt cannot be inspected; this issue may be resolved if the 
manufacturer could produce bolts with the indicator on the thread end; 
2. railway S&C are exposed to the build-up of dirt; therefore there is a significant risk of 
the tension indicator being covered by dirt and therefore not allowing proper remote 
inspection; this condition is particularly dangerous due to the bolt generating a false 
negative situation if image processing is used to automatically identify the red sports, 
and; 
3. the partial loss of torque may not be identifiable, as the indicator changes colour 
proportionally to torque and not abruptly. 
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The Tracksure® locking mechanism provides an alternative which has had been proven 
within various industries including the railway industry. However, in the context of a self-
inspection S&C, the question of liability arises. As the bolts would not be manually inspected 
on a periodic basis, it must be establish whether or not Tracksure® would take liability for 
losses and injuries caused as a result of loosening bolts. If Tracksure® cannot accept such a 
liability then their solution is not a true fit-and-forget solution and thus manual inspection 
would still be required. 
Smart Component Technologies Limited could provide the railway industry a true fit-and-
forget bolt monitoring device if an energy harvester could be fitted to their smart washers. 
The liability issue does not stand up here as the device can be designed to never fail in a false 
negative situation. 
The RotaBolt-TD can also provide a solution for railway S&Cs, however due to the expected 
life of S&Cs it is expected that its battery should be at least 10 years. Thus, as S&Cs 
components are redesigned for greater reliability and a longer life it is expected that the life 
of S&Cs could extend further. 
Conclusion 
Electronic joint monitoring devices have a distinct advantage in comparison to mechanical 
joints (e.g. Tracksure®) and that is the ability to eliminate any on-site inspection while 
assuring that no false negatives will be experienced. Thus, as technology advances at such a 
fast rate, it is expected that an increasing number of safety-critical mechanical joints will be 
monitored electronically in the railway industry, as well as in other industries (e.g. aerospace, 
gas, etc). 
2.5.4 Cracks in rails and the crossing 
Cracks in the rails are a common problem to all railways and much research has been done to 
improve detection and sizing methods. Rail cracks develop under various failure modes such 
as rolling contact fatigue, head check, fish-bolt hole cracking, etc. Thus, they can appear in 
various locations of the rail and can develop into different shapes and sizes, all of which have 
to be reliably detected to assure safety. Furthermore, rail turnout components have non-
standard shapes (shapes which are considerably different compared to a rail profile) which 
make them more difficult to inspect. S&Cs manufactured from austenitic manganese steel 
(AMS) pose an even greater challenge as many non destructive testing (NDT) techniques do 
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not work, at least not reliably enough, on this type of material. Currently, accurate NDT 
testing of S&Cs is achieved in most European countries by using hand held equipment [7]. 
In a review paper on state-of-the-art and future developments in NDT, Papaelias et al. [63] 
concluded that significant research is needed to achieve high-speed rail inspection (without 
even considering the specific challenges posed by S&Cs nor AMS components) and it is 
possible that this will come about by the integration of different techniques which can 
complement their deficiencies. Thus, even though NDT techniques have come a long way, it 
is needless to say that extensive research is required to improve current techniques and/or 
develop new ones in order to reliably inspect S&C using rail vehicles. The inspection of 
cracks within S&Cs without the use of manual equipment or trolleys currently seems 
unachievable, not now and not within the next few decades. 
2.5.5 Geometry measurements 
The main track geometry parameters which are used to assess its condition are: gauge, cant, 
twist, levelling (for each rail) and alignment (for each rail). Measurement devices are 
generally in the form of manual gauges, trolleys, robots and measurement cars (or wagons). 
Manual gauges have the advantage that they are generally quick to use on S&Cs whilst 
trolleys and robots provide better data in terms of accuracy and measurement frequency. 
However, measurement trains are the single solution which can provide geometry 
measurements without requiring a maintenance team to visit the S&C. Measurement train 
cars have various complexities. The inferior end of the range can use inertial measurement 
units (IMU) mounted on in-service passenger trains to measure acceleration and jerk values 
and generate an alert if they are too high [7]. Thus, they are instrumented trains rather than 
measurement trains as they do not provide accurate measurements of any of the five 
mentioned geometry parameters. At the other end of the range the rail industry makes use of 
dedicated measurement trains which travel at line speeds and accurately measure track 
geometry together with other parameters (e.g. catenary related). However, these trains are 
expensive to run, difficult to schedule and generally measure important mainlines leaving out 
the majority of S&Cs in stations. 
Measurement systems such as the SIM can be used to successfully measure S&C geometry 
around large stations. Thus, the use of RILA systems and other similar measurement 
equipment mounted on in-service trains can provide an efficient means of measuring the 
geometry of S&Cs which are located at various locations within the railway network. 
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With the exception of dirt and grease on the gauge face of switch rails, which can slightly 
influence the measurements, there is no real challenge to geometry inspection of S&Cs using 
in-service trains/wagons. 
2.5.6 Point machine inspection 
Point machine inspections  generally require cover removal/dismounting to allow access to 
various components such as the actuator and sensors and are classified separately for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the inspection requirements of point machines are highly dependent on 
the manufacturer and show a great diversity of tasks (e.g., visual inspection, measured 
inspection and even maintenance tasks such as adding grease/oil are documented as being 
part of the inspection process). Thus, the challenges of automating point machine inspection 
tasks are far greater than the benefit that could be gained. Secondly, many point machines 
require a functional test to be carried out. This is neither a visual or instrumented inspection 
as it requires the point machine to be thrown in its two possible states, extended and retracted. 
Depending on the manufacturer and the type of machine, the design of railway point 
machines varies greatly, generally due to the various types of actuators, different sensors used 
and the overall mechanical design. The equipment manufacturer sets out the maintenance 
regime of the point machine, which includes periodic inspection tasks. Currently, there are no 
real alternatives to manually carrying out the required inspection tasks and for the following 
reasons, the development and implementation of remote inspection is most likely to be 
counter-productive: 
• diversity is great, therefore, an inspection solution for one point machine will most 
likely not work on a different point machine as they require bespoke inspection tasks 
to be carried out; 
• generally point machine inspection requires a large variety of inspection tasks; some 
of them are difficult to automate (e.g. checking if a pin is still in a shaft; checking the 
length of the carbon brushes in electrical motors) and others even require proactive 
maintenance actions (e.g. periodic lubrication); 
• newer point machines are being built for reliability with minimum maintenance 
requirements at the heart of design specifications. 
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Therefore the author believes that the single solution feasible towards a “self-inspecting” 
turnout is the development and use of point machines with no or minimal inspection 
requirements. 
 
Figure 2-16 HW2000 point machine (left); Bombardier EBI point machine (centre); HPSS 
point machine (right) 
left: Courtesy and Creative Commons Copyright McKenna; centre: Courtesy and Copyright 
Bombardier; right: Courtesy and Copyright Claverham 
The most commonly used point machine in UK is the HW 2000 and it requires various types 
of periodic inspections. The most often periodic inspection is carried out on a fortnightly to 
monthly basis and it is known as a face point lock test. 
The Bombardier EBI is a built in sleeper point machine that is widely used throughout the 
Netherlands. This machine does not require a periodic face point lock test and, as stated in its 
user manual [64] and also confirmed by senior Strukton personnel (September, 2012), the 
most frequent inspection is on a yearly basis. However, it must be mentioned that due to the 
location of the point machine, it is generally not possible to carry out any inspection or 
maintenance during the normal running of trains (unlike line-side point machines). 
The High Performance Switch System (HPSS) [65] was designed for reliability. As its 
brochure states “Designed for 25 year service life, with zero scheduled maintenance”, it was 
designed with the aim of eliminating both point machine maintenance and timetable 
disruptions. However, during a discussion with Philip Neep, NR (June, 2012), it was asserted 
that there are various failure modes affecting the HPSS machine. One such example is the 
failure of LVDT sensors. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, with the development of newer point machines it is possible to move towards 
an inspection-free switch and this is more likely to provide an effective and efficient 
maintenance regime. Condition monitoring of point machines can help to increase the 
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efficiency of S&C maintenance but it cannot replace any required S&C inspection as stated in 
the GB railway inspection standards. 
Final conclusions 
The improvement of lubricants used for both the switch rail and slide chair should in future 
allow the use of optical systems for automatic inspection. As other S&C parts such as slide 
chair rollers, tubular stretcher bars, new crossing design, point machine, instrumented bolts, 
etc are further improved and introduced to the British railway industry the automatic/remote 
inspection of S&C becomes feasible, other than the inspection of cracks within the rails and 
crossing which is unlikely to be solved in the next few decades. 
Various condition monitoring systems such as the VAE Roadmaster, POSS and other 
condition monitoring research carried out on point machines was found to not cover any 
inspection requirement as specified in the NR S&C inspection standards. Therefore, although 
these systems can be beneficial, they cannot be used to replace current inspection tasks. 
It is possible that the reason for this is the fact that the S&C inspection standards were written 
and improved before the development of modern condition monitoring equipment and thus 
they were not written with the use of condition monitoring in mind. Furthermore, even if the 
S&C inspection standards are rewritten (this would be very costly partly due to the 
development of safety cases that need to support the replacement of old inspection tasks with 
condition monitoring techniques that can provide at least the same level of safety) it is clear 
that the current S&C inspection tasks have the ability of providing more detailed information 
regarding the health of S&C through the use of visual and measured inspection when 
compared with various CM techniques. 
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3 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
3.1 Problem introduction 
Network Rail, the infrastructure manager for most of Great Britain’s railways, uses a set of 
two inspection standards to assess the profile condition of S&C. The main standards which 
set out procedures for assessing the profile of the S&C are: NR/L2/TRK/0053 – Inspection 
and repair to reduce the risk of derailment at switches [15] and NR/L2/TRK/1054 – 
Inspection, maintenance and repair procedures for cast, welded and fabricated crossings in 
the track [16]. 
NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard 
The purpose of the NR/L2/TRK/0053 standard is to provide an inspection method for 
identifying S&Cs that present a derailment hazard. According to Silmon and Roberts, a 
hazard is anything that can cause harm [66]. The NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard 
defines five derailment hazards. S&Cs are inspected against each derailment hazard which is 
applicable to the inspected S&C (not all derailment hazards are applicable to all S&Cs). The 
inspection against each derailment hazard is carried out using one or several manual gauges. 
The standard specifies a total of six manual gauges which are used to inspect S&Cs: Gauge 1, 
Gauge 2, TGP8, Switch rail radius gauge, NR4 sidewear gauge, and stepped gauge. If no 
derailment hazards are identified, the S&C is deemed safe for rail traffic. The stepped gauge 
is used to measure the switch rail hogging. The amount of hogging is used to compensate for 
the measurement of TGP8, Gauge 1 and Gauge 2. The picture below shows one of the five 
manual gauges used to inspect the switch rails for derailment hazards, the TGP8 gauge. 
In a railway accident report published by RAIB it was documented that, after the accident,  
most workers who had been interviewed had an adverse opinion regarding the use of the 
TGP8 gauge [12]. Workers found it difficult to use and some of them adopted their own 
method of using the gauge [12]. There are derailments which are known to have occurred as a 
result of incorrect usage of the TGP8 gauge [11,12]. Both the RAIB and Office of Rail 
Regulation (ORR) recommended that NR should improve the inspection method for 
measuring the contact angle (currently being carried out using the TGP8 gauge) [12,67]. 
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Figure 3-1 NR TGP8 manual gauge applied on a switch 
Courtesy and Copyright Network Rail 
In the last 10 years there have been a number of situations where S&Cs failed to comply with 
the NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard, which has led to a derailment. These inspections 
are grouped into five chapters, each of them titled “derailment hazard 1” to “derailment 
hazard 5”. The procedure of checking whether or not a derailment hazard exists can have one 
or several inspection tasks. Table 5 shows four derailment events and the derailment hazards 
(abbreviated DH1 to DH5) that were identified after the derailment had occurred. Each 
derailment hazard is discussed in detail in sections 5.1.3 to 5.1.7. 
Table 5 S&C faults leading to a derailment 
Location and date of 
derailment 
Identified 
derailment hazard 
London 
11 
September 
2006 [10] 
London 
24 October 
2006 [10] 
Glasgow 
3 September 
2007 [11] 
Edinburgh 
27 July 
2011 [12] 
DH1 X X  X 
DH2 X X X X 
DH3     
DH4     
DH5  X   
 
The RAIB’s investigation into the derailment in Edinburgh concluded that the train could 
have derailed on a section where the switch was compliant with the NR/L2/TRK/0053 
standard [12]. This is because the switch passed the TGP8 profile, which simulates a new P8 
profile, but failed when tested against a compliant worn P8 profile [12]. The same report 
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mentioned that “There is an apparent risk of a ramp being created where a switch rail that is 
failing gauge 2 in the first metre increases in height and is introduced between the stock rail 
and wheel flange from below (...)” [12]. Both these limitations can be overcome by 
introducing new inspection techniques. 
During a meeting with senior NR personnel (January, 2012) it was reinforced that the S&C 
inspection procedure to protect against derailment hazards is susceptible to human errors and 
thus a new or improved inspection method should be developed. Moreover, it was stated that 
the lack of advice and information received by the S&C maintenance team decreases the 
effectiveness of the weld and grind repair on switch rails and that due to this switch rails can 
be left in a worse condition after repair. This is indeed what happened in 2007 [11] when 
workers introduced a “derailment hazard 2” while repairing “derailment hazard 1”. After the 
derailment in Edinburgh, 2011, RAIB concluded that the repair attempt on the S&C was 
unfeasible as the switch was beyond repair. A new or improved inspection method can help 
workers to better scope the work and thus improve the effectiveness and quality of the repair 
process. 
NR/L2/TRK/1054 inspection standard 
The purpose of the NR/L2/TRK/1054 standard is to identify and quantify the wear and batter 
on the profile of railway crossings. The standard specifies the use of a one-metre (or two-
metre for high speed crossings) straight edge used in conjunction with a stepped gauge. The 
inspection is carried out by placing the straight edge in seven different locations on the 
crossing while using a stepped gauge to measure the gap between the two. 
The measurement resolution is generally 1 mm. Figure 3-2 shows a representation of such a 
measurement in which two straight edges are used. The geometry of the profile is not 
considered to be a safety-critical issue as it is unlikely to derail a train on its own. However, 
the shape of the crossing has a direct influence over the dynamic forces that occur in the 
crossing due to the passage of trains. Crossings with poor profile are more susceptible to 
damage caused by running trains. This is supported by recent research that looks at 
optimizing the crossing profile [68]. Thus, the profile of railway crossings is important for the 
reduction of their life cycle cost (LCC). 
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Figure 3-2 Representation of a crossing inspection task as defined in NR/L2/TRK/1054 
Courtesy and Copyright Network Rail 
During a meeting with senior NR personnel (January, 2012) it was asserted that NR was 
seeking to have better management over the profile of crossings as current crossing profile 
inspection is affected by human errors and this reduces the effectiveness of the whole 
maintenance process. 
In a meeting with senior Deutsche Bahn (DB) personnel (June, 2012), it was stated that the 
reduced performance of some crossings within the DB railway network had been due to more 
than half of the newly installed crossings not complying with design profile specifications. 
3.2 Requirements analysis 
This section sets the requirements for a system which can address the above mentioned 
maintenance issues. The requirements are largely dictated by NR, which was actively 
involved in this step of the research. 
The top-level requirement is defined as follows: A system shall be able to inspect the switch 
against the NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard and the crossing profile against the 
NR/L2/TRK/1054 inspection standard. This requirement is further refined through several 
additional requirements: 
1. Replication of inspection requirements: The system must be able to replicate the 
required inspection tasks just as if they would be carried out manually but without any 
human error. This will help the validation process for use on NR infrastructure. 
2. No black box approach: The system must be transparent in the inspection method and 
the way it arrives at the final result. This will help the validation process for use on 
NR infrastructure. 
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3. Improved accuracy: The accuracy of the system must be better than the current 
accuracy of the manual inspection methods. For most inspection tasks the accuracy of 
the current inspection it is very difficult to establish. Because (1) the current 
inspection standard and gauge specifications (e.g. TGP8 gauge, Gauge 1, Gauge 2, 
Switch rail radius gauge and straight edge for crossing inspection) do not specify any 
inspection accuracy and (2) the loss of accuracy due to human errors is also 
undocumented, it is very difficult to accurately and objectively define the accuracy of 
current manual inspection. However, efforts have been made to identify the accuracy 
limitations of current manual inspections and research an improved alternative. 
4. Acceptable price: The solution should not be overly expensive (<£100,000). 
5. Availability: The solution should be available and ready to use with minimal/no 
overhead preparations (e.g. no scheduling of measurement trains). 
6. Easy to use and immediate results: The solution should not require more than one or 
two personnel and should not need significant time to carry out an inspection 
(< 10 min). 
By defining a set of clear system requirements at an early stage, the direction of the research 
is steered towards a well defined target instead of an ambiguous and changing target making 
the research process more effective and efficient. This is also a key aspect of systems 
engineering [69]. 
3.3 Inspection of S&Cs 
The idea of surveying plain rail in order to measure and monitor its parameters is not new and 
there are many commercially available laser-based systems some of which are installed on 
dedicated measurement trains (e.g. NMT), others on passenger trains, some on rail robots 
(e.g. FELIX) and trolleys and others on hand held devices (e.g. Calipri). While much research 
and development has been focused on plain line measurements, little has been done on S&Cs. 
The SIM measurement wagon manufactured by Eurailscout [43] was developed mainly with 
the aim of measuring the geometry of S&Cs and for off-line visual inspections. The system 
currently does not carry out a comprehensive set of measurements as defined in section 2.5.2. 
The RILA system has similar capabilities as the Eurailscout system, excluding visual 
inspection. 
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The ASIV system, which is a vehicle based system, was developed by Zarembski et al. 
[47,61,70] and focuses on the measurement of wear on the switch rail and stock rail as well 
as potential derailment hazards. The system has been developed to automatically inspect 
S&Cs against certain derailment hazards, but does not carry out a complete S&C inspection 
against derailment hazards as specified in the NR/L2/TRK/0053 standard. Little is available 
in the public domain regarding the methods used by the ASIV system or the system’s 
accuracy and precision. 
The FELIX S&C inspection robot [49] was designed to carry out many important S&C 
inspections within the area of geometry measurements and rail shape and position 
measurements. However, the system does not currently assess S&Cs in accordance with the 
NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard. As the system weighs approximately 150 kg, it can 
only be considered to be semi-portable. The system is designed so that it can be carried in 
pieces (the heaviest part is 47 kg), and then assembled on site. 
The CALIPRI measurement system from NextSense is a portable device that can acquire the 
profile of rails and crossings within S&Cs and carry out various measurements. The fact that 
the system is a hand-held device constrains the type of inspections that can be achieved. 
Inspections requiring the opposite rail as reference (such as the TGP8 gauge) cannot be 
carried out with the same accuracy as trolley-based or vehicle-based solutions. Measurements 
over a large longitudinal area (such as the one-metre edge measurement on crossings) can not 
be carried out. 
3.4 Optical displacement measurement systems 
The automatic assessment of S&C in accordance with the NR/L2/TRK/0053 and 
NR/L2/TRK/1054 standards requires the measurement of the physical shape and size of rails 
and crossings in at least two dimensions. There are a vast number of technological methods 
that can be used to survey objects; these can be classified into contact and non-contact 
methods. 
Contact methods are generally slow to use, especially when high point density is required. 
Non-contact methods can be used to rapidly survey an object and some of the most important 
optical methods are: optical triangulation, time of flight and modulated light, structured light 
and conoscopic holography. 
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Survey techniques generally differ in accuracy and measurement range. The optical 
triangulation method is generally used to acquire data at accuracies between 5 µm 
and 1000 µm and measurement ranges between 5 mm and 1000 mm. This makes it a 
preferred method for many railway inspection and condition monitoring applications as most 
other methods have either poorer accuracy or a smaller measurement range. 
Ji et al. present the principle of optical triangulation in displacement measurement devices 
[44]. The acquired data from triangulation laser scanners consists of point clouds. A point 
cloud is a collection of geometric points which represent samples taken from the surface of 
the surveyed object. These points can be extrapolated to reconstruct an approximate shape of 
the surveyed object. 
3.5 Data registration and geometry measurements 
Triangulation laser scanners can emit a single spot of light (point lasers), in which case a 
single distance measurement is achieved between the laser and a point on the target surface 
(one dimensional measurement). When a stripe of light is emitted (line lasers), multiple 
coplanar measurements can be achieved (two dimensional measurements). Many approaches 
have been developed to achieve three dimensional measurements using a single triangulation 
laser (e.g. using mirrors to direct the radiance in different directions or by generating multiple 
stripes) [71], however, they cannot be used to survey large areas (> 1 m) as this would exceed 
the maximum measurement range and furthermore certain areas would not be measurable due 
to shadowing of the laser light. 
As the measurements obtained from line lasers are referenced to an internal coordinate 
system (i.e. relative to the laser), any changes in the position or orientation of the laser (i.e. 
pose in computer vision and robotics) become measurement errors unless they are correctly 
managed. The process of identifying and applying the required linear translation to each 
dataset in order to compensate for the pose of the laser scanner is known as data registration 
[71]. 
Common methods for data registration of 2D point clouds retrieved from triangulation lasers 
include: constraining the pose of the laser to a known value, measuring the pose using various 
sensors, and measuring overlapping areas of the surveyed object. 
When a line laser is used on a rail trolley, then the task of pose estimation of the laser is very 
similar to the task of measuring track geometry. Track geometry measurement trolleys 
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commonly use various sensors such as: global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), inertial 
navigation systems (INS), inclination sensors, odometers, chord lasers, high-speed cameras 
(CCD, CMOS), prisms (subsidiary to optical total stations) and optical total stations in order 
to measure the geometry of railway tracks [72]. 
In this research, data registration has been accomplished using the following methods: 
constrained translation using wheel clamp, measurement of distance using an odometer, 
scanning overlapping datasets and inertial measurement from a gyroscope; this is further 
discussed in section 4.3. 
3.6 Point cloud filtering 
Due to laser measurement errors, the acquired point cloud data is rarely perfect and it can be 
expressed as the sum of ideal data and measurement errors. As a result the accuracy of any 
calculations executed on the measured point cloud data is affected. Measurement errors 
generally result in noisy point cloud data, and thus smoothing algorithms are used to improve 
their quality. Although the intent is to completely remove the measurement errors whilst not 
affecting the ideal data, this is rarely achievable and most often the errors will be either 
undercompensated or overcompensated resulting in a final data which is different from the 
ideal data. 
Certain smoothing algorithms can be run directly in various software packages or by using 
the open-source PCL library [73] available for both commercial and research use. The PCL 
library contains various algorithms such as the Fast Bilateral Filter or Mesh Smoothing 
Laplacian VTK which can be used to smooth point cloud data. 
Smoothing algorithms are often unable to eliminate all measurement errors and they can 
undesirably smooth out features of the surveyed object. As a result, much research has been 
undertaken to overcome undesirable smoothing by developing feature preserving smoothing 
algorithms. The goal of these algorithms is to smooth out the point cloud data while 
preserving the inherent features of the surveyed object (e.g. sharp corners). However, feature 
preserving algorithms generally work when a priori assumptions can be drawn upon the 
surveyed object. As an example, Volodine [74] proposed several variants of a point cloud 
feature preserving smoothing algorithm, namely (), () and	(). The ()variant works 
well for objects with straight edges and sharp corners and () works well for objects which 
do not have well defined edges and corners. Depending on the surveyed object, the 
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appropriate method should be used. As two different (although very similar) objects, when 
surveyed can lead to the same point cloud data, the problem of point cloud smoothing without 
any a priori knowledge becomes apparent. 
In order to achieve the best results, information regarding the surveyed object and 
information regarding the measurement errors can be used optimise the smoothing algorithm. 
As a simple example, if the surveyed object is known to be a straight and smooth surface and 
the measurement errors are known to follow a normal distribution with a null average error, 
then the use of a linear regression technique such as linear least squares fitting is expected to 
provide better results than general purpose smoothing algorithms. If new or different 
information regarding the surveyed object or measurement errors are available (e.g. surveyed 
object is non-linear, the point cloud has many outliers, the mean error is -1, etc) then the 
filtering technique can be refined or even completely replaced by a different one in order to 
achieve better results. Thus, often in point could filtering, there is no one-size-fits-all 
technique that can be used to achieve the best results. 
As convex hull is an important geometrical calculation that is often used in Chapter 5, it is 
briefly introduced here. There are endless definitions for convex hull and the following was 
chosen as it is more easily understood: “The convex hull of a finite set of points 	 in the 
plane is the enclosing convex polygon 
 with smallest area” [75]. 
 
Figure 3-3 The convex hull of a set of random points 
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Applying the definition on a set of 20 random points in a 2D space, as shown in Figure 3-3, 
the convex hull is the polygon defined by the following set of 
points:	{, , , , , , , , }. 
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4 DEVELOPMENT OF A LASER BASED TROLLEY FOR 
THE MEASUREMENT OF RAIL PROFILES IN S&Cs 
In order to achieve the objectives of the second stage of the research as set out in section 1.4, 
a laser based trolley was developed to measure the profile of the rails through S&Cs. The rail 
profile of several S&Cs was measured and the data was then used in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
Section 4.1 explains the notations used throughout this and the following chapters. Section 
4.2 identifies the required accuracy of the measured rail profiles. Section 4.3 describes the 
adopted design and how the accuracy requirements are being met. Finally, section 4.4 briefly 
describes the process of acquiring the rail profiles. 
4.1 Notations 
For clarity, this section describes a number of notations that are often used in chapters 4, 5, 
and 6. Figure 4-1 shows most notations that refers to rails or parts of a rail. 
 
Figure 4-1 Rail notations 
Opposite rail always refers to the rail opposite the one being inspected. Gauge points and 
field points are points on the gauge side and field side of the rails and crossing at a height of 
14 mm below the top of the rail or crossing (or as close as possible). Top is the highest point 
in a 2D rail or crossing profile. Switch toe refers to the very beginning of the switch rail 
(visible in Figure 4-2). 
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The inspection of switches against derailment hazards generally requires the inspection of 
two dimensional, transversal sections of the rails. When considering the transversal sections 
of the rail, a preference was given to use a XOY notation for the coordinate system (most 
common notation used to describe a plane in a two dimensional space) instead of a XOZ 
coordinate system. For this reason the Z axis became along the length of the rail instead of 
being the vertical axis. The adopted coordinate system is shown in Figure 4-2. The X and Y 
axes are also referred to as the horizontal axis, and vertical axis respectively. 
 
Figure 4-2 Naming of Cartesian axis used throughout this work 
Translations are expressed as a column vector: , where  ,  and  expresses the 
translation, in millimetres, along each of the three axes shown in Figure 4-2. Where two 
dimensional translations are expressed,  is omitted from the vector. 
Unless otherwise specified, all angles are referenced to the horizontal axis (X axis). 
4.2 Accuracy requirements for point cloud data 
4.2.1 Introduction 
This section aims to identify the necessary accuracy of the point cloud data. 
The NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard requires the inspection of switch rails and stock 
rails in various locations along the length of the switch. Each inspection is carried out on the 
transversal profile of one or both of the two rails. Figure 4-1 shows an example of transversal 
profile within a switch. In order to carry out a complete inspection in a given location along 
the switch, the following areas must be measured: field side, top area and gauge corner of the 
stock rail, and top area and gauge side of the switch rail. 
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Figure 4-3 Crossing profile inspection along the centre of the crossing as defined in 
NR/L2/TRK/1054 
Courtesy and Copyright Network Rail 
 
 
Figure 4-4 The six longitudinal paths of crossing inspection as defined in NR/L2/TRK1054 
Courtesy and Copyright Network Rail 
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The NR/L2/TRK/1054 inspection standard requires the inspection of rails and crossings 
along seven paths, one central to the crossing and six longitudinal to the rails, as shown in 
Figure 4-3, and Figure 4-4 respectively. As a conclusion, both transversal profiles (for 
inspection of switches) and longitudinal profiles (for inspection of crossings) must be 
acquired. In this work, transversal profiles (XOY) were acquired by using a two 2D laser 
scanners positioned as shown in Figure 4-5. Longitudinal profiles were achieved by scanning 
consecutive 2D transversal profiles, combining them to create a 3D model of the inspected 
S&C, and then extracting the required 2D longitudinal profile from the 3D model. The 
measurement of consecutive 2D transversal profile (to obtain a 3D model) was achieved by 
designing an S&C inspection trolley which moved the lasers along the length of the S&C. 
 
Figure 4-5 Laser scanners setup for the inspection of a pair of switch rail and stock rail 
As the accuracy of 3D model is highly dependent on the accuracy of the individual 2D 
profiles, the accuracy requirements of the 2D profiles was calculated first. Then, the accuracy 
requirements of the 3D model was calculated which is dependent on the accuracy of the 2D 
profiles and other accuracies. 
4.2.2 Accuracy requirements for inspection of 2D profiles within switches and crossings 
The NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard specifies the use of six manual gauges: Gauge 1, 
Gauge 2, TGP8, NR4, Switch rail radius gauge and Stepped gauge. Their use is briefly 
explained below, where necessary. Issues relating to correct usage of the gauges and their 
possible limitations are discussed in sections 5.1.3 to 5.1.7. The accuracy requirements were 
analysed for each inspection gauge. 
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Gauge 1 and Gauge 2 inspection 
The inspections using Gauge 1 and Gauge 2 assess whether or not the relative height 
difference between the top of the stock rail and the top of the switch rail is less than 15 mm or 
more than 19 mm respectively. As the measurement depends on the visual acuity of the 
inspector it has been considered that a measurement error of up to 0.5 mm is acceptable. 
TGP8 gauge inspection 
The TGP8 gauge is used to identify whether or not the lowest contact point between the train 
wheel and the switch rail is above 60 degrees (measured to the horizontal). Figure 4-6 shows 
an example of a TGP8 inspection. For the inspection to pass there must not be any contact 
between the TGP8 gauge and the rail below the white line. 
 
Figure 4-6 Example of TGP8 measurement using a white paper 
Because it can be very difficult to determine if there is any contact below the white line, some 
personal use a white piece of paper which they push between the rail and the TGP8 gauge. 
This is also the practice that has been used for all TGP8 inspections throughout this work. 
Figure 4-7 shows two computerized TGP8 measurements in the form of images. 
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Figure 4-7 Two TGP8 measurements; top: 67.99 degrees, bottom: 65.72 degrees (to scale) 
The measurements were carried out with the following considerations: a) the point cloud data 
was converted to an image with a resolution of 0.1 mm per pixel, and b) a contact condition 
was considered if the horizontal distance between the two parts was no more than a pixel 
(equivalent to 0.1 mm, to account for the thickness of the white paper). 
Although the images are very similar, the lowest contact points are made at slightly different 
angles: 67.99 degrees and 65.75 degrees. 
The errors involved in measuring the TGP8 contact angle are: laser measurement error, 
quantization error of the rail profile, quantization error of the TGP8 gauge and errors in the 
transformation matrix that converts the axis of origin of the laser into the axis of origin of the 
track. The latter two types of errors are considered constant throughout the process of 
acquiring the two measurements. Thus, the difference between the two results is attributed to 
the former two types of errors. The maximum quantization error is +/-50 µm on each of the 
two axes. The maximum laser measurement errors have been estimated at +/-150 µm by 
consulting the sensor acceptance report and taking into account the average distance at which 
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the measurements were taken (errors increase as distance to target increases). Thus the 
maximum measurement errors have been estimated at +/-200 µm. 
In conclusion, small measurement and quantization errors of up to +/-200 µm lead to an error 
of 2.25 degrees when measuring the lowest contact angle between the TGP8 gauge and rail. 
 
Figure 4-8 Close-up of the two TGP8 measurements; left: 67.99 degrees, right: 
65.75 degrees (equal scale on both axes) 
Figure 4-8 shows a close up of the two images. Random measurement errors can decrease the 
conformity between the two shapes which in turn leads to smaller contact areas. Smaller 
contact areas generally lead to the measurement of higher TGP8 contact angles. It is 
concluded that the result of this measurement is highly dependable on the conformity 
between the TGP8 gauge and stock and switch rail pair. This is particularly important as the 
measurement system could generate a false negative (e.g. a pass measurement of 61 degrees 
when the result should be a fail of 59 degrees). 
As a result, it was concluded that the measurement error for the calculation of the TGP8 
contact angle should ideally be no more than ±0.1 mm. 
NR4 sidewear inspection 
The NR4 gauge was designed to measure the sidewear on stock rails. As shown in Figure 4-9, 
the measurement process requires that the gauge is in contact with the rail in three locations: 
field side, for alignment, and the gauge corner and top, for measurement. If accidentally 
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reversed (i.e. using the gauge side for alignment), the gauge would lead to erroneous 
measurements. The gauge has two parts, one for measuring rail heads of 72 mm, which can 
be identified by the presence of two small holes, and one for rail heads of 70 mm, which can 
be identified by the absence of the two holes. Hence, the picture shows the measurement of a 
rail head with a width of 70 mm. In essence, the gauge measures the sidewear by comparing 
the height loss of the gauge corner relative to the top of the rail. The difference is measured 
using a stepped gauge with increments of 0.78 mm. The stepped gauge is marked with 
numbers from 0, where its thickness is 10 mm (for highest sidewear), to 18, where its 
thickness is 24.04 mm (for brand new rail). 
 
Figure 4-9 Application of NR4 sidewear measurement gauge 
Courtesy and Crown Copyright RAIB 
To understand how measurement errors can affect the NR4 sidewear measurements, a UIC60 
rail profile was modelled and then artificially worn by a new P8 train wheel (most common 
wheel profile in GB). In Figure 4-10 shows the modelled rail and the important parts of a 
NR4 sidewear measurement gauge. The contact angle on the gauge corner is approximately 
45 degrees. 
The errors affecting the NR4 measurement were both calculated and then verified using the 
model. The calculation and the model produced very similar results (difference of less than 
1%). The small difference is due to considering the contact angle fixed at 45 degrees in the 
calculations (to reduce calculation complexity) whereas in reality it often changes when 
measurement errors are introduced in the point cloud data. 
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The distance between the top of the rail and the middle of the gauge is 18.7 mm, resulting in 
a sidewear reading on the stepped gauge of number 12. Considering a horizontal 
measurement error of -0.1 mm on both the gauge corner and field side and a vertical 
measurement error of +0.1 mm on the top of the rail (the rail becomes slightly thinner and 
taller), the rail to gauge distance becomes 18.4 mm and the sidewear reading on the stepped 
gauge becomes number 11. 
 
Figure 4-10 A model of the NR4 gauge placed over a heavily worn UIC60 rail 
As the measurement errors change the reading by 0.3 mm (from 18.7 mm to 18.4 mm) and 
the sidewear is measured in increments of 0.78 mm, the measurement error is 0.38 units on 
the sidewear scale. 
It must be noted that, for heavily worn stock rails where the gauge contacts the gauge corner 
(or gauge side) at a steep angle such as 60 degrees (to the horizontal), the measurement error 
on the gauge corner (or gauge side) can almost double its impact on the measurement: 0.2 
tan(60) " 0.34 %% (instead of 0.2  tan45 " 0.2 %%). If the top measurement error is 
considered as well, the total error becomes 0.34 ' 0.1 " 0.44 %% (instead of 0.3 %%). 
A similar case is considered where the field side of the rail is affected by measurement errors, 
such that the lowest point and the highest point within the field side of the rail that comes in 
contact with the NR4 gauge have measurement errors of 0.1 mm and -0.1 mm respectively on 
the horizontal axis. In this case, the measurement errors lead to a counter clockwise rotation 
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of the gauge by arctan0.2 23⁄  " 0.5 ,-./--0. This results in a final measurement error of 
0.4 mm, which equates to 0.51 units on the stepped gauge. 
Considering another (worst) case where the rail measurements are affected by 0.1 mm errors, 
a maximum error of 0.67 mm can occur where 0.4 mm is due to the errors in the field side 
causing gauge rotation, 0.1 mm is due to top measurement error and 0.17 mm is due to gauge 
side measurement error (considering a worst case 60 degrees contact condition). 
Although this error is significant, the probability of the point cloud data being affected by 
such errors is extremely small. This is mostly because every point in the field side of the rail 
which comes in contact with the gauge should have a specific error in order to rotate the 
gauge by 0.5 degrees. Thus, as the errors affecting the acquired point cloud data can generally 
be considered to follow a normal distribution and show a random component, it was 
concluded that measurement errors of up to ±0.1 mm are acceptable. It was also considered 
that measurement errors of up to ±0.2 mm could be acceptable if filtering is used to improve 
the point cloud data. 
Switch rail radius gauge inspection 
The inspection using the Switch rail radius gauge (widely known as pac man) is used to 
establish whether or not the switch rail gauge face has a sharp or pronounced edge. Due to the 
design of the gauge and the method of use, the evaluation of sharp corners is carried out over 
an area of the switch blade and not locally at each potential sharp edge. This means that the 
measurement error can be as high as 0.5 mm. However, the inspection standard states that 
any tactile or visual sign of a sharp edge fails the switch. Thus an alternative algorithm for the 
inspection of sharp switch rails is proposed in this work. As the algorithm individually 
assesses every potential sharp edge, the measurement error should not exceed ±0.3 mm. 
Stepped gauge inspection 
The stepped gauge is used to measure the amount of hogging present at the foot of the switch 
rail. This is achieved by inserting a stepped gauge between the foot of the switch rail and the 
slide chair. The measurement resolution is 1 mm. As the slide chair and switch blades can 
become very dirty and greasy, optical techniques cannot be used to automatically measure the 
switch rail hogging. No techniques have been found to automatically measure the switch rail 
hogging from a safe distance (>20 cm) and thus this measurement has not been automated. 
As one of the requirements for this research was to eliminate human error, the implications of 
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hogging not being measured automatically are significant. Many of the switch inspection 
tasks for checking against derailment hazards cannot be carried out accurately if this 
measurement is inaccurate. The automatic measurement of switch rail hogging over a 
percentage of switches could be beneficial as long as the measurements would be guaranteed 
to be accurate. 
Visual switch inspection 
The NR/L2/TRK/0053 requires the visual inspection of the switch rail for damage. The types 
of defects which this inspection standard aims to find are generally well sized (>1 mm) and 
thus the measurement accuracy can be as poor as ±0.5 mm. 
Crossing profile inspection 
The profile of railway crossings is currently inspected with a resolution of 1 mm. Thus, the 
measurement error should be no more than ±0.5 mm. However, as the height of the crossing 
is compared along its length, the error applies to a 3D crossing profile with a length of 
1 metre (the length of the straight edge used to inspect the crossing) and not a 2D profile. 
Thus, in order to achieve this error limit, the maximum error within a 2D profile should not 
exceed ±0.2 mm. 
Conclusion 
Considering that the laser measurement errors follow a normal distribution (with a relatively 
null average error) and show a random component, it was concluded that the errors for 
measuring 2D point cloud data should be no greater than ±0.2 mm, although ±0.1 mm is 
recommended for the TGP8 measurement.  
4.2.3 Accuracy requirements for 3D inspection of switches 
A physically unconstrained object (i.e. an S&C inspection trolley) has six degrees of 
freedom: heave, sway, surge, pitch, yaw and roll. The first three describe translation motions 
along the three axis of the tri-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system (up/down, left/right 
and forward/backward) and the latter three describe the three possible rotations around the 
axes of the coordinate system. The six degrees of freedom are shown in Figure 4-11. Ideally, 
a 3D survey of the switch is carried out by moving the laser scanner along the red axis (surge) 
while constraining the other five degrees of movement. However, in practice, this is difficult 
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to achieve and thus, the impact of unaccounted movement (translational and rotational) over 
the measurement process is considered here. 
 
Figure 4-11 The six degrees of freedom in a 3D environment 
Because the effect of rotational movement is dependent on the rotation origin (which at this 
stage is unknown), the rotation origin for all rotational movements is considered in the 
geometrical centre of the acquired data. 
A distinction is made between two types of errors, absolute errors and constant relative 
errors. Considering a tridimensional Cartesian coordinate system in a tridimensional space, 
the difference between the measured coordinates and the true coordinates of a point, 1 − 3, 
is considered an absolute error. An absolute error divided by the true value, 1 − 3 3⁄ , is 
considered a relative error. A relative error that does not change (or change very slightly) 
during a complete set of measurements is considered a constant relative error. To exemplify, 
the measurement errors generated by the distance measurement wheel as a result having a 
different diameter is a constant relative error (i.e. if a true distance of 1000 mm, is measured 
at 1010 mm, then, considering the error to be constant relative, at 2000 mm, the expected 
measured distance is 2020 mm). 
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1) Heave (up/down) 
All inspections involving the use of manual gauges are not influenced by heave errors. For 
the inspection of switch rail damage, random errors should not exceed ±0.5 mm, but errors of 
up to 0.2 mm per 1 mm of surge have been considered acceptable. 
2) Sway (left/right) 
The acceptable errors for sway have been considered to be the same as for heave. 
3) Surge (forward/backward) 
Due to the requirements of positioning the gauges on the switch, it has been considered that 
constant relative surge errors of up to ±10% are acceptable. 
4) Pitch 
Pitch errors of up to ±3 degrees lead to acceptable measurement errors (i.e. 4% of a unit for 
the NR4 gauge, 20 µm for Gauge 1 and 26 µm Gauge 2 and unquantified but considered 
acceptable TGP8 errors). 
5) Yaw 
Yaw errors of up to ±3 degrees lead to acceptable measurement errors (i.e. 10% of a unit for 
the NR4 gauge and unquantified but considered acceptable TGP8 errors). Gauge 1 and 
Gauge 2 are not affected by yaw. 
6) Roll 
Roll errors of up to ±3 degrees can lead to measurement errors in excess of 1 mm in the case 
of Gauge 1 and Gauge 2. Although unquantified, it was also concluded that roll errors of up 
to 3 degrees can significantly change the TGP8 contact angle and thus impact on the 
inspection accuracy. As a result, roll errors should not exceed ±0.5 degrees. The NR4 gauge 
is not influenced by roll errors as their effect is mitigated in the required fitting process of the 
gauge. 
Note: The TGP8 gauge, Gauge 1 and Gauge 2 are mechanically designed to rest on the 
opposite stock rail in order to minimize roll errors to within acceptable values. 
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4.2.4 Accuracy requirements for 3D inspection of crossings 
1) Heave (up/down) 
Current manual measurement method has a resolution of 1 mm. However, the accuracy is 
also affected by systematic errors and human errors. This error can be as high a several 
millimetres and are discussed in more detail in sections 6.1.3 to 6.1.6. Thus it was concluded 
that random errors of up to 0.5 mm are acceptable. Errors which are proportional with surge 
do not decrease the accuracy of measurements as defined by the NR/L2/TRK/1054 inspection 
standard. 
2) Sway (left/right) 
Similar to heave, random sway errors should not exceed 0.5 mm and sway errors which are 
proportional with surge errors do not affect the measurements. 
3) Surge (forward/backward) 
Due to the requirements of using a straight edge with a certain length, constant relative surge 
errors should not exceed ±10%. 
4) Pitch, yaw and roll 
It was concluded that small (±5 degrees) pitch, yaw and roll errors have little influence over 
the measurements (the rotational origin was considered in the geometrical centre of the rail 
crossing profile). Thus, rotational errors of up to ±5 degrees were considered acceptable. 
4.3 Mechanical design, sensory setup and management of accuracy 
4.3.1 Management of measurement errors of 2D point cloud data 
Measurement errors of 2D point cloud data are mainly attributed to the performance of the 
triangulation laser scanners. The chosen laser scanners are scanCONTROL 2700-100(500) 
produced by MICRO-EPSILON. The measurement errors of the laser are dependent on the 
measurement depth and are up to ±0.2 mm. Detailed information regarding the laser sensors' 
performance can be found in APPENDIX D: LASER SCANNER “SENSOR 
ACCEPTANCE REPORT”. 
To minimize the errors of the transformation matrix that converts the axis origin of the laser 
into the axis origin of the trolley, the position and orientation of the lasers were calibrated. 
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The calibration process was as follows: 
1. A rectangle calibration object with a precisely known width (70.15 mm) was placed in 
the field of view of the two lasers where the stock rail would normally be expected to 
be; the top surface of the calibration object was set up parallel with the transversal 
line that goes through the top of the two stock rails on which the trolley was sitting; 
2. The corner of the calibration object was measured and the X axis of the laser was 
adjusted so that the corner measured exactly 90 degrees; this calibration step was 
needed as the manufacturer of the lasers confirmed independent laboratory 
experiments which found that the X axis of the laser was suffering from a systematic 
error; 
3. The rotational component of the transformation matrices was calculated so that the 
faces of the calibration object became vertical and horizontal when referenced to the 
trolley’s coordinate system; 
4. The horizontal translation of the transformation matrices was calculated so that the 
width of the measured profile was the same as the width of the calibration object 
(70.15 mm) and the horizontal value of the gauge point of the measured profile 
(referenced to the trolley’s coordinate system) reflected the correct track gauge; 
5. The vertical translation of the transformation matrices was calculated so that the top 
area of the measured profile was at the same height between the two lasers and the 
vertical value of the top of the measured profile reflected the height of the calibration 
object in relation to the trolley wheel.  
During the calibration process, the combined measurement errors have been constrained to 
±0.1 mm. 
4.3.2 Mechanical design and sensory setup 
Based on inspection requirements (as described in NR/L2/TRK/0053 and NR/L2/TRK/1054), 
S&C dimensions (both design and actual dimensions), specifications of triangulation laser 
scanners (e.g. measurement ranges) and required inspection accuracies, a mechanical design, 
sensory setup and post processing algorithms were developed. These factors are highly 
interdependent and thus a holistic view and analysis was needed. Based on a holistic view of 
the factors shown in Figure 4-12, an S&C inspection trolley prototype was designed. The 
trolley weighs less than 20 kg. Figure 4-13 shows the 3D model designed in Google    
Sketch-up® and Figure 4-14 shows the physical trolley. 
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Figure 4-12 Interdependable factors affecting the design process 
The following section shows how a change in the design process has immediate effects on 
other design decisions, thus supporting a holistic view. 
The use of a wheel clamping mechanism which constrains the trolley motion to “follow” the 
gauge side of the opposite stock rail instead of the field side of the opposite stock rail is a 
mechanical design feature which, due to the S&C dimensions (curved switch rail), would 
make the trolley follow the measurement rail more closely (i.e. less unwanted sway) and thus 
allow the change of laser scanner specifications to a lower measurement range with higher 
measurement accuracy. This can help to meet the required accuracies. However, poor 
surfaces of the switch rail gauge side (S&C dimensions) can lead to unwanted trolley roll, 
which introduces surge errors in the measured data which must not exceed the required 
accuracies. Even if the surge errors are within acceptable limits, due to the inspection 
requirements, the switch rail has to be scanned twice, including once with the opposite switch 
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rail in the open position. Thus, the use of laser scanners with relatively high measurement 
ranges is still required. 
 
Figure 4-13 3D model of the S&C inspection trolley 
 
Figure 4-14 S&C inspection trolley 
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The design features of the S&C inspection trolley are as follows: 
• rigid body vertically supported by three wheels; 
• two wheel clamping mechanisms mounted on the opposite rail, guiding the trolley 
along the field side of the opposite rail; 
• 1 metre distance between the two clamping mechanisms; 
• a Kubler incremental encoder (05.2400.1122.0500), which is used to measure trolley 
surge, and; 
• a Silicon Sensing gyroscope (CRS-09), which is used to measure the rate of roll.  
All the above design features are important to achieving the desired accuracy. 
4.3.3 Management of measurement errors of 3D point cloud data 
The 3D measurement errors are attributed in part to the 2D measurement errors and in part to 
the mechanical design of the trolley together with the accuracy limitation of the algorithms 
used to inspect S&Cs. 
The management of errors in 3D measurements was achieved as follows: 
• the use of a three wheel rigid body assured that position and orientation was well 
defined (unlike four wheel rigid body); 
• two clamping mechanisms 1 metre apart assured negligible pitch and yaw values 
during measurement; the clamping mechanisms guided the trolley along the field side 
of the opposite rail, which is considered free of wear; 
• an algorithm was developed to accurately measure the roll of the trolley using the data 
provided by the CRS-09 gyroscope, and; 
• based on matching overlapping point cloud data, an algorithm was used to register the 
two sets of 2D point cloud data (with the switch rail in the open and closed position) 
and calculate switch rail data by “subtracting” them. 
The following sources of errors affect the 3D point cloud data but were estimated to be 
sufficiently below the maximum acceptable errors (as calculated in sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4) 
and thus have been considered acceptable for the inspection of S&Cs in accordance with the 
inspection standards: 
• errors affecting 2D point cloud data (as listed in section 4.3.1, laser scanner 
measurement errors and laser calibration errors); 
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• irregularities (from one millimetre to one metre wavelengths) on the field side of the 
opposite stock rail which can generate yaw, surge and sway errors in the rail profile 
point cloud data; 
• irregularities (from one millimetre to one metre wavelengths) on top of the opposite 
stock rail which can generate pitch, surge and heave errors, as well as roll and heave 
errors in the rail profile point cloud data; 
• the effects of wheel out of roundness and light dirt on the surface of wheels; 
• the effects of considering the opposite stock rail vertically and horizontally straight 
for both switch and crossing inspection, and; 
• the effects of laser scanner vibration due to movement of the trolley. 
The algorithm used to calculate the roll of the trolley is discussed in section 6.1.1. 
4.4 Data acquisition 
A total of 11 datasets comprising half-set switches and half crossings (as detailed in Table 6) 
were inspected both manually and automatically at Whitemoor Rail Recycling Centre, UK. 
Additionally, two half-set switches were inspected at the Birmingham Centre for Railway 
Research and Education, UK. The switches were of curved chamfered CEN56 type (113A 
metric equivalent) which is the most common type of switch used within NR. 
Table 6 List of inspected switches and crossings 
S&C name 
Inspected parts 
13 PTS 16 PTS 61 PTS 
far end 
1 
far end 
2 
BCRRE 
lab 
Right half-set switch x  x x x x 
Left half-set switch  x  x  x 
Crossing – straight  x  x   
Crossing – diverging x x  x   
 
Accurate optical inspection is possible only when the inspected parts are clean. Thus, all 
S&Cs were cleaned prior to inspection. This is also standard practice when carrying out 
manual S&C measurements on NR infrastructure. 
An automated solution for measuring switch rail hogging was not identified and thus any 
hogging measurements were carried out manually. 
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The distance between two consecutive 2D profile measurements was 4 mm. The location 
along the switch was calculated by considering the switch toe at 0 mm. 
When a complete set of manual switch inspections are carried out in accordance with the 
NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard, the switch has to be thrown in both positions. 
Although it may be possible for an automatic inspection system to carry out all inspections 
while the switch is kept in a single position (either open or closed), this has not been 
researched in this work and thus the inspection system requires the switch to be thrown in 
both positions. 
A complete acquisition of a half switch set was accomplished through the following steps: 
1. Switch is thrown in the closed position (if necessary); 
2. Trolley is positioned anywhere in front of the switch toe; 
3. Trolley is pushed at least 2 meters along the switch; 
4. Trolley is pushed back in front of the switch toe; 
5. Switch is thrown in the open position, and; 
6. Trolley is pushed a second time at least 2 meters along the switch; 
A total of 2*500 profiles were acquired along the length of the switch during two scans (500 
profiles per scan). 
A complete acquisition of a crossing was accomplished through the following steps: 
1. Trolley is positioned at one of the crossing ends, on one of the two train paths; 
2. Trolley is stationary for at least 10 seconds during which gyroscope data is acquired; 
3. Trolley is pushed at least 4 meters over the crossing; 
4. Trolley is pushed back to its initial position; 
5. Trolley is stationary for another 10 seconds during which gyroscope data is acquired, 
and; 
6. Steps 1-5 are carried out again with the trolley on the other train path. 
A total of 2*1000 profiles were acquired along the length of the crossing during two scans 
(1000 profiles per scan). 
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5 INSPECTION OF RAILWAY SWITCH PROFILE 
Throughout the period of maintaining their railway infrastructure, NR identified five 
derailment hazards which can cause a train to derail. These derailment hazards are described 
in the NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard. The standard also specifies the use of six 
manual gauges, together with visual inspections in some cases to determine whether or not 
the inspected switch presents any of the five derailment hazards. 
Each of the five derailment hazards are discussed in detail in separate sections from 5.1.3 to 
5.1.7. The objectives of each of the mentioned sections are, as set out in section 1.4: 
• to identify whether or not the use of current switch profile inspection methods, as 
defined by the NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard, can lead to considerable 
measurement errors and the source of those errors; 
• to identify if possible and to develop alternative automatic inspection methods can be 
used to replicate the current switch profile inspection tasks as defined by the 
NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard whilst eliminating human errors; 
• to identify whether or not improvements on the developed switch profile inspection 
methods could reduce the systematic errors of inspecting switches. 
Section 5.1.8 discusses improvements which are modifications to the current inspection 
standard or completely new inspections and processes. Thus, section 5.1.8 lies outside the 
aims and objectives of this research work; however, as it is highly relevant it is included in 
this thesis. 
5.1.1 Point cloud data preparation 
Prior to the calculation of derailment hazards, the acquired point cloud data was prepared 
using simple point cloud processing techniques such as outlier removal, and elimination of 
unnecessary data. 
As the switch point cloud data is formed out of two data acquisitions, one of both the stock 
rail and switch rail and one just with the stock rail, the sole shape of the switch rail was not 
available. Loosely speaking, the shape of the switch rail was identified by comparing the two 
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acquisitions (pair by pair, 500 times) and identifying the points that were present in the first 
scan, but not in the second. 
The process is described below as two steps: 
1. Data registration of the two data acquisitions through matching overlapped areas 
Although, due to the constrained movement of the trolley, the point cloud data should already 
be registered along the X and Y axes, misalignments can occur. Lateral misalignment was 
caused mostly because the side rollers had been compressed with different forces during the 
two data acquisitions. Vertical misalignment was caused by severely hogged switch rails, 
which forced the trolley to climb on them instead of running on the stock rail. The data 
registration was achieved by aligning the data in two locations. 
For the purpose of aligning the two datasets, two reference points were used, a vertical one 
calculated at a height of 20 mm below the top of the rail (on the field side) and a horizontal 
one at a horizontal distance of 30 mm from the vertical reference point. The calculation of the 
point was done by averaging 5 points. 
for profileNumber=1 to 500 do 
 for scanNumber=1 to 2 do 
  Calculate the maximum height of profile profileNumber in scanNumber; 
  Identify the field point, FP20, which is 20 mm below (or closest) the  
   maximum height of the profile; 
  Calculate the average X coordinate of the four closest points to FP20 point, 
   including the FP20 point; 
  Identify the top point, TP30, which is 30 mm to the right (or closest) of 
   FP20 point; 
  Calculate the average Y coordinate of the four closest points to TP30 point, 
   including the TP30 point; 
 end 
 //calculate registration values for each 2D profile 
 Calculate the X registration value by subtracting the averaged X coordinate of the  
  first scan from the second scan; 
 Calculate the Y registration value by subtracting the averaged Y coordinate of the  
  first scan from the second scan; 
 //apply registration 
 Add the X registration value to the X coordinate of every point in the profile  
  profileNumber of the first scan; 
 Add the Y registration value to the Y coordinate of every point in the profile  
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  profileNumber of the first scan; 
end 
Algorithm 5-1 Registration of switch rail profiles 
Several [76,77] Iterative Closest Point (ICP) algorithms were also used to align the data, but 
all with worse results when compared with the final method. The reason for this could have 
been the fact that a-priori information regarding the data was available and its use allowed the 
writing of a bespoke and more efficient algorithm. 
2. Calculation of the minimum distance between each point in the first acquisition (stock 
rail and switch rail) and the polygon formed by all points in the second acquisition (stock rail 
only) and selection of points where the distance is greater than 1 mm 
The process is exemplified in Figure 5-1. 
   
Figure 5-1 Exemplification for the process of identifying the switch rail (left plots to scale) 
The left plot in Figure 5-1 shows a sample of acquired data and the right plot shows a subset 
of the minimum distance. All data points whose distance is at least 1 mm are considered part 
of the switch rail. Where the distance becomes less than 1 mm it is considered to be the last 
point of the switch rail (red circle in Figure 5-1). 
5.1.2 A feature preserving point cloud filtering approach for convex point cloud data 
Smoothing algorithms are often unable to eliminate all measurement errors and they can 
undesirably smooth out features of the surveyed object. As a result, much research has been 
undertaken to overcome undesirable smoothing by developing feature preserving smoothing 
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algorithms. The goal of these algorithms is to smooth out the point cloud data while 
preserving the inherent features of the surveyed object (e.g. sharp corners). 
Often, the evaluation of feature preserving algorithms used to smooth out point cloud data is 
based on a visual, subjective evaluation of performance and on a limited set of point cloud 
datasets. However, in the context of inspection of safety-critical components, it is important 
to assure that the point cloud data is altered within understandable limits which do not allow 
the deformation of important shape features and cannot increase the error in the point cloud 
data. However, with most feature preserving smoothing algorithms this is difficult to assure. 
Another important issue regarding feature preserving smoothing algorithms is that they 
generally require setting up one or several smoothing parameters (or the user must choose a 
variant of the algorithm). The parameters (or variants) are generally selected based on 
information regarding the data which is to be filtered. However, in the case switch rail 
profiles there is very little that can be safely inferred. 
Several algorithms were used to filter 2D transversal profiles of switch rails, two of these 
being the Savitzky–Golay smoothing filter and the Mesh Smoothing Laplacian VTK found in 
the PCL library. The above two issues were common amongst most used algorithms. 
Thus, a point cloud filtering algorithm was developed specifically for the presented 
inspection system. The algorithm was developed only for convex point cloud data. Thus, it is 
used to filter only point cloud data representing stock rails (excluding switch rails). 
The approach 
The measurement errors of scanCONTROL 2700-100(500) laser scanners, as shown in the 
sensor acceptance reports available in APPENDIX D: LASER SCANNER “SENSOR 
ACCEPTANCE REPORT”, can be mostly attributed to errors in the measured distance 
between the laser and the object, commonly named the Z axis by many laser scanner 
producers. Figure 5-2 is extracted from one of the two sensor acceptance reports. 
The algorithm was demonstrated using artificially created convex data that contains both 
close to straight segments and round corners with a small radius of 2 mm (representing the far 
ends of the range of shapes found in stock rails). The noise was generated in MATLAB® as a 
vector of 100 elements that follow a normal distribution with an average of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 0.1. A histogram of the noise is shown in Figure 5-3. Although the graph seems 
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to have a break, in reality none of the 100 elements were inside the range of the penultimate 
bin. 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Z axis linearity errors of a scanCONTROL 2700-100(500) laser scanner 
 
Figure 5-3 Histogram of generated values following a normal distribution 
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Figure 5-4 shows, in green, the noise free data and, in red, the noisy data. The noise was 
added perpendicular to the shape of the object to mimic the effects of the laser scanner errors 
(often described as Z axis errors by laser scanner manufacturers). In other words, the noise 
was added along the normals of the noise free data. 
 
Figure 5-4 Generated data with and without noise (to scale) 
The steps of the algorithm are as follows: 
1. Generation of convex hull 
A convex hull of the point cloud data was generated. 
2. Elimination of points 
As positive errors increase in the area of the measured object, it increases the area of the 
convex hull. Thus the majority of the points forming the convex hull are affected by high 
positive errors, as shown in the top plot of Figure 5-6. The points forming the convex hull 
(generally points with high positive errors) were successively eliminated as long as the 
following two rules were met: 1) there are never more than two consecutive eliminated 
points, and 2) there are never two consecutive groups, each having two eliminated points. 
               
 
Figure 5-5 Graphical representation of the elimination rules 
The rules are expressed graphically in Figure 5-5, where red squares represent eliminated 
points and green squares represent points which cannot be further eliminated. 
3. Iteration of steps 1 and 2 
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The previous two steps are iterated until no points forming the convex hull can be further 
eliminated. Figure 5-6 shows the result of the first, fifth and tenth iteration of steps 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 5-6 Iterative results of steps 1 and 2 of point cloud filter algorithm (to scale) 
In this example, during the first iteration 22 points were eliminated; 20 from the small corners 
and 2 from the almost straight areas of the shape (Figure 5-6, first plot, blue dots in red 
circles). During the fifth iteration 10 points were eliminated from almost straight areas of the 
shape and none from the corners (Figure 5-6, second plot, blue dots in red circles). During the 
tenth iteration no points could be further eliminated (Figure 5-6, third plot, all circled dots are 
now green) and the algorithm finished execution. 
Discussion of results 
In principle, the algorithm improves the smoothness of the data through elimination of points 
that are more likely to be affected by large positive errors. Most positive errors are eliminated 
in the iterative process described in step 3. Most negative errors are eliminated at the end 
when the final convex hull is calculated. The overall results of the filter algorithm on a 
convex surface are shown in Figure 5-7. 
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Figure 5-7 Filter result on the convex point cloud data (to scale) 
Figure 5-8 shows one of the best results, where the filtered noisy data is very smooth and the 
average difference between the noise free data and the filtered noisy data is less than 20 µm. 
 
Figure 5-8 Example of good filter result (to scale) 
Figure 5-9 shows one of the poorest filter results. The arc circle is poorly reproduced with a 
highest error of approximately 130 µm. The main reason for this is that the point cloud data 
contains 10 consecutive points all with errors of the same sign. The precision of the algorithm 
decreases where large groups of consecutive points have errors with the same sign. A shape 
(e.g. circle, rectangle or even a random shape) if scanned using a laser scanner which is 
consistently affected by errors of same sign will appear as being either enlarged or 
compressed (depending on the sign of the error). It is reasonable to say that such errors 
cannot be compensated using any method unless some additional information is available 
regarding the errors and/or the shape.  
However, point cloud data collected from the laser scanners do not show such poor 
randomness. Groups of consecutive points with errors of the same sign are generally limited 
to three or four. 
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Figure 5-9 Example of poor filter result (to scale) 
Another poor result in Figure 5-9 is the blue point in a red circle which has not been 
eliminated. The result would have been better if the preceding point had been eliminated 
instead. The algorithm does not evaluate the order in which points should be deleted. It is 
expected that a rule to establish the order of elimination could improve the algorithm, such 
as: points which lead to a greater reduction of convex hull area are eliminated first. In the 
case of Figure 5-9 the above rule would keep the preceding point instead of the circled one, 
and thus improve the results. 
Final comments 
The filtering algorithm is recommended where: (1) the point cloud data is convex, (2) the 
errors follow a normal distribution with a mean error close to zero and the sign of the error is 
reasonably random, and (3) the smallest features within the data are defined by at least 6-
8 points. 
The point cloud data collected from the laser scanners showed significantly better accuracy. 
This helped to achieve good results when using unfiltered switch rail point cloud data. 
5.1.3 Derailment hazard 1 
This hazard can appear on switches where the stock rail is heavily worn and the switch rail 
has very little wear. As the stock rail develops a sidewear scar, the height of the lowest part of 
the sidewear scar moves down the gauge face eventually reaching the top of the switch rail 
(e.g. Figure 5-10, diagram 3b). Under such conditions, the constant passage of wheel sets 
bends the tip inside the stock rail sidewear scar, as shown in diagram 3c. 
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Figure 5-10 Description of derailment hazard 1 
Courtesy and Copyright Network Rail 
Derailment mechanism 
Such deformation of the switch rail can change the interaction between the switch rail and the 
wheel to such an extent that the switch rail can provide a ramp on which the wheel flange can 
climb up. 
Note: During the normal life cycle, a switch gradually wears out changing its shape from 
diagram 3a to diagram 3c without passing through diagram 3b (i.e. as the switch tip rises 
below the sidewear scar it is immediately bent towards the stock rail). However, it is not 
impossible for a switch to be in the condition of diagram 3b. This would be possible if 
inadequate repairs are carried out. If so, this could create a different hazard: train wheel 
striking the top of the switch rail. This hazard is also known to have caused derailments in 
some situations [78]. 
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Method of inspection 
Inspection for this derailment hazard is carried out using (1) a NR4 sidewear measurement 
gauge, and (2) by visually checking to see whether or not the top of the switch rail is above 
the lowest part of the stock rail sidewear scar. 
Measurement principle of NR4 gauge 
In order to achieve accurate measurements the straight edge of the gauge must be fitted flush 
to the field side of the rail head. The gauge must also be pushed down and the sidewear is 
measured by sliding in a specific stepped gauge between it and the rail head. 
 
Figure 5-11 Application of NR4 sidewear measurement gauge 
Courtesy and Crown Copyright RAIB 
In principle, the NR4 gauge measures the height difference between two parts of the rail: the 
middle and close to the flange side. The straight edge of the gauge is inclined at 1:20 from 
vertical as commonly used rail head profiles have a 1:20 inclination on the field side. 
Inherent reliability limitations of NR4 gauge 
During measurement trials, it was concluded that a considerable source of error results from 
the failure to properly fit the straight part of the gauge to the field side of the rail (this 
supported the analysis for accuracy requirements discussed in section 4.2.2). 
Rails which has developed rust, or rails where the field side of the stock rail was not straight 
and smooth for environmental reasons, were difficult to measure with a high repeatability. In 
such conditions the accuracy of the measurement was reduced. Furthermore, under some 
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conditions, the uneven surface led to rocking of the gauge, which reduced the precision of the 
measurements. 
Thus, two sources of errors have been identified: (1) instrumental errors due to the limitation 
of the measurement device measuring rails with an uneven field side (systematic error), and 
(2) operator errors due to failing to place the gauge in the best possible position and failing to 
keep the gauge stationary during the whole duration of the measurement (random error). 
Although, systematic errors can often be corrected, in the case of the NR4 measurement, the 
error is variable, and dependent on the shape of the rail head and thus is not easy to correct. 
Proposed automatic NR4 measurement algorithm 
The main challenge within this measurement comes from the inherent measurement 
reliability previously discussed. An automatic solution must choose the best possible fit based 
on the features of the rail. This was achieved in steps 3-5 and the performance of these steps 
determine, in large, the accuracy of the measurement. The rest of the steps did not pose 
challenges nor add any significant errors to the measurement process. 
The steps which are undertaken to measure the sidewear are explained below: 
1. Modelling of the NR4 gauge as point cloud data (one time only) 
A point cloud model of the NR4 gauge was created using the official drawings of the gauge. 
An average distance of 0.2 %% between two consecutive points was used. 
2. Preparation of point cloud data as described in section 5.1.1 and application of point 
cloud filtering algorithm on the stock rail point cloud data as described in section 5.1.2 
3. Generation of stock rail head convex hull 
As a laser based inspection is expected to closely reproduce the manual measurement, the 
algorithm was designed to replicate the manual inspection as much as possible. Thus, the 
convex hull of the rail is calculated as it identifies all the sides of the rail against which the 
gauge could be fitted, as well as the relative inclination between the rail and the gauge. 
4. Selection of convex hull segments whose angles are within 92.86 ±1.6 degrees 
The main rail profiles which are used within Network Rail infrastructure are designed with a 
field side inclined at 1:20 (this equates to an inclination of 2.86 degrees from vertical). Due to 
the tolerances of the rail and the installation, a designed inclination of 1:20 can in practice 
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have any values between 1:40 and 1:13 and still be within design limits [79]. This equates to 
a tolerance of -1.43 and +1.54 degrees respectively. 
There are situations where the field side of the rail may not allow an accurate measurement 
due to all segment angles being far from 92.86 degrees (note: this is a limitation of the NR4 
gauge). Thus, in the case of such a rail head profile, if no angles are found to be within the 
normal range of 92.86 ±1.6 degrees, the measurement is aborted as a high accuracy 
measurement is unlikely to be achieved. 
All segments outside these tolerances are omitted from the next steps. 
5. Weighting calculation for each segment based on the following formula: 4 " 4 ∗
4 ∗ 46where: 
• 4 is inversely proportional to the minimum y value of the points forming the 
segment 
• 4 is proportional with the length of the segment 
• 46 is highest when the segment angle is 92.86 degrees and reduces as the segment 
angle becomes far from 92.86 degrees 
This is the most important step, as within this step the best fit between the gauge and the rail 
is decided by choosing just one of the available field side segments. In order to achieve this, 
the best segment is chosen based on the set of three criteria mentioned above. Each of the 
three weightings, 47, help to establish which segment within the field side should be chosen 
to fit the gauge against. The better the segment, the bigger the individual weights for that 
segment. 
The first criterion advantages lower segments on the vertical axis. Upper areas of the field 
side tend to suffer more from metal migration and lipping than lower areas and as such lower 
areas of the field side are more reliable. As segments can have lengths of up to 20 mm, the 
lowest point in each segment is considered. 
The second criterion advantages long segments. The length of the segment is generally 
inversely proportional to the curvature. Thus, the longer a segment is, the more likely it is to 
be located in a flat area of the field side. 
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The third criterion advantages segments whose angle is closer to 92.86 degrees. This is due to 
the expectation that the field side would have an inclination of 1:20 and that track cant is 0. If 
the inclination and cant differ from this expectation, the new values should be accounted for. 
6. Rotation of the rail head so that the angle of the chosen segment is 92.8 degrees 
Once the segment has been selected, the rail is rotated to match the angle of the straight edge 
of the NR4 gauge. 
7. NR4 gauge translation along both axes so that the gauge is vertically above the rail 
and its straight edge is collinear with the segment that has the highest weighting 
8. Repetitive NR4 gauge translations of 8/:;/< until any one point of the gauge is on or 
inside the rail head 
During this step, the gauge is repeatedly translated on the vertical axis by −50 =%, making 
the gauge ultimately intersect the rail. As the straight part of the gauge is inclined at 1:20, the 
gauge is also horizontally translated 2.5 =% at every iteration. The repetitive process ends 
when any point of the gauge is on or within the rail head. 
   
Figure 5-12 NR4 fitting process; left: available segments; right: NR4 fitting based on a the 
chosen segment (both not to scale) 
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9. Measurement of the minimal vertical distance, ,, between the middle of the gauge 
and the rail head 
In practice, this step is carried out by using a stepped gauge that is placed between the gauge 
and the rail. The top surface of the rail (rail measurement area) may not be parallel with the 
top gap in the gauge (gauge measurement area). 
 
Figure 5-13 Fitting of stepped gauge 
An angle difference of 1.5 degrees would make the distance vary by sin1.5° ∗ 6 " 157=m 
across the measurement area. The stepped gauge has a thickness of 5 mm and the gap in the 
NR4 gauge is 6 mm. This limits the lateral play to just 1 mm. Thus, the maximum 
measurement error due to the possibility of placing the stepped gauge in various positions is 
just 157=% ∗ ; " 26=% and was considered negligible (a maximum inclination of the 
rail’s top area of 1.5 degrees was considered). The measurement is taken as the minimum 
distance between the two measurement areas (marked in orange in Figure 5-13). 
10. Calculation of sidewear using the following formula: 0 " C, − 10/0.78E 
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Figure 5-14 Drawing of stepped gauge used in conjunction with the NR4 gauge 
Courtesy and Copyright Network Rail 
The calculation of the sidewear, 0, is accomplished by using the above formula, which was 
derived by analyzing the official drawing of the stepped gauge. The gauge has a starting 
thickness of 10 mm and each step is 0.78 mm thick. The round up operator reflects the 
behaviour of the stepped gauge not fitting unless , has a minimum distance. 
Discussion of the accuracy of automatic NR4 measurement algorithm  
The gauge is modelled to such accuracy that the error contribution to the final measurement 
is considered negligible. 
The 2nd step improves the point cloud precision and is considered to have only positive 
effects towards the final result. 
In the 3rd step, the convex hull is calculated. The calculation of convex hulls is an error free 
process. 
The 4th step eliminates segments that do not allow an accurate measurement. 
The 5th step is the most important step, as it decides how the gauge will be fitted against the 
field side of the rail. As explained, this step takes into account three rail features which lead 
to accurate measurements. 
In the 6th step a rotation is executed. As a double-precision floating-point format is used; all 
rotations are considered to produce negligible errors. 
The 7th step introduces no errors. 
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The 8th step introduces an error of up to 50 =%, which is considered negligible and can easily 
be improved if necessary. 
The 9th step introduces an error of up to 26 =%, which is due to the design of the gauge and is 
considered negligible. 
Finally, the 10th step does not introduce any errors. 
With the exception of the 4th step, all the steps undertaken to measure the NR4 sidewear are 
error free or negligible. The error involved here is difficult to quantify as it is dependent on 
the shape of the rail head. In many situations the identification of an error free fit is 
impossible due to the absence of a clear definition of best fit. Although it is concluded that it 
is not possible to calculate the best fit (which means that it is also not possible to calculate the 
measurement error), the sidewear can still be measured with good accuracy.  
The collected point cloud data from the scanCONTROL lasers had significantly better 
accuracy than the accuracy stated in the sensor acceptance report. Using the presented 
methodology, 68% of the automatic NR4 measurements matched the manual measurements 
while the remaining 32% were off by one sidewear unit. This equates to an average error of 
0.32 units on the sidewear gauge, or 0.25 mm on the vertical axis. 
It must be noted that part of the difference may be attributed to operator errors. 
Switch tip height inspection 
A visual check is carried out to identify whether or not the tip of the switch rail is above the 
lowest part of the stock rail sidewear scar. This will be simply referred to as the switch tip 
inspection. The figure below shows two sketched examples of this check, a PASS example on 
the left side and FAIL example on the right side. The green arrows show the lowest point of 
the stock rail sidewear scar. If the green arrow is vertically below or levelled with the blue 
arrow then the switch fails the inspection. In practice this inspection is carried out visually 
without the use of any tools or devices. 
The derailment mechanism in this case is that as the sidewear of the stock rail progresses, the 
wheel flange can start to strike the switch rail. This situation is hazardous as (1) the wheel can 
start to climb on the switch rail and (2) the switch rail can be bent into the void forming 
between the two rails changing the wheel-rail contact angle (low wheel-rail contact angle is a 
derailment hazard, discussed in more detail in section 5.1.4). 
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Figure 5-15 Two examples of switch tip height check; PASS (left), FAIL (right) 
adapted from NR/L2/TRK/0053; Courtesy and Copyright Network Rail 
Four hypothetical cases are considered and are shown in Figure 5-16. All four plots have the 
same stock rail. Two types of switch rail are shown, one type in plot (a) and (b) and another 
type in plot (c) and (d). 
 
Figure 5-16 Switch tip height case study (to scale) 
As the stock rail shows a fairly round gauge corner it is difficult to identify the exact location 
of the sidewear scar and thus to carry out a correct inspection. However, plots (b) and (d) 
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should be positively identified, as due to the small gap between the two rails, there is a risk 
that the switch rail could be bent out of shape, whereas plots (a) and (c) should not be 
considered to show a derailment hazard, as the stock rail does not have any sidewear that 
would allow the train switch rail to be bent out of shape or the wheel flange to strike it. 
It must be observed that in the case of plots (a) and (b) the hazard is present if the switch rail 
is above the 20 mm mark, while in plots (c) and (d) the hazard is present only if the switch 
rail is above the 30 mm mark. As all four plots have identical stock rails but different heights 
for determining the presence of the derailment hazard, it was concluded that the sidewear scar 
of the switch rail may be an unreliable source of information. As a result, it was considered 
that the best method for determining the derailment hazard is to identify the location on the 
stock rail at which it no longer provides lateral support to its switch rail. 
It is true that the shapes shown in Figure 5-16 are not of any standard. The reason for 
experimenting with non-standard rail types is because it is difficult to understand the limits 
under which the rails can change their shape, due to the high number of existing rail types 
and high number of wearing mechanisms such as abrasion, metal flow, other rail damage and 
not the least repairs (NR switch repair procedures do not define the shape of rail that must be 
achieved after the repair is complete). Thus, a robust method was needed to cope with rail 
shapes which may be very different than expected. 
Although colour information can be used to help identify the location of the stock rail 
sidewear scar, this method was not researched due to the following disadvantages: (1) 
dimensional measurement accuracy is generally poor, and (2) for the purpose of this work, 
the use of vision techniques is very unlikely to produce reliable results. 
In this work two approaches are presented for switch tip height inspection. 
First approach of automatic switch tip inspection: rule based 
This approach is explained on three of the switch planing designs used by NR (Figure 5-17), 
but can be adapted for other types. All three switch rail designs show the field side at an 
angle of -15 degrees from vertical. Although the top and gauge area of the switch rail can 
change to any shape, the field side of the switch rail remains the same. It can only be affected 
by lipping. 
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Figure 5-17 Switch planing used throughout NR railway infrastructure (left: 113 curved 
chamfered; centre: UIC60 shallow depth; right: 113A/UIC54B shallow depth) 
The corner of the worst case flange worn train wheels shows an angle no steeper than 
10 degrees from vertical. Due to this wear, the stock rail cannot develop a sidewear at an 
angle steeper than 10 degrees. 
Figure 5-18 shows a wheel-rail example where the stock rail is marked at -15 degrees and 
10 degrees. 
 
Figure 5-18 Important angles in the evaluation of Derailment hazard 1 
grey: P8 wheel; red, orange and green: rail  (to scale) 
If the top of the switch rail is below the -15 degrees mark (in the green area), it is in an area 
where stock rail sidewear cannot develop (a stock rail sidewear scar cannot develop below 
the 10 degrees mark shown in Figure 5-18), and thus it is considered hazard free. Moreover, 
the stock rail provides full support to the field side of the rail. 
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If the top of the switch rail is above the -15 degrees mark (in the yellow area), it is below the 
stock rail sidewear, and thus it is considered hazard free. However, the flange of the wheel 
can slightly bend the switch rail into the shape of the stock rail. 
If the top of the switch rail is above the 10 degrees mark, it is in an area where stock rail 
sidewear can develop, and thus it is considered a hazard. Moreover, train wheels with a 
flange angle of 10 degrees (worst case) are likely to strike the top of the switch when 
approaching under flange contact conditions. 
Proposed automatic switch tip inspection algorithm 
The switch tip inspection is carried out on each acquired set of profiles (the switch rail in 
both the open and closed positions) for the first 250 mm of the switch rail and the steps are as 
follows: 
1. Preparation of point cloud data as described in section 5.1.1 and application of point 
cloud filtering algorithm on the stock rail point cloud data (as described in section 
5.1.2) 
2. Generation of stock rail convex hull 
3. Calculation of vertically lowest point of the convex hull where the upper segment 
forming the convex hull has an angle of 10 degrees or more from vertical 
Various rail defects such as rolling contact fatigue (RCF) cracking and gauge corner breaking 
can create small (millimetre and sub-millimetre) concave areas on the rail surface, most 
commonly on the gauge corner. These types of defects can lead to catastrophic failures such 
as rail breaks; however, they are managed by other inspection standards which are outside the 
scope of this work. However, these defects are relevant in the sense that they can alter the 
profile of the rail by introducing concave areas. As concave areas in the rail profile do not 
contact the train wheel, their angles are not of interest. Thus, in addition to filtering the data, 
the convex hull is further used to improve the measurement of angles within the point cloud 
data by filtering the concave areas of the rail profile. 
4. Calculation of vertically highest point in the switch rail 
5. Calculation of vertical difference between the two identified points in steps 3 and 4 
Results 
One surveyed switch was affected by derailment hazard 1 and was used to evaluate the 
algorithm. The switch is pictured in Figure 5-19 and Figure 5-20. Figure 5-19 shows the bent 
tip of the rail as well as the stock rail sidewear scar. 
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Figure 5-19 A switch that failed Derailment Hazard 1 (photo 1) 
 
Figure 5-20 A switch that failed Derailment Hazard 1 (photo 2) 
In Figure 5-21 the result of the algorithm is shown. The results match the extent of the 
damage as shown in Figure 5-19 and Figure 5-20: 
• At the beginning of the switch the tip of the switch rail is just a millimetre above the 
stock rail sidewear scar 
• Five centimetres along the switch (first green arrow counted from the switch toe) the 
bottom end of the stock rail sidewear scar is clearly visible. The algorithm marginally 
fails the switch at this location 
AUTOMATION OF RAILWAY SWITCH AND CROSSING INSPECTION: RAIL 
PROFILE INSPECTION CASE STUDY 
 
Page 95 of 199 
 
• Seven to eleven centimetres along the switch (first red arrow), the switch rail covers 
part of the sidewear scar and is visibly bent in Figure 5-19. The algorithm fails it with 
2 to 3 mm 
• Twelve to fifteen centimetres along the switch rail (second green arrow), the switch 
rail has a low height but Figure 5-19 shows that its tip is slightly bent. The algorithm 
fails it with 1 to 2 mm 
• Seventeen centimetres along the switch (second red arrow), the switch shows one of 
the most pronounced failures. The algorithm fails the area with almost 5 mm of 
excessive height difference. 
 
Figure 5-21 Result of switch tip algorithm on a failed switch 
Advantages of presented method 
The method is simple, efficient (a relatively low number of calculation are required). The 
sidewear of the stock rail is reliably identified irrespective of the shape of the stock rail (i.e. 
the algorithm is reliable even if the stock rail is shaped as a circle) 
Disadvantages of presented method 
The method was researched and tested only for the commonly used rail types in NR. Older 
switch rails are designed with a vertical field side. Although the 10 degree limit for failing the 
switch relates to the worst case flange worn train wheels, meaning that no change to the 
algorithm is required, this was not the subject of this research and thus its performance on 
these rails was not researched. 
Instead of measuring the stock rail sidewear, the algorithm considers the worst case for the 
stock rail sidewear. This means that in some cases the algorithm may be slightly conservative 
(e.g. the algorithm identified a marginal fail condition at 5 cm along the switch rail, while the 
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visual inspection was a marginal pass; however, this results in a measurement difference of 
less than a millimetre between the manual and automatic inspection and it is on the safe side). 
Second approach of automatic switch tip inspection: wheel-rail interaction based 
The stock rail sidewear scar is a result of contact (abrasion) between the wheel and rail. As a 
result, the location of the sidewear is the same as the location of the wheel-rail contact. Thus, 
this approach fits a new P8 train wheel to the stock rail (the fitting process is explained in 
section 5.1.4) and identifies the lowest contact point on the gauge corner of the stock rail. The 
identified point is considered to be the lowest point of the stock rail sidewear and is then 
compared with the top of the switch rail. The results (shown in Figure 5-22) are poor, as they 
underrate the severity of the fault and also show low precision (the results are noisy). 
 
Figure 5-22 Result of switch tip algorithm on a failed switch 
The conformity between a new P8 profile and the worn rail is poor and as a result a two-point 
contact (in reality, the contact points are two small patches the size of a coin) is formed which 
is dependent on both the shape of the rail and the shape of the wheel. Thus, in order to 
identify the correct location of the sidewear, a certain train wheel profile must be used which 
closely conforms to the profile of the stock rail. Moreover, the rail profile generally changes 
slightly along the length of the switch. 
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Figure 5-23 Wheel-rail fitting using a P8 profile (new) (to scale) 
In Figure 5-23 the lowest contact point was at a height of 17.3 mm but the stock rail sidewear 
was below 15 mm. The steeper the wheel flange is, the lower the contact point is. Thus, it is 
concluded that the identification of the sidewear location is better achieved using the first 
approach where the 10 degree limit can be used to set the worst case wheel flange angle that 
is expected to occur on the railway network. 
5.1.4 Derailment hazard 2 
According to the NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard, a derailment hazard can occur if the 
sidewear angle of the switch rail is flatter than the sidewear angle of the stock rail. This 
hazard generally occurs at switches that have a sideworn stock rail and switch rail. This 
hazard can also occur when the switch rail has suffered damage and rail traffic has smoothed 
it out. 
The figure below shows two situations, one in which the switch rail sidewear angle is flatter 
than the stock rail sidewear angle (left diagram; fail) and one in which the sidewear angle is 
steeper (right diagram; pass). The hatched area in the right diagram shows remedial grinding 
work that would normally be carried out in order to repair the switch rail profile.  
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Figure 5-24 Two examples of rail sidewear; fail (left), pass (right) 
Courtesy and Copyright Network Rail 
Before 2005, the NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard required a visual comparison of the 
sidewear angles on the two rails. Mathematically, the sidewear angle is a tangent line to a 
point within the rail profile and hence is dependent on the point at which it is being 
calculated. Although, in the above example, the tangent is easy to identify as the rail has a 
large area of flat surface where the tangent is constant, this is not always the case. Figure 
5-25 shows an example with possible sidewear angle readings (marked as t). 
 
Figure 5-25 Possible sidewear angles on a measured stock rail and switch rail (to scale) 
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A reading of F1 and F3 would fail the inspection while a reading of F2 and F4 would pass it.  
In 2005, the TGP8 (Track Gauge P8) was introduced to replace the visual comparison of 
sidewear, which allowed a more accurate identification of this hazard [10]. 
Method of inspection: The current NR/L2/TRK/0053 standard describes the use of three 
gauges: 
1. TGP8 (also known as P8 gauge) is used to identify the presence of the derailment 
hazard by analysing the contact angle between a new P8 wheel and the rail 
2. Gauge 2 is used to determine the relative height between the two rails 
3. NR4, in conjunction with a stepped gauge, is used to measure the amount of sidewear 
on the stock rail 
Gauge 2 is used purely for the identification of areas where the top of the switch rail is at 
least 19 mm below the top of the stock rail. This does not pose any technical challenges and 
is not further discussed. 
The measurement of NR4 sidewear is accomplished as described in section 5.1.3. 
Flange climb derailment mechanism and the TGP8 contact angle 
A flange climb can occur at switches where a lateral force is acting upon the wheel pushing it 
towards the rail and the wheel has a positive angle of attack (AoA) [79], as shown in Figure 
5-26. As the wheel rolls over the rail the wheel flange continuously slides down along the 
gauge side of the rail [80]. If the friction or lateral force is too high a derailment can occur. 
This is described by Nadal’s well known formula:  

G "
FHI − =
1 ' = ∗ FHI 
Where: 
•  is the lateral force acting on the wheel 
• G is the vertical force acting on the wheel 
• I is the flange angle relative to horizontal 
• = is the friction coefficient between the wheel and the rail 
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Figure 5-26 Diagram showing a two point contact for a positive AoA (top view; not to scale) 
For NR, the flange climb derailment hazard is partially managed by limiting the flange 
contact angle I to 60 degrees. Often, the flange contact takes place under a range of angles. 
The TGP8 contact angle refers to the flattest (worst case) flange angle between the P8 wheel 
and the rail. 
The use of TGP8 gauge 
The gauge has a small line which identifies the 60 degree mark. 
 
Figure 5-27 Drawing of TGP8 gauge (left); example of failed TGP8 inspection (right) 
Courtesy and Copyright Network Rail 
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The correct use of the TGP8 can be seen as a two-step process: (1) correct application of 
gauge over rails and (2) correct reading of the TGP8 angle. The author considers the second 
step to be fully defined, as irrespective of the shape of the rails, it can always (limited to 
visual acuity) be identified whether or not any part of the two rails is in contact with the 
lower part of the gauge (below the white line). However, there is no clear and complete 
definition of what is a correct fitting of the TGP8 gauge. In most cases, due to the shape of 
the rails, such a definition is not necessary. However, in the context of automatic inspection 
of safety-critical assets, a clear definition of the inspection task is very important in achieving 
accurate, precise and reliable results irrespective of any factors such as the shape of the 
inspected rail. 
In order to understand and refine the definition of a correct TGP8 fitting, a challenging TGP8 
fitting is considered. Considering a square shaped rail profile as shown in Figure 5-28, most 
TGP8 users would fit the TGP8 gauge in different positions. Without a clear definition for a 
correct TGP8 fitting, an automatic fitting algorithm is also likely to produce less predictable 
and satisfactory results in such a case. However, if the definition of TGP8 fitting is well 
defined, considering no human errors, all users and all automatic fitting algorithms should 
produce the same and predictable fitting. 
 
Figure 5-28 P8 wheel with three different possible fittings over a theoretical squared shaped 
piece of rail (to scale) 
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For this reason the square rail has been considered and a definition for TGP8 fitting was 
elaborated. Figure 5-28 shows possible TGP8 fittings over a hypothetical square rail. The 
inspection standard alone is not sufficient to identify the correct TGP8 fitting in this 
particular and more challenging scenario. 
Measurement reliability of TGP8 gauge 
In 2007 a train derailed near the Exhibition Centre station in Glasgow and four years later 
another train derailed at Princes Street Gardens in Edinburgh, both derailments taking place 
at poorly maintained switches. In both cases incorrect inspection using the TGP8 gauge had a 
causal role in the derailment [11,12]. During the investigation of the Edinburgh accident, 
RAIB found that most personnel questioned found the TGP8 gauge difficult to use [12]. 
The RAIB investigation also discovered that a section of the switch which was compliant 
with the TGP8 gauge had a contact angle of less than 60 degrees when a worn P8 wheel was 
used. 
Figure 5-29 shows a switch rail which passed the TGP8 gauge inspection. 
 
Figure 5-29 A second example of a switch rail which passes the TGP8 gauge but has signs of 
contact well below the pass mark 
The measurement was carried out by continuously pushing the TGP8 gauge against the two 
rails after which the piece of white paper was pushed into the remaining gap between the 
switch rail and the gauge. The lowest worn part of the switch rail (blue line and red arrow) 
was significantly below the 60 degree limit. Thus, unless the switch rail has a much higher 
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vertical position with respect to the stock rail when trains are passing over it (a situation 
which could not be explained), the actual contact angle can be significantly below the contact 
angle measured using a TGP8 gauge. Any switch rail hogging cannot account for this 
situation as the compensation only makes matters worse. 
As a conclusion, measurement reliability is limited due to both human error and the inability 
to check the contact angle against different wheel profiles. However, the use of a laser based 
inspection system could improve the TGP8 measurements with respect to both these 
limitations. 
The 20 degree criterion for TGP8 fitting 
Under a square shaped rail head the correct fit of the TGP8 gauge is not obvious. A clear and 
precise method for the application of the TGP8 gauge was sought and the adopted one is 
presented here. 
Considering two objects which are pushed against each other (with rotational restrictions) the 
fitting between the two is dependent on the forces that are applied to the objects. Thus, the 
fitting was considered as a physics problem where two solid objects are fitted together under 
the presence of a force, with zero rotational movement and zero friction conditions. 
 
Figure 5-30 Description of the chosen TGP8 fitting criterion (to scale) 
A force angle of 70 degrees was found to well replicate the manual procedure of fitting the 
TGP8 gauge on a piece of rail and was adopted as a physical constrain for the calculation of 
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TGP8-rail contact angle. The process always produces a unique solution for any given TGP8-
rail fitting. 
The TGP8-rail fitting can be carried out using a physics engine (a program or software that 
can simulate the physical interaction between multiple bodies) and adding the mentioned 
constrains, namely zero rotational movement, zero friction conditions and the presence of a 
force acting on the TGP8 gauge at 70 degrees from horizontal. However, in order to reduce 
complexity, the fitting was carried out without the help of a physics solver. 
When the fitting is carried out with the mentioned constrains in place, the fit always results in 
a 20 degree contact between the TGP8 gauge and rail or a range of contacts which includes 
20 degrees. Thus, an iterative algorithm was written that calculates the TGP8-rail fitting and 
stops when the contact between the TGP8 and rail is 20 degrees or the range of contacts 
includes 20 degree. The algorithm delivers the same results as using a physics solver and 
setting the mentioned constraints. 
 
Figure 5-31 Fitting example for a square shaped rail using the 20 degrees criterion (to scale) 
Figure 5-31 shows the result of a fitting against a square shaped rail when the 20 degrees 
criterion is used. The green circle marks the contact point between the TGP8 and rail. 
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Proposed automatic TGP8 measurement algorithm 
For simplicity, the TGP8 gauge and rail point cloud data will be referred to as simply TGP8 
and rail. The steps are as follows: 
1. Modelling of TGP8 as point cloud data 
The distance between two consecutive 2D points and the resolution were chosen to have 
unnoticeable effects on the accuracy of the measurement process. 
2. Preparation of rail point cloud data as described in section 5.1.1 
After the data is prepared, the rail is automatically positioned in the vicinity of the TGP8. 
3. Fitting of TGP8 on rail according to the “20 degrees” criterion 
The fitting is carried out by changing the position of the rail instead of the TGP8, but this 
does not affect the final result. The rail’s position is calculated using successive 
approximations which gradually decrease the fitting error at every iteration. Successive 
approximation is a well known mechanism that is used in Successive Approximation 
Analogue to Digital Convertors. The application of this mechanism in ADCs is described in 
numerous books, one example being [81]. 
The successive approximation operations are carried out in a nested loop to account for both 
X and Y axes. After every iteration, if the range of TGP8-rail contact angles includes 
20 degrees, the rail is moved to the left, otherwise to the right. The algorithm stops after 12 
iterations when the fitting error is < 12.2 µm on each axis. 
Position the rail below the wheel and to the left of the wheel flange 
dx=25; //mm 
dy=25; //mm 
for i=1 to 12 do 
Move rail left by dx; 
 for i=1 to 12 do 
  Move rail up by dy; 
  if Rail and TGP8 overlaps then 
   Revert last vertical move; 
  end 
  dy=dy/2; 
 end 
 if range of TGP8-rail contact angles > 20 degrees then 
  Revert last horizontal move; 
 End 
 Vertically reposition the rail below the wheel 
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 dx=dx/2; 
end 
Algorithm 5-2 TGP8 fitting algorithm 
Figure 5-32 shows a TGP8 fitting result. 
 
Figure 5-32 TGP8 fitting result on a measured switch (to scale) 
4. Calculation of TGP8-rail contact angle 
The TGP8-rail contact angle is measured by calculating the distance between the TGP8 
points and the polygon formed by the rail points. As the manual measurements were carried 
out using a piece of white paper to aid visibility (a practice also used by some NR personnel), 
where the distance between the TGP8 and the rail is less than 0.1 mm (approximate paper 
thickness) the TGP8 was considered to be in contact with the rail. Figure 5-33 shows a close-
up of a TGP8 fitting. The black circle marks the lowest point of the TGP8 that is considered 
to be in contact with the rail. 
In Figure 5-33 the tangent at the black circled point is 59.86 degrees (to horizontal). 
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Figure 5-33 Close-up of TGP8 fitting example on a measured switch (to scale) 
Discussion of proposed TGP8 algorithm 
Due to the repetitive calculation of the time-consuming operation to check if a point is inside 
a polygon during the fitting stage, a TGP8 calculation in MATLAB® takes 8 to 9 seconds to 
complete on an Inter® Core™ 2 Duo @ 2.8 GHz processor. For a fitting accuracy of 50 µm 
(on each axis), the calculation takes 6 seconds to complete.  
A different method was developed where the TGP8 gauge and rail are handled as images. 
The main advantage is that the previously mentioned time-consuming operation is not 
needed. For a resolution of 10 pixels per mm using LabVIEW® the calculation time was less 
than a second. However, this method introduces quantization errors. For a higher resolution 
of 100 pixels per mm the processing time was over a minute. 
The calculation process is influenced by three sources of error: 
1. Laser measurement errors 
The first source of error acts as noise over the measured rail surface and it can never be 
completely eliminated. The noise is specific to the laser scanner and the scanCONTROL used 
in this work generally showed a normal distribution whereby small errors in the range of 
±20 µm are more likely than larger errors in the range of ±100 µm. As one of the two contact 
points that usually form (thread and flange contact points) generally shows a concave shape, 
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the filtering algorithm presented in section 5.1.2 was not used. Due to the risk of shape 
deformation the rail data was used unfiltered. 
As the noise increases the roughness of the rail, the increased roughness decreases the 
conformity between the two surfaces, which can decrease the area of contact and therefore 
can slightly increase the measured contact angle. 
2. Laser sensor axis origin errors 
In order to achieve accurate measurements it is important that the P8 wheel profile is placed 
over the rail at the same roll angle as the manual TGP8 gauge (which in turn is designed to 
replicate the roll angle of the train wheel set). During a wheel-rail contact stress analysis, 
Todd Euston, el al., [82] modelled a wheel set and used one wheel-rail contact point as a 
pivot point to rotate the wheel set until the other wheel would contact the rail, therefore 
calculating the correct roll angle of the wheel set. This solution is useful for a variety of 
wheel-rail fitting analysis; however, it can only be applied when both rails are recorded. In 
this work, the roll angle is calculated by knowing the transformation matrix between the 
trolley wheel-rail contacts and axis origin of the laser sensors. The error of the transformation 
matrix as well as the deformation of the trolley frame and vibration of the laser scanners has 
been considered negligible. 
The change in roll due to TGP8 having wheel profiles at both ends was not accounted for. As 
the TGP8 is fitted under flange contact conditions, the other P8 profile which is placed on the 
opposite rail experiences a tread contact. As a result, any track gauge variations lead to very 
small roll angles, which have been considered negligible in the computerised TGP8 
measurements (a change in height of 1 mm of the P8 profile sitting on the opposite rail leads 
to a roll error of just 0.036 degrees). 
3. TGP8-rail fitting measurement errors 
The fitting errors of 12.2 µm (for each axis) are considered negligible. 
4. Measurement of TGP8 contact angle 
For the identification of the lowest contact point a spacing allowance of 0.1 mm was adopted 
in order to simulate manual inspection methods. This is believed to introduce negligible 
errors. The contact angle was measured by calculating the tangent in the TGP8 profile. The 
high number of points forming the TGP8 point cloud data ensured a high resolution in 
measuring the tangent. 
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Overall, the highest source of errors is considered to come from the laser scanner. The 
difference between the manual measurements and the automatic ones is very small, but due to 
the nature of the measurement (shape fitting and lowest contact measurement), an overall 
measurement accuracy was not calculated. 
Differences between TGP8 contact angle and the contact angle as experienced by train 
wheels 
1. Under the weight of the train, point contacts deform to patches the size of small coins. 
This increases the conformity between the wheel and rail and thus the area of contact. This 
decreases the wheel-rail contact angle. In conclusion, the real wheel-rail contact angle can be 
slightly lower than the measured one. However, the difference is unlikely to be significant 
and if necessary can be partially compensated in the fitting process. 
2. Under the passage of train wheels with various wheel profiles, the rails wear out to 
various shapes. The lowest wheel-rail contact depends on the profile of both the wheel and 
the rail. Where the wheel profile is similar to the rail profile, a low contact can generally be 
achieved. Where the wheel-rail conformity is poorer, the lowest contact angle can become 
higher. 
For example, Figure 5-34 shows how the unworn flange of the TGP8 gauge can disallow 
contact to be made at a lower height and thus the TGP8 measurements can show a higher 
contact angle. 
In Figure 5-34 the black circle shows the location where the contact angle was automatically 
measured and the blue circle shows where contact could be made if the flange of the TGP8 is 
worn. 
In the case of Figure 5-35 it is the unworn gauge corner of the TGP8 which disallows contact 
to be made at a lower height along its flange. 
Although the difference is large, such situations appear further along the switch where the 
derailment hazard is very unlikely to appear and thus is not even checked. This measurement 
was taken at 1.2 m from the switch toe whilst the TGP8 measurements are required just for 
the first 1 metre in the case of this switch. 
There is at least one documented occurrence where the inspection of a switch passed the 
TGP8 gauge but failed when tested against a compliant worn P8 profile [12]. The use of the 
laser based system allows the measurement of the P8 contact angle using various P8 profiles 
(worn, part-worn, thread wear, flange wear, etc) assuring greater safety. 
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Figure 5-34 Example of TGP8 unworn flange now allowing contact at a lower height 
 
Figure 5-35 Example of TGP8 unworn gauge corner now allowing contact at a lower height 
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3. The TGP8 gauge measures the contact angle between the rail and a new P8 wheel 
when the wheel is fitted flush to the rail at a neutral angle of attack. In practice, the flange of 
a real P8 wheel may come in contact at a positive angle of attack, as shown in Figure 5-26. 
Thus, in this situation the wheel-rail contact angle can differ from the measured TGP8 
contact angle. The actual contact angle depends on: wheel profile, rail profile and relative 
position between the two. The relative position between the two is difficult to know as it 
depends, among other factors, on the track geometry and vehicle suspension and dynamics. 
Hence, the use of a laser based system alone cannot compensate for this error unless 
approximations are used, which would inevitably reduce the measurement accuracy. 
Although all of the above situations have the potential of generating a false-negative 
inspection result, which is dangerous for a safety-critical asset, the amount of error generated 
when using the TGP8 is relatively bounded. The author believes that the current maintenance 
limit of 60 degrees for a TGP8 measurement is a conservative one which can accommodate 
for errors in the measurements. For example, three trains managed to safely pass over a 
switch rail which measured a contact angle of just 46 degrees [11]. 
5.1.5 Derailment hazard 3 
The third derailment hazard inspection is carried out, depending on the switch type, by using 
either Gauge 1 or a TGP8 gauge. 
Gauge 1 is used to measure the height difference between the top of the stock rail and the top 
of the switch rail. This does not raise any challenges. The measurement of the TGP8 contact 
angle has already been discussed in section 5.1.4. 
Any hogging of the switch rail must be measured and used in order to compensate both 
measurements. 
5.1.6 Derailment hazard 4 
As explained in the NR/L2/TRK/0053 standard, the buildup of lipping on the inner faces of 
the two rails slowly prevents the switch rail from fully closing. Thus, the lipping provides a 
pivot point against which force develops and breaks off parts of the switch rail. The aim of 
this inspection task is the identification of such switch rail damage as it can pose a derailment 
hazard. 
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Provided the switch rail is cleared of grease and dirt, the manual inspection can be considered 
to have a good immunity against human errors. In 2012 at Shrewsbury station in the UK, the 
failure to correctly inspect a switch rail against damage was mostly due to inadequate 
cleaning of the switch rail [13], which if done improperly can cause any visual inspection 
method to fail. However, the aim of this chapter is to replicate all inspection tasks defined in 
the NR/L2/TRK/0053 standard while reducing, if not eliminating, human errors.  
The manual inspection starts by identifying the areas of damage. The depth of the identified 
damage is evaluated using Gauge 2 and the switch fails inspection if: (1) the depth of any 
damage renders the remaining top of the switch rail below Gauge 2 (more than 19 mm below 
the top of stock rail), (2) the length of the damage is more than 200 mm along the length of 
the switch rail, (3) if damage is present in two or more separate locations along the length of 
the switch rail, or (4) if the damage is associated with the switch toe. Thus, the inspection 
system must be able to identify damages and establish: 
1. their location along the switch; 
2. their length, and; 
3. their depth relative to the top of the stock rail. 
Methodology 
The methodology for automatically identifying damaged switch rails according to the 
NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard is composed of three steps. The first one was to first 
develop an understanding of what the switch rail damage is. Secondly, this understanding 
was then disseminated in order to identify a set of characteristics that characterise damaged 
switch rails and can be expressed in a mathematical context. Lastly, an algorithm was written 
to assess switch rails based on the identified characteristics of switch rail damage in 
accordance with NR/L2/TRK/0053. 
Step 1: Understanding switch rail damage in accordance with NR/L2/TRK/0053 
There has been little information published relating to the understanding of how the switch 
rail breaks and the shapes under which damage can occur. Due to the fact that switches are 
immediately replaced or repaired once it has been identified that they have sustained damage, 
it is very difficult to have access to damaged switches on the railway network. Thus, the 
switches that were assessed for the presence of derailment hazard 4 were either from old rail 
yards or in pictures obtained by the author from various sources. 
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Figure 5-36 Example of damaged switch rail (photo 1) 
In Figure 5-36 as well as the following figures, the red lines mark the damaged areas of the 
switch rail and the green lines mark the undamaged areas in accordance with 
NR/L2/TRK/0053. 
 
Figure 5-37 Example of damaged switch rail (photo 2) 
In Figure 5-37 the switch rail has damage in both the left and the right areas. When the 
middle part is individually assessed it shows no signs of switch rail damage. However, given 
the context (how it blends with the two damaged areas) it is possible that it had also suffered 
damage, but for one reason or another it is in a better condition. One such reason is that rail 
traffic may have smoothed out the damage. As the NR/L2/TRK0053 inspection standard does 
not provide any guidance on this matter, the clasification is considered open for debate. In 
practice, such situations may require a judgement call as the application of the 
NR/L2/TRK/0053 standard may be insuficient. 
AUTOMATION OF RAILWAY SWITCH AND CROSSING INSPECTION: RAIL 
PROFILE INSPECTION CASE STUDY 
 
Page 114 of 199 
 
 
Figure 5-38 Example of damaged switch rail (photos 3 and 4) 
right: Courtesy and Copyright Joss Apps 
The switch rail in the left photo of Figure 5-38 has small damage along its length (including 
both red and green areas). The author believes that because the damage indicated by the green 
line does not extend across the whole thickness of the switch rail all the way to the gauge side 
(along the X axis), it does not provide a rough surface on which a flange climb can occur. 
Thus, although vaguely specified in NR/L2/TRK/0053, the author believes that the green area 
in left photo of Figure 5-38 does not represent a derailment hazard. 
The tip and the end of the switch rail in the right photo of Figure 5-38 are free of damage; 
however the middle part had sustained some damage on its field face. As in the case of the 
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left photo in Figure 5-38, this damage also does not extend to the gauge side of the switch rail 
and thus is not considered by the author to be a derailment hazard. 
 
Figure 5-39 Example of damaged switch rail (photo 5) 
Courtesy and Copyright Joss Apps 
Although the damage pictured in Figure 5-39 is across the whole thickness of the switch rail, 
the damage is smooth and does not present any signs of breaking which may provoke flange 
climb. Thus, under NR/L2/TRK/0053 it is not considered a derailment hazard. 
 
Figure 5-40 Example of damaged switch rail (photo 6) 
Courtesy and Copyright Joss Apps 
Similar judgement applies to the switch rail shown in Figure 5-40. With the exception of the 
switch tip, the switch rail does not present a derailment hazard as described in 
NR/L2/TRK/0053 (even though the switch rail presents a steep ramp which could help a train 
wheel to climb up). 
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Figure 5-41 Example of damaged switch rail (photo 7) 
In Figure 5-41, the damage is similar to that shown in Figure 5-39 and Figure 5-40, but in 
comparison it is much more irregular in height. Although difficult to assess, the author 
believes that it does not show derailment hazard 4 as there are no signs of breaking at the top 
of the switch rail as described by the NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard. 
Step 2: Identification of switch rail damage characteristics in accordance to 
NR/L2/TRK/0053 
Based on the developed understanding, a set of characteristics were established that define 
damage in accordance with the NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard. These characteristics 
are as follows: 
1. Damage is present extending across the whole thickness of the switch rail (along X 
axis); 
2. The top of the switch rail has an irregular height along the length of the switch (along 
Z axis), and; 
3. Parts of the switch rail which present the first characteristic but not the second may be 
classified as damaged if other parts of the switch present both the first and second 
characteristics (open to interpretation). 
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Step 3: Automatic inspection of switch rail damage in accordance with 
NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard 
As stated in section 3.2, one of the requirements of this research is to not use black box 
techniques. Thus, the algorithms must be easy to understand. The use of signal processing 
techniques is less transparent to the user and is not used in this work for the identification of 
switch rail damage. 
Based on the three characteristics of switch rail damage, it is clear that the maximum height 
of the switch rail along its length contains enough information to be solely used for the 
identification of damage. Thus, it will be referred to as the height profile. The height profile 
is used to create a defect free height profile which has similar features to the height profile 
but it does not show any defects. The difference between the two is calculated and called 
potential damage. The potential damage is then classified as gradient defect (not a derailment 
hazard 4 damage) and damage defect (a derailment hazard 4 damage). The process is shown 
in Figure 5-42. 
 
Figure 5-42 Damage identification process 
The height profile of in-service switches can be very different from the manufacturer 
specifications and still be considered to be in a good condition, therefore the defect free 
height profile is derived from the height profile and not S&C design specifications.  
Figure 5-43 shows the correct defect free height profile for four hypothetical switch rail 
height profiles. For the sake of clarity the figure is shown at a scale of 1:1 and the defect free 
height profile is shown slightly above the height profile. 
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Figure 5-43 Defect-free height profiles for four theoretical height profiles (1:1 scale) 
A distinctive feature that the defect-free height profile must have is that it should have a 
holistic view of the switch. For example, in Figure 5-43 plot (c), the defect-free height profile 
identifies two separate possible defect areas whereas in Figure 5-43 plot (d), due to the higher 
defect depth, the two defects are treated as just one. 
The calculation of the convex hull of the height profile partially satisfies the requirements for 
the generation of defect-free height profile. However, as it is not sufficient, an extra step has 
been introduced. Prior to the calculation of the convex hull, the height profile is deformed. 
The amount of deformation is proportional to the severity of height variations, which are still 
considered defect-free. The process is graphically shown in Figure 5-44, where the blue plot 
represents an height profile 2 metres long and the green plot represents the deformed height 
profile using a radius of 1.5 meters. 
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Figure 5-44 Deformation of height profile before calculation of convex hull (to scale) 
Considering point B(x,y) part of a perfectly horizontal height profile, B’(x,y) is calculated 
using the following formulas: 
∝ K/,L " M/ 
NOx " r ∙ sin α 
NOy " r ∙ cos α 
Where M " , and , " NU − VU. 
Now considering a height profile which is not perfectly horizontal, then any height variations 
are added to the deformed height profile along OB' and thus the last two formulas become: 
NOU " / ∙ 0WHX ' YNZ − VZ[ ∙ 0WHX 
NOZ " / ∙ \]0X ' YNZ − VZ[ ∙ \]0X 
The convex hull of the deformed height profile is then calculated. The indexes of the points 
that define the convex hull are then used to identify the shape of the defect free height profile 
based on the original height profile. 
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The last step is defect classification. In Figure 5-45, plot (a) shows a relatively good height 
profile, plot (b) one with a damage defect, plot (c) one with a gradient defect and plot (d) one 
with a damage defect and high gradients (i.e. a combination of plot (b) and (c)). For clarity 
they are shown at a scale of 1:1. 
 
Figure 5-45 Switch rail height profile examples (1:1 scale) 
According to the identified characteristics of a damaged switch rail, the second derivative of 
potential damage can be used to identify damage defects. Thus, a simple threshold technique 
can be used to identify the damage defects. The results are shown in Figure 5-46. 
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Figure 5-46 Identified damage defects in four hypothetical scenarios (1:1 scale) 
In Figure 5-46 the red stars show where the second derivative of potential damage exceeded 
40 µm/mm2. Using this method, both small damage defects of just 1 mm (Figure 5-46, plot 
(b)) and large gradient defects (Figure 5-46, plot (c)) are correctly classified. In this example, 
the second derivative of potential damage in plot (c) was 8 times smaller than the threshold 
value. 
Where no more than one or two damaged points are identified, the length of the damage is 
considered the same as the distance between the two consecutive 2D profiles (4 mm in this 
case). Where several damaged points are identified, the damage length is considered the same 
as the length of the potential damage (which is the case of Figure 5-46, plots (b) and (d)). 
The potential damage also estimates the depth of the damage. 
Automatic inspection of switch rail damage on a measured switch 
As switches are immediately repaired or taken out of service once a derailment hazard is 
identified, the number of switches on the rail network which show a derailment hazard 4 is 
very is low. Moreover, due to health and safety requirements, it also very difficult to access a 
switch for research purposes on a live part of the NR infrastructure. Thus, due to this 
AUTOMATION OF RAILWAY SWITCH AND CROSSING INSPECTION: RAIL 
PROFILE INSPECTION CASE STUDY 
 
Page 122 of 199 
 
combined difficulty, the measured S&Cs are limited in their diversity of faults. Figure 5-47 
shows a photo of one of the switches that was inspected that had the greatest amount of 
damage, 13 PTS. 
 
Figure 5-47 Photo of a measured switch (13 PTS, Whitemoor Rail Recycling Centre, photo 1) 
Although the switch rail is overall in a poor condition, it does not present a derailment 
hazard 4. In plot (a) of Figure 5-48, the damage-free height profile correctly follows the 
shape of the height profile (abbreviated h.p. in Figure 5-48) where the gradients are small, but 
also identified a defect where the gradient changed abruptly. 
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Figure 5-48 Switch rail damage analysis (plot b to scale 1:1) 
A damage point was identified at 520 mm along the length of the switch. The location is 
shown in Figure 5-49 and its profile in plot (b) of Figure 5-48. 
 
Figure 5-49 Photo of a measured switch (13 PTS, Whitemoor Rail Recycling Centre, photo 2) 
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The result is considered good as it reflects the outcome of an inspection as specified by the 
NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard. As the length of the damage was identified at 4 mm 
(equal with the sampling period), the switch passes the derailment hazard 4 inspection. 
5.1.7 Derailment hazard 5 
The last derailment hazard within the NR/L2/TRK/0053 standard is concerned with the 
possibility of flange climb due to a sharp gauge corner profile. As explained in the standard, 
sharp gauge corners, which resemble the corners of a 20p coin, may provide an edge that can 
cut into the wheel and form a ledge to climb. The derailment risk is present in the case of 
austenitic manganese steel (AMS) switches only. 
The manual inspection against sharp gauge corners is carried out using a small gauge, switch 
rail radius gauge, the size of a one pound coin. 
Inspection procedure 
Figure 5-50 shows three examples of correct inspection as published in the NR/L2/TRK/0053 
inspection standard. 
 
Figure 5-50 Exemplification of the usage of switch rail radius gauge 
Courtesy and Copyright Network Rail 
The following is a summary of the five inspection rules as stated in NR/L2/TRK/0053 [15]: 
1. Face A of the switch rail radius gauge must be fitted flush to the rail; in Figure 5-50 
all diagrams are considered to follow this rule although the left diagram can arguably 
be a good example; 
2. If the switch rail is of “sufficient thickness” and there is no contact in face B, it fails 
the switch rail radius gauge inspection (e.g. Figure 5-50, centre diagram); 
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3. If the switch rail is so thin that the top of the switch rail falls within face C, it has to 
make contact at the top of face A in order to pass the switch rail radius gauge 
inspection (e.g. Figure 5-50, right diagram); 
4. If the switch rail touches faces A and B and leaves a gap at C it passes the switch rail 
radius gauge inspection (e.g. Figure 5-50, left diagram), and; 
5. Visual or tactile evidence of a sharp gauge corner fails the switch rail even if it passed 
the switch rail radius gauge inspection. 
The above five rules form the basis for passing or failing a switch rail assessed for sharp 
gauge corners. In this section, each of the above rule is referred to as the nth rule (e.g. 1st rule 
through 5th rule). 
The 5th rule implies that the inspection of the switch rails against derailment hazard 5 cannot 
be carried out by using only the switch rail radius gauge and that visual or tactile evidence 
can fail the switch rail irrespective of the inspection outcome of the gauge. 
As the gauge has an arc circle cutting of 60 degrees with a radius of 6 mm, it fails any switch 
which has a radius gauge corner of less than 6 mm over at least 60 degrees (application of 2nd 
rule). 
Potential issues relating to the correct application and usage of switch rail radius gauge 
The majority of switches (>95%) on the rail network can be confidently assessed based solely 
on the inspection standard. However, some switch rails may have a profile for which the 
correct inspection is not apparent in the inspection standard. In other words, the information 
provided by the inspection standard is not sufficient to always provide a confident and 
objective inspection result. Because of this, the use of the gauge can be subjective and may 
require a judgement call. Thus, through several meetings it was rapidly said that the gauge 
can be sometimes used in a subjective manner. 
To develop a good understanding, a set of various switches was inspected, which included 
many non AMS (austenitic manganese steel) ones. Hypothetical situations were also 
considered. The following is a summary of the concerns raised relating to the inspection of 
switches using the switch rail radius gauge: 
1. The size of the features that must be observed can sometimes be less than a 
millimetre. This makes it difficult to achieve precise and accurate inspections. 
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2. The phrase “thin such that the top surface of the switch rail falls within face C of the 
gauge” can lead to subjective use of the gauge. It is possible that for a given switch rail one 
person would class it as thin enough, apply the 3rd rule and pass it if contact is made at the top 
of face A and another would class the same switch rail as not thin enough to apply the 3rd rule 
and apply the 2nd rule and fail it. 
3. Correct usage of the gauge implies that face ‘A’ is fitted flush to the rail. This is not 
always possible as the switch rail may have a concave or convex surface which face ‘A’ 
should be in contact with. The inspection standard does not define how the inspection should 
be carried out in such situations. Possible causes of concave and convex switch rail gauge 
faces are: damage, deformation, lipping and poor grinding. For slightly convex surfaces the 
gauge can usually be positioned in slightly different wrong positions. The more convex the 
face is, the greater the range of possible incorrect positions. This can lead to both pass and 
fail results on a single switch rail. 
 
Figure 5-51 Example of how rocking of switch rail radius gauge may lead to different 
inspection results (left: pass example; right: fail example) 
In Figure 5-51, the two rails have the same shape. The gauge is positioned differently by 
rocking it clockwise and anticlockwise. The left diagram shows the gauge fitted so that the 
lower part of the A face conforms better than the upper part. This can lead to the application 
of the 4th rule as the switch rail makes contact at B and has a gap at C, therefore passing it. 
Similarly, the right diagram shows the gauge fitted to better conform to the higher part of the 
A face. This can lead to the application of the 2nd rule, as the switch may seem thick enough 
and it does not make contact at B, therefore failing it. 
4. Two specific situations can make it difficult to achieve an accurate and precise 
reading using the switch rail radius gauge. Considering a switch rail which conforms well on 
all three faces of the gauge (e.g. left diagram in Figure 5-52), it is difficult to accurately and 
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precisely identify if there is a small gap or a contact at face C. Similarly, considering a 
situation where the gauge may be in a small contact with the rail at the boundary between 
face B and C (e.g. red circle in Figure 5-52), it is difficult to objectively identify whether or 
not the contact is in face B or face C. Furthermore, by rocking the gauge clockwise and 
anticlockwise, the small contact can be slightly moved into face B or face C, which can 
change the outcome of the inspection (2nd rule and 4th rule). 
 
Figure 5-52 Two specific cases where it is difficult to accurately and precisely inspect switch 
rails using the switch rail radius gauge 
5. In some situations, the use of the switch rail radius gauge can pass a switch rail that 
has a sharp gauge corner. In Figure 5-53, the 4th rule passes the switch rail in the left diagram 
and the 3rd rule passes the switch rail in the right diagram. Both switch rails have a sharp 
gauge corner. 
 
Figure 5-53 Diagram of two theoretical sharp switch rails that pass the switch rail radius 
gauge 
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The switch rail radius gauge can also fail to identify the sharp corners of the British 20 pence 
and 50 pence coins. Accepting that the A face cannot entirely be fitted flush, the application 
of the 4th rule passes both situations shown in Figure 5-54. 
 
Figure 5-54 Switch rail radius gauge applied on a 20 pence and 50 pence coin 
Thus, the switch rail radius gauge cannot reliably be used to meet the aim of derailment 
hazard 5 as stated by the inspection standard, which is to identify rails with pronounced edges 
“like a 20p coin” [15]. 
In a report written by Zarembski [61], an expert panel concluded: “This gauge [switch rail 
radius gauge] was judged to be inconclusive. The difference between compliance and non-
compliance was determined to be very small, and it was not clear where non-compliance 
represented a dangerous condition.” 
The challenges of replicating derailment hazard 5 inspections as required by 
NR/L2/TRK/0053 inspection standard 
It has been concluded that, accepting the inherent reliability limitations of the switch rail 
radius gauge, the research and design of an automatic inspection algorithm to replicate the 
derailment hazard 5 inspection requirements would require: (1) the development of a clear 
and concise set of rules that can define the correct application of the gauge on any piece of 
rail, (2) the research and development of an algorithm that can be assured to reliably carry out 
the fitting process based on the identified rules and (3) the research and development of an 
automatic inspection algorithm that can carry out the inspection task of visually and tactilely 
checking for signs of a sharp gauge corner. The third inspection task is difficult to automate 
due to its weak and loose definition, as the inspection task is not defined in a complete, 
objective and measurable manner. 
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Thus, due to the following reasons, the development of an algorithm for automatic inspection 
of switch rails against derailment hazard 5 is difficult to research and develop: 
1. the switch rail radius gauge has, to some extent, inherent reliability issues; 
2. is it difficult to accurately establish the correct use of the gauge for any rail shape, 
and; 
3. it is difficult to accurately establish what tactile and visual evidence of a sharp switch 
rail is. 
As a result, the author considers that the development of an alternative method for automatic 
inspection of switch rail sharpness is the best way to proceed. By considering an alternative 
approach: 
1. the issues related to the correct usage of the gauge, the automatic fitting process, the 
gauge’s inherent limitations and the automatic inspection of visually and tactilely 
inspecting the switch rail can all be avoided, and; 
2.  a more scientific approach can be developed resulting in higher reliability and safety 
assurance. 
It must be noted that the development of an alternative method for the inspection of switch 
rails against sharp corners implies that the automatic inspection results are no longer fully 
comparable with manual inspection results.  
The requirements and challenges of inspecting switch rails for sharp corners 
The first question that needs to be answered is what rail property should be measured. Sharp 
corners can be well defined by two parameters: (1) the amount of angle change along the 
surface of the rail and (2) the distance along the surface of the rail over which the angle 
change takes place. However, the ratio between angle change and distance may not be 
sufficient if adequate values for angle change or distance are not considered. In order to 
establish meaningful limits, the following criteria are considered: 
1. the rail shape must show an angle change greater than a certain limit in order to 
consider it a potential sharp corner; thus, the angle change is considered a qualifying 
parameter which has to reach certain levels, and; 
2. a corner has to change its angle over a distance less than a certain limit in order to be 
a sharp one; thus, the distance parameter is considered a severity measurement 
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parameter which has to be below a certain level to consider the edge a severe one 
(failure). 
Both parameters have to fulfil certain limits for a switch to be positively identified. Figure 
5-55 shows the adopted limits for the identification of sharp switch rail corners. 
 
Figure 5-55 Limits for the identification of sharp switch rail corners 
As there is no standard for identifying such limits, the limits used in this work have been 
established empirically through observation of various switch rails with and without sharp 
corners. Angle changes of less than 20 degrees are not considered a hazard even if the 
distance is as low as zero. Angle changes of 20 degrees are still considered too small to pose 
a derailment hazard 5, but are identified anyway. Angle changes of 25 to 35 degrees are 
considered to reflect the commonly sharp corners found on the railway network which pose a 
derailment hazard 5. 
The design of the switch rail radius gauge features a corner of 60 degrees over a distance of 
6.28 mm. Therefore, the gauge would fail any switch which shows a distance of less than 
6.28 mm over an angle change of 60 degrees. This gauge behaviour was adopted in the new 
method by setting a limit of 6 mm for an angle change of 60 degree. However, most faults are 
expected to show an angle change of around 25 to 30 degrees. 
Switch rails are positively identified if the distances along the angle changes of 20, 25, 30, 35 
and 40 are: 1, 1.4, 1.9, 2.4 and 3 mm. 
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Considering two points in a two dimensional coordinate system defined by 
 " {U, Z} and  

 " {U, Z}, the angle of the line that passes through the two points can be calculated using 
the following formulas: 
% " Z − ZU − U 
∝" arctan % 
where X is the angle. However the simple calculation of angle on a measured profile 
generally leads to poor results. Figure 5-56 shows a measured rail profile. Although the rail 
profile did not show any sharp corners, the use of the above formulas leads to noisy 
measurements of the rail angle, as shown in the lower plot of Figure 5-56. 
 
Figure 5-56 A switch rail profile and its angle along its surface 
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The difficulty in measuring the angle comes from the fact that the angle of the raw data 
shows high noise levels of up to ±15 degrees (as shown in the lower plot of Figure 5-56) 
although the surface can be considered to be relatively round (as shown in the upper left plot 
of Figure 5-56). As a result, the identification of 20 degrees corners is not immediately 
possible due to the high noise level. Ideally, the noise level should be at least four times 
lower than the useful value (e.g. less than ±5 degrees). Furthermore, the distance over which 
the angle change should be measured is just 1 mm, meaning that it could be defined by as few 
as just four 2D points. 
In general, angle measurement methods which use very few points around the point where 
the angle is to be calculated result in noisy measurements, while methods which have a more 
holistic approach to the data (e.g. curve fitting) result in smoother measurements. The use of 
feature preserving filtering algorithms also presents a risk on both sides; they can over filter 
the data or accentuate the corners. 
Another issue with the inspection of sharp corners is related to the overall shape of the rail 
and how it interacts with the train wheel. Due to the localized nature of the wheel-rail contact, 
a switch rail with a sharp surface may not pose a derailment hazard 5 if the sharp corner 
never comes in contact with any train wheels. Such a situation is shown in Figure 5-57. 
 
Figure 5-57 Sharp switch rail that does not pose a derailment hazard 5 (diagram 1) 
Such situations should be identified in order to avoid the expenditure of unnecessary 
maintenance. 
As the shape of the rail can change to an unknown shape through wear, damage and 
maintenance, very little information can be inferred about the rail which can be used for the 
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task of assessing its sharpness. For example, in many situations (as in Figure 5-57) sharp 
corners with angles close to horizontal do not come in contact with the train wheel. However, 
it cannot be concluded that the above statement will apply to all inspected switch rails. For 
example, the switch rail shown in Figure 5-58 has a very similar shape but due to its very low 
height, it is likely to make contact with train wheels. 
 
Figure 5-58 A switch rail with a sharp gauge corner 
Courtesy and Crown Copyright RAIB 
Thus, if anything is to be inferred about the impossibility of a sharp rail corner posing a 
derailment hazard 5, an approach must ensure that the statement is valid for all situations that 
can take place. 
In order to identify if a sharp switch rail corner poses a derailment hazard 5, the wheel-rail 
interaction can be analysed. However, the analysis would reveal the answer only for the 
wheel profile used in the analysis. Analysis with a worse case wheel profile is not feasible, 
because in this context there is no wheel profile which can act as a worst case for all switch 
rails. This is because worst case is a case where the wheel profile is in contact with the largest 
possible area of the switch rail. This implies that the wheel-rail conformity is extremely good, 
which also implies that the wheel has a shape which is very similar to the combined shape of 
the stock rail and switch rail. The use of a set of wheel profiles in a wheel-rail analysis poses 
two other issues: (1) possible large computation time (as one accurate wheel-rail fitting can 
AUTOMATION OF RAILWAY SWITCH AND CROSSING INSPECTION: RAIL 
PROFILE INSPECTION CASE STUDY 
 
Page 134 of 199 
 
take a few seconds to compute) and (2) the task of demonstrating that the selected set of 
wheel profiles is diverse enough to identify derailment hazard 5 for any switch rails. 
Development of inspection algorithm 
The first issue to be discussed here is the accuracy of the measured rail angle. Figure 5-59 
shows the profile of a new P8 wheel and its corresponding angle. 
 
Figure 5-59 P8 wheel profile and its corresponding tangent 
It can be observed that the angle of a new P8 profile (bottom plot of Figure 5-59) has three 
distinct sections: a green section where the angle is strictly increasing, a red section where the 
angle is constant, and a blue section where the angle is strictly decreasing. As the green and 
blue sections show strictly increasing and strictly decreasing angles, they are concave (green) 
and convex (blue) shapes. In all new and worn wheels, these sections always come as a whole 
and in the same order. 
Figure 5-60 shows the profile and corresponding angle of two measured worn train wheels. 
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Figure 5-60 Two worn wheel profiles 
Although the three sections in the two angle profiles shown in the bottom plot of Figure 5-60 
are not strictly increasing, constant and strictly decreasing, the reason is considered to be 
primarily due to measurement errors and secondarily to very small wheel 
imperfections/defects. Thus, the wheel angle profiles are considered to be monotone. 
When two objects are pushed against each other, any concave section of one object cannot 
come in contact with any concave section of the other object. In the context of wheel-rail 
interaction this means that any concave sections of the rail cannot come in contact with the 
concave section of the wheel. Because of this, considering just the concave and straight 
sections of the wheel, a wheel-rail fitting using the convex hull of a convex rail (instead of 
the actual rail) will result in the same contacts as when using the rail. Thus, the convex hull of 
the rail is used to improve the measurement of the rail angle. 
Figure 5-61 shows that the convex hull is able to both (1) smooth out the measured angle and 
(2) have very little negative effect on the real corners which must be measured. 
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Figure 5-61 The angle of a measured rail profile and angle of convex hull of the same rail 
For example, at 67 mm along the X axis, the rail has a small corner of approximately 
10 degrees which is well preserved. Angle variations around that location do not pose a 
derailment hazard 5 as they do not come in contact with train wheels and are well filtered out. 
The application of this method is of course limited to the convex parts of switch rails. 
However, as all switch rail profiles are designed and managed to a convex shape, the author 
identified just one case where corners can lead to concave areas in switch rails. This is 
generally at the lower end of the profile and is due to wear and/or metal migration. 
The pronounced sharp corners on the lower part of the rail (as shown in Figure 5-62) are 
unlikely to appear on AMS switches (due to material hardness) and if any such corners form 
they do not present a derailment hazard 5. 
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Figure 5-62 Sharp switch rail that does not pose a derailment hazard 5 (diagram 2) 
The second issue discussed here is the elimination of sharp corners which do not come in 
contact with the wheel and hence do not pose a derailment hazard 5. This is achieved by 
calculating the convex hull of the stock rail and switch rail pair and identifying sharp switch 
rail corners which cannot come in contact with train wheels. Figure 5-63 shows an example.  
 
Figure 5-63 The use of convex hull to identify areas in the switch rail which cannot come in 
contact with any train wheel 
For clarity the purpose of the two convex hulls which are carried out is summarized. The first 
one is applied only on the switch rail and its purpose is to filter the concave corners which 
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cannot come into contact with the concave areas of train wheels. The second one is applied 
over both the stock rail and switch rail and its purpose is to filter convex corners (although as 
a side effect it filters concave ones as well) of the switch rail which cannot come into contact 
with the concave areas of train wheels due to the presence of the stock rail. 
Thus, only the red area is considered for evaluation against sharp corners. The pronounced 
sharp corner of the switch rail (around 65 mm on the X axis) is dismissed. 
The measurement algorithm is as follows: 
1. Calculation of convex hull over both the switch rail and stock rail 
As shown in Figure 5-63 and explained above, this step identifies the switch rail area which 
cannot come in contact with any train wheel. 
2. Expansion of considered area 
As shown in Figure 5-64, switch rails can show sharp corners in the immediate vicinity of the 
convex hull. Thus, the considered area is expanded to account for possible wheel and rail 
deformations. Points forming the convex hull of the switch rail are added to the considered 
area until a minimum length of 0.7 mm is added. 
 
Figure 5-64 Expansion of considered area 
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The process is exemplified in Figure 5-64 where the expanded area is shown in pink. 
3. Elimination of concave areas within the switch rail 
In some situations, due to wear and metal migration, the switch rail can show concave areas. 
These areas are eliminated. This is achieved by calculating the convex hull of the switch rail 
and eliminating the lowest points in the switch rail until the maximum distance between the 
convex hull and the switch rail is less than 0.5 mm. 
4. Elimination of switch rail points which are 30 mm below the top of the switch rail 
Considering the design specification of the P8 wheel and worst case scenarios, the lowest 
wheel-rail contact point is never more than 30 mm below the top of the stock rail (or tread of 
the wheel). 
5. Calculation of angles and distances 
The shortest distance for angle changes of 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55 and 60 degrees is 
calculated and compared with the thresholds shown in Figure 5-55. 
This particular example has two small corners with an angle change of around 15 degrees and 
thus no faults are identified. 
Discussion of algorithm 
The presented method provides good results as it is able to both filter the point cloud data and 
achieve accurate measurements of corners which come in contact with train wheels. For the 
measurement of sharp corners, the use of the convex hull is also a good substitute for worst 
case wheel-rail analysis, as it can help to identify all sharp corners which may come in 
contact with any train wheel. 
5.1.8 Further possible improvements in the area of inspection and maintenance of 
S&Cs outside the current Network Rail standards (NR/L2/TRK/0053 and 
NR/L2/TRK/1054) 
Sections 5.1.3 to 5.1.7 analysed the current inspection methods, outlined potential limitations 
in reliability (both due to method and human errors) and proposed new methods which 
replicate the current standards but without being affected by human errors. 
As the title suggests, this section outlines possible improvements in the area of S&C 
inspection which builds up on the top the current NR/L2/TRK/0053 and NR/L2/TRK/1054 
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inspection standards. Some improvements are alterations to current inspection procedures 
while others are completely new practices. 
Considering a laser-based approach to the inspection and maintenance of S&C, the following 
improvements are suggested: 
1. The P8 contact angle measurement should at least be carried out using a set of 3 or 4 
wheel profiles instead of a single P8 profile. In the future, the calculation of the P8 
contact angle should be changed to measure the lowest possible contact angle for any 
worn train wheel. This would likely be achieved by analysing the rail profile without 
fitting any train wheels. This would increase the level of safety as the current TGP8 
gauge measures the contact angle for a brand new P8 profile which is likely to be 
higher than the actual contact angle for certain worn P8 profiles. 
2. The P8 contact angle could also be calculated while virtually wearing the rail profile. 
This would allow the amount of useful material remaining to be measured and would 
enable the prediction of future P8 derailment hazards. This would be beneficial 
towards asset management and maintenance planning. 
3. Wheel-rail fitting can be used to measure the lateral position of the wheel set under 
flange contact conditions as it enters the switch. A large lateral displacement at the 
switch toe can identify the risk of striking the top of the switch rail. This was the 
cause of a tram derailment at Birmingham Snow Hill station [78], as shown in Figure 
5-65. 
 
Figure 5-65 A switch rail which caused a tram to derail at Birmingham Snow Hill 
station 
Courtesy and Crown Copyright RAIB 
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This derailment hazard is generally managed by periodically carrying out derailment 
hazard 1 inspections which aim to identify whether or not the maximum height of the 
switch rail is above the lowest point in the sidewear scar. However, it is likely that 
this inspection is not sufficient to identify the risk of striking the top of the switch rail 
when a square flange in being used. There is also no evidence to say that the tip of a 
switch rail which passes derailment hazard 1 cannot be struck by train wheels 
showing new and worn P8 profiles. 
Figure 5-66 shows the lateral position of a simulated new P8 wheel profile on a 
measured switch rail which failed derailment hazard 1. The lateral position has been 
measured relative to the field point (14 mm below the top of the rail) of the measured 
stock rail just in front of the switch toe. 
 
Figure 5-66 The lateral movement of a simulated P8 train wheel in flange contact 
with a measured switch rail that failed derailment hazard 1 
The risk of striking the top of the switch rail is very evident, as Figure 5-66 shows a 
lateral movement of 3 mm in the first 25 mm of the switch and 5 mm in the first 
70 mm of the switch. The figure also shows that the switch rail could be ground to a 
condition where the lateral movement would be smooth and start from zero. By 
simulating the lateral movement of train wheels, one can precisely identify whether or 
not the tip of a switch rail could be struck by train wheels (this analysis considers 
worst case for switch geometry where the wheel is always in flange contact with the 
rail). This could help achieve better safety as well as help to scope and plan the S&C 
repair work. 
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4. The height profile of the switch rail can be used to identify gradient defects. 
Figure 5-67 shows the height profile of a switch rail located in the area of Princes 
Street Gardens close to Edinburgh Waverley station, immediately following a 
derailment. RAIB concluded that “There is an apparent risk of a ramp being created 
where a switch rail that is failing gauge 2 in the first metre increases in height and is 
introduced between the stock rail and wheel flange from below, particularly where 
there is flange contact between the train wheels and the stock rail”. Using an S&C 
laser-based trolley such conditions can be easily identified, which would help to scope 
the grind and weld repair. 
 
Figure 5-67 A switch rail height profile as measured by RAIB 
Courtesy and Crown Copyright RAIB 
5. When carrying out weld and grind repairs on switches, the repair actions could be 
used to simulate the shape of the switch after the planned repair work. Often, the 
switch repair work consists in grinding the switch rail. This process removes a defect 
but can introduce another. This is what happened in 2007 [11] when workers 
introduced a “derailment hazard 2” while repairing “derailment hazard 1”. Similarly, a 
grind repair created the condition shown in Figure 5-67. Most switch rail grid repairs 
can be generally described by three vectors: angle of grinding, amount of grinding, 
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and distance. By simulating the proposed grind repair on the switch rail, one can 
recalculate the result of the five derailment hazards and identify whether or not the 
repair work can lead to another derailment hazard or other faults such as the one 
shown in Figure 5-67. This could be used as a powerful tool for improving the quality 
of switch rail repairs. 
The above five improvements, together with the automatic inspection of the five derailment 
hazards, if used as part of a laser-based S&C inspection strategy could improve both the 
safety and quality of maintenance of S&Cs which in turn may also improve the life cycle cost 
(LCC). Chapter 7 discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the use of laser-based 
inspection of S&Cs under five different technical solutions: dedicated measurement trains, in-
service trains, inspection wagons, road-rail vehicles, on-site robots, rail trolleys, and laser-
based hand gauges. 
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6 INSPECTION OF RAILWAY CROSSING PROFILE 
The profile of railway crossings are managed by Network Rail through period manual 
inspection as described in the NR/L2/TRK/1054 inspection standard. Depending on the type 
of the crossing, the standard specifies the use of a one-metre or two-metre straight edge in 
conjunction with a stepped gauge. When carrying out the inspection, the straight edge is 
placed on the crossing in seven positions (procedure also known as “7-point check”). 
However, three positions are very similar with other three positions, the difference being just 
the path for which the wear is inspected, straight path or diverging path. The seventh position 
is along the centre of the crossing, middle way between the straight path and the diverging 
path. Thus, the inspection standard specifies in total four methods for the inspection of 
crossing profile. These methods are discussed in separate sections from section 6.1.3 to 
section 6.1.6. The objectives of each of the mentioned sections are, as set out in section 1.4: 
• to identify whether or not the use of current crossing profile inspection methods, as 
defined by the NR/L2/TRK/1054 inspection standard, can lead to considerable 
measurement errors and the source of those errors; 
• to identify if possible and to develop alternative automatic inspection methods can be 
used to replicate the current crossing profile inspection tasks as defined by the 
NR/L2/TRK/1054 inspection standard whilst eliminating human errors; 
• to identify whether or not improvements on the developed crossing profile inspection 
methods could reduce the systematic errors of inspecting crossings. 
As the straight edge inspection method requires that the measured crossing profile is accurate 
along the length of the crossing, a method for registering the crossing profiles was developed 
and is described in section 6.1.1. Finally, section 6.1.7 presents a number of conclusions. 
6.1.1 An approach for the registration of railway crossing point cloud data 
As shown in section 4.3, the S&C inspection trolley was designed to minimise unwanted 
movement across the six degrees of freedom. The design of the trolley constrains its 
movement such that the acquired data can be used to accurately carry out a NR/L2/TRK/0053 
inspection; however, this is not sufficient for the inspection of crossings in accordance with 
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the NR/L2/TRK/0054 inspection standard. The longitudinal height profile of the crossing, if 
unaccounted for, leads to unwanted roll of the measurement trolley which generates 
unacceptable measurement errors within the 3D model. As the height profile of the opposite 
rail is reasonably straight in comparison with the height profile of crossings, in the context of 
crossing inspection, the height profile of the opposite rail is considered straight. Thus the 
height profile of the crossing is accounted for by measuring the roll of the trolley. 
 
Figure 6-1 The developed S&C laser-based trolley on a measured railway crossing 
As the accuracy of inclinometers is greatly affected by accelerations (they are accurate only 
when stationary), a gyroscope is used to measure the roll angular speed which is defined by: 
^ " ,_,F  
where _ is the absolute roll angle. 
The measurement of angular speed using gyroscopes has several disadvantages and 
limitations. They are summarised as follows: 
1. The measurement is affected by the earth’s rotation. Note that this is a disadvantage 
purely in the context of the presented work. Under worst case conditions, when the 
measurement axis of the gyroscope is parallel to the rotational axis of the earth, the 
complete angular speed is measured, which is 360 degrees per 24 hours. This equates 
to 4.16×10-3 degrees per second. As the distance between the trolley wheels along the 
X axis is approximately 1500 mm, the height profile of the crossing can be affected 
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by a maximum of 1500sin(4.16×10-3) = 0.11 mm per second. Thus, if measuring 
30 seconds, the maximum error becomes 3.3 mm which is unacceptable. Depending 
on the location of the trolley (equator or poles) as well as its orientation (N-S or W-
E), the absolute error varies between 0.11 mm per second and 0 mm per second. 
2. Gyroscope measurements suffer from a constant bias [83]. As a result, the measured 
angular speed is not zero when the gyroscope is stationary. Due to this, the integrated 
angular speed is unbounded. In addition to the gyroscope bias, the input bias of the 
measurement device used to measure the output (generally voltage) of the gyroscope 
also contributes to measurement errors. 
3. Most gyroscopes suffer from bias instability [83]. As a result, the bias is not constant 
over time. Most gyroscopes present a bias which is temperature dependent. 
4. Other errors can occur, such as output linearity errors and random walk [83]. 
Figure 6-2 shows the measured height profile difference six times using a stationary CRS-09 
gyroscope. 
 
Figure 6-2 Measured height profile difference using a stationary CRS-09 gyroscope 
The blue plots show three measurements where the gyroscope was powered off for at least 
60 seconds prior to acquiring the data and the green plots show three measurements where 
the gyroscope was powered on for at least 5 minutes prior to acquiring the data. In practice, 
the bias drift is generally stabilised by keeping the gyroscope powered prior to taking 
measurements. However, in the context of an S&C laser based trolley this is not ideal, as it 
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requires significant overhead time. In railway geometry measurement applications both the 
constant bias and varying bias (due to bias instability) are easily compensated by high pass 
filtering. However, crossings generally show a dip in the middle, which when measured at 
walking speed produces an angular velocity that has the same appearance as a bias drift (in 
the blue plots of Figure 6-3 the effect of bias drift  during cold start is very visible). For this 
reason, low pass filtering cannot be used. 
Another approach is to eliminate just the DC component in the angular speed prior to 
integration. The results of this approach are shown in Figure 6-3. 
 
Figure 6-3 Measured height profile difference using a stationary CRS-09 gyroscope with the 
elimination of DC component prior to integration 
This approach eliminates mean bias error but does not compensate for bias instability. As 
shown in Figure 6-3, the approach can lead to large errors of up to -2 mm when the signal is 
acquired for 100 seconds under cold start conditions. The acquisition of short data (less than 
20 seconds) can reduce the maximum absolute error to about 0.2 mm. However, as shown in 
Figure 6-3, using this approach the end of the height profile is always measured at 0 mm. In 
the context of crossing inspection this is not acceptable, as one end of the crossing may be 
higher or lower than the other end. 
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Thus, a new approach is proposed which aims to measure the height profile of the crossing 
more accurately. For this reason, the output signal of the gyroscope during a finite amount of 
time is approximated to a function of the following four terms: 
H.`M/ 0--,F "  Fab − FFab ' c
F
Fab ' \ ∙ sin d
F
Fab ∙ ef ' ,F, 
where  is the bias at the beginning of the measurement (including the bias of the voltage 
measurement device and the measurement of the earth’s rotation), c is the bias at the end of 
the measurement, \ is a factor proportional with the non-linearity of the varying bias and , is 
the real angular speed affected by all other gyroscope errors such as non-linearity errors, 
noise and random walk. As railway crossings are reasonably straight sections of the railway, 
the orientation of the gyroscope relative to the rotational axis of the earth can be considered 
constant. Hence, the effect of the earth’s rotation is accounted for as a static bias. 
The angular speed was measured following a series of steps as follows. The trolley was 
initially stationary for 10 seconds. In this time, knowing that the angular speed of the trolley 
relative to the rails was zero, the acquired data was used to estimate the initial bias, marked  
in the previous formula. The trolley was pushed over the crossing and then pushed again back 
to its initial position (the trolley incremental encoder can be used to advise on its current 
position). The trolley was left stationary a second time for about 10 seconds, during which 
time the acquired data was used to estimate the bias at the end of the acquisition, marked c in 
the previous formula. The two estimated parameters were used to generate a compensation 
vector with linearly distributed values. The compensated angular speed was integrated in 
order to obtain the absolute roll value. The angular speed was compensated a second time by 
subtracting: 
\ ∙ sin 8 33ghi ∙ e<, 
where the \ parameter is calculated so that the roll value at Fab is zero. This compensates the 
non-linear varying bias. The results of the proposed approach on the measured, stationary 
data are shown in Figure 6-4, where the absolute maximum error is approximately 0.2 mm. 
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Figure 6-4 Measured height profile difference using a stationary CRS-09 gyroscope and the 
proposed method for improving the roll measurement 
The approach was used to measure the height profile difference of 3 metres of rail over which 
a reference board with known dimensions was mounted. The reference board is shown in 
Figure 6-5. 
 
Figure 6-5 Reference board with known dimensions 
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The reference board had three progressive height steps of 13 mm, 5.7 mm and 0.3 mm as 
shown in Figure 6-6. 
 
Figure 6-6 Dimensions of the reference board 
The results of the proposed approach are shown in Figure 6-7 as nine plots, six cold start 
(blue) and three warm start (green). 
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Figure 6-7 Measured height profile of height board using proposed approach 
The three height steps of 13, 5.7 and 0.3 mm have been measured with good accuracy despite 
various measurement errors. One source of errors was wheel out of roundness, which is 
visible in the middle graph of Figure 6-7 as a 0.2 mm peak-to-peak variation. The trolley had 
two types of wheels, one of 30 mm in diameter and one of 50 mm in diameter. Each of the 
two types were subsequently replaced with ball units, which did not introduce out of 
roundness errors, and the diameter of the remaining wheel type matched the periodicity of the 
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measured height profile. This confirmed that the source of error was wheel out of roundness. 
However, in practice, the ball units have not been used on the trolley to measure S&Cs as 
they generated excessive noise and vibrations. Another source of errors was from the tilted 
wheel-rail contact as exemplified in Figure 6-8. 
 
Figure 6-8 Example of wheel-rail contact measurement error 
The height of the red dotted line in Figure 6-8 shows the measurement error when the wheel-
rail contact point is considered to be horizontally in the middle of the wheel (at 40 mm along 
the X axis) but in reality is not (in the right plot of Figure 6-8 it is at 20 mm). 
 As the width of the wheels on the measurement side is 105 mm and the distance between the 
wheels across the width of the trolley (Y axis) is approximately 1500 mm, the assumption 
that the wheel-rail contact occurs in the middle of the wheel leads to a maximum 
measurement error of 105/2/1500=35 µm per millimetre of measured height. Thus, due to this 
error, a height measurement of 20 mm could be the result of measuring a true height of as 
low as 20-0.035×20=19.3 mm or as high as 20.7 mm. However, this would imply that the 
inspected track gauge is very different from the gauge of the trolley (e.g. track gauge of over 
1490 mm for a designed gauge of 1435 mm) which is not the case in practise as the S&C 
would receive a ban on movements much before it could degrade to such a condition. Thus, 
such a worst case scenarios is not representative of real life situations. 
The height of the rail relative to the opposite rail was not verified. This is due to the difficulty 
in carrying out such measurements. However, the ability of the algorithm to compensate for 
the earth’s rotation, fixed bias and varying bias was demonstrated in Figure 6-4. 
Conventionally, manual crossing measurements are carried out using 1 mm stepped gauges. 
Thus, manual measurements are limited to an accuracy of ±0.5 mm when all other errors are 
zero. However, when human errors are added, the measurement error can be in the range of 
millimetres, which is the reason why an automatic inspection system is desirable. 
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Measurement errors of up to ±0.5 mm are considered acceptable and thus the proposed 
approach is considered sufficiently accurate for the inspection of railway crossings. 
6.1.2 Point cloud data preparation 
Prior to analysing the profile of a measured crossing, the data is pre-processed, in seven steps, 
to achieve the following: 
• registration of each 2D profile to ensure accuracy of 3D model; 
• elimination of 3D points which are irrelevant towards profile inspection, and; 
• separation of rails and identification of rail knuckle for easier analysis in the next 
sections. 
The steps are as follows: 
1. Calculation of roll angle with reference to time using the approach presented in 
section 6.1.1 
2. Calculation of roll angle for each acquired 2D profile 
An incremental encoder was used to know the position of the trolley along the Z axis. Every 
4 mm the scanCONTROL lasers were triggered to acquire a 2D profile. Each 2D profile is 
time stamped when received by the computer. The beginning of the angular velocity 
measurement is also time stamped and added as an offset to the time axis of the roll angle 
waveform. The roll correction for each 2D profile is identified in the roll angle waveform at 
the moment in time defined by the timestamp of the 2D profile. Each 2D profile was rotated 
with the additive inverse of its corresponding roll angle. The middle of the contact points of 
the two top rollers sitting on the opposite rail was used for the axis origin of the rotation. 
3. The point cloud data is reversed along the Z axis (if necessary) so that the stock rail is 
first followed by the crossing nose as distance increases along the Z axis 
This was done so that the rest of the process is identical for the inspection of both diverging 
and straight routes (upper right plot in Figure 6-9). The point cloud data was decimated prior 
to plotting Figure 6-9 and Figure 6-10. 
4. Elimination of unwanted wing rail 
The flangeway gap which is always in excess of 30 mm was used to automatically identify 
the wing rail for elimination. The result is shown in the lower left plot of Figure 6-9. 
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5. Elimination of all points under 14 mm relative to the top of the rail 
As all inspection tasks are carried out either at the top of rails or at 14 mm below the top of 
the rails, all points which are below this value are eliminated (lower right plot of Figure 6-9). 
6. Separation of stock rail/wing rail and crossing nose 
In order to ease the inspection process, the two components are separated. The flangeway 
gap, which is always in excess of 30 mm, was used to automatically classify the point cloud 
data (Figure 6-10). 
 
Figure 6-9 Results of preparation of crossing point cloud data; upper right: after sorting; 
lower left: after elimination of wing rail; lower right: after elimination of points under 14 mm 
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Figure 6-10 Results of separation; left: crossing nose; right: stock rail and wing rail 
7. Identification of stock rail/wing rail knuckle 
Prior to the identification of the stock rail/wing rail knuckle, the crossing angle was 
measured. All stock rail/wing rail gauge points that were on the X axis at least 30 mm away 
from the gauge point at the start of the stock rail were used to calculate a linear regression. 
The angle of the linear regression represents the crossing angle (in this example 1:8 or 
7.2 degrees). A second regression was calculated using all the gauge points which were not 
used in the first linear regression and were at a distance of at least 30 mm from it. 
Considering the y values of the two linear regressions as null, the linear regressions intersect 
each other at the knuckle point. 
6.1.3 Inspection of batter at the knuckle 
For the inspection of batter at the rail knuckle, a straight edge is placed on top as shown in 
Figure 6-11. The right end of the edge is firmly pushed against the rail while the gap forming 
at the left end is measured using a stepped gauge. 
The measurement algorithm is as follows: 
1. Measurement of stock rail height profile (measured central to the width of the rail) 
2. Selection of one metre of height profile starting from the knuckle point 
3. Application of one-metre straight edge 
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Figure 6-11 Inspection method of batter at the knuckle as defined in NR/L2/TRK/1054 
Courtesy and Copyright Network Rail 
The application of the straight edge was done so that the gap between the top of the stock rail 
and the right most 40 cm of the straight edge was minimal. 
4. Calculation of stock rail top wear at knuckle 
The wear was calculated as the maximum distance between the left most 20 cm of the straight 
edge and the corresponding stock rail height profile. All three inspected crossings presented 
minimal wear at the knuckle. Figure 6-12 and Figure 6-13 show two results of automatic 
inspection of batter at the rail knuckle (“13 PTS, diverging path” and “far end 1, diverging 
path”). 
 
Figure 6-12 Inspection of batter at the knuckle (13 PTS, diverging path) 
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Figure 6-13 Inspection of batter at the knuckle (far end 1, diverging path) 
Manual measurements did not identify any wear at the rail knuckle. The automatic 
measurements identified 0.7 mm and 0.2 mm of wear. If compensating the measurements for 
wheel out of roundness (as identified in section 6.1.1), then the measurements become 
approximately 0.5 to 0.6 mm and 0 to 0.1 mm respectively. 
The automatic measurements also show the presence of twist, which is an important cause of 
rail derailments. This information can be used to better maintain the infrastructure. However, 
trolley based twist information should be treated with caution as the measurements are 
performed with the track unloaded. 
6.1.4 Inspection of crossing sidewear 
The inspection of crossing sidewear is accomplished by the application of a straight edge on 
the gauge side of the crossing ‘vee’ as shown in Figure 6-14. 
 
Figure 6-14 Inspection method of crossing sidewear as defined in NR/L2/TRK/1054 
Courtesy and Copyright Network Rail 
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The straight edge has to be positioned approximately 14 mm below the top of the crossing 
and its left end (as pictured) has to be firmly fitted flush. 
Manual inspections have been found to be difficult to carry out. The straight edge is wider 
than the flangeway gap and could not be fully inserted into the gap to achieve a firm 
horizontal position. Instead, the straight edge was introduced into the gap at an angle. Due to 
poor accessibility and the requirement to firmly fit the left side of the straight edge (as 
pictured in Figure 6-14) the gauge was often accidentally dropped in the flangeway gap 
before an accurate measurement was taken. Because of these difficulties, the measurement 
was carried out by two persons, one holding the straight edge and one inserting the stepped 
gauge. 
Some crossings were difficult to measure as they did not show a long and straight surface to 
which the straight edge could be correctly fitted. Instead, pivoting points changed the amount 
of sidewear measured. The shape of the crossing could be a result of lipping and metal 
migration. 
Another aspect is the height at which the measurement is taken. Although unspecified in the 
NR/L2/TRK/1054 standard, NR personnel carry out the inspection at 14 mm below the top of 
the crossing.  The height of the crossing ‘vee’, as shown in Figure 6-20, has a designed height 
profile which shows a height difference of 7 mm at the tip. When worn, the difference further 
increases. It is unclear whether the whole straight edge should be placed horizontally at 
14 mm below the highest part of the crossing, or if the edge should be placed at an incline, to 
reflect the height of the crossing profile. 
The measurement algorithm is as follows: 
1. Calculation of vertical position and pitch angle (rotation around the X axis) of straight 
edge 
Two reference points are created. As it was not clear whether the orientation of the straight 
edge should be horizontal or inclined to reflect the height profile of the crossing, a calculation 
was carried out for each case. For both calculations, the gauge point at 1 metre away from the 
tip of the crossing ‘vee’ was used as the first reference point. For the first method, the gauge 
point of the stock rail knuckle was used as a second reference point. For the second method, 
the gauge point of the tip of the crossing ‘vee’ was used as a second reference point. The two 
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reference points are used to establish the Y axis position and pitch angle of the straight edge 
(i.e. constrains all Y coordinates of the straight edge). 
2. Calculation of horizontal position and yaw angle (rotation around the Y axis) of 
straight edge 
Due to various imperfections in the crossings, lipping and metal migration, it became evident 
that in some cases more accurate measurements can be obtained by aligning the straight edge 
parallel with the opposite stock rail rather than with the crossing nose (see Figure 6-15). After 
constraining the yaw angle, the straight edge was horizontally shifted until it intersected the 
crossing. 
3. Calculation of sidewear 
The sidewear is calculated by subtracting the x coordinates of the straight edge from the x 
coordinates of the crossing points that are at the same height (or the closest) as the straight 
edge. 
Figure 6-15 shows a graphical result of both methods when used to measure the crossing 
sidewear of a 16 PTS crossing (straight path). The two methods did not produce the same 
results. The measurements differ the most at the tip of the crossing ‘vee’ where the measured 
sidewear was 1.85 mm and 1.15 mm. This shows that the vertical position of the second 
reference, and as a consequence the pitch angle of the straight edge, can change the amount 
of measured sidewear. Thus the question arose as to which approach is correct. As the 
crossing had very few unworn parts, the comparison with the profile of a new crossing would 
have been potentially inaccurate. Thus, a different approach was used. 
The crossing sidewear is relevant only to the passing of train wheels. As a conclusion, the 
wheel-rail interaction was considered. The sidewear can be measured at a height of 14 mm 
below the tread of the wheel, where the vertical position of the tread of the wheel is given by 
a wheel-rail simulation. Although a crossing wheel-rail simulation had not been carried out in 
this work, published wheel-rail simulations show that due to the dip present in crossings, train 
wheels experience a vertical displacement of 2 to 5 mm. Thus, considering that the sidewear 
should be measured at the height where the gauge contact normally occurs, the first method 
measures the sidewear at a height which is too high, overestimating it. Train wheels are 
partially supported by the wing rail as they engage with the tip of the crossing ‘vee’. Thus, 
the second method measures the sidewear at a height which is too low, underestimating it. 
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Figure 6-15 Crossing sidewear measurement example; top: stock rail knuckle used as second 
height reference; bottom: tip of crossing ‘vee’ used as second height reference (16 PTS, 
straight path) 
According to published wheel-rail simulations, the second reference point should be in the 
range of 68.84-5 to 68.84-2 which comes out at 63.84 to 66.84 mm. As the vertical positions 
of the second reference point for the two methods were 62.95 mm and 68.84 mm 
respectively, this supports the conclusion that one method underestimates the sidewear and 
the other overestimates it. 
As the vertical displacement of a train wheel running over crossings is generally not linear, 
but rather logarithmic, the author suggests that more accurate results should be obtained using 
a curved edge instead of a straight one, simulating the height of the wheel as is passes over 
the crossing. 
The cosine like shape in the upper plot of Figure 6-15 was a result of localised deformation 
(similar to a score mark) on the side of the crossing. As a result, the author suggests that more 
accurate measurements could be possible if the sidewear measurement would be carried out 
at a range of depths instead of a fixed value (i.e. 10 to 14 mm). 
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Both methods show a high sidewear at 2500 mm along the Z axis, a location where the 
straight edge is expected to be fitted flush. The main reason for this result was a change in the 
shape of the crossing. Figure 6-16 shows two cross sections of the crossing nose, one at 
1950 mm and one at 2500 mm. Note that unlike Figure 6-14 and Figure 6-15, these are not 
longitudinal sections (ZOX plane), but transverse ones (XOY plane). 
 
Figure 6-16 Two crossing profiles showing a change in shape (16 PTS, straight path, to 
scale) 
The green plot was plotted with a vertical offset of 1 mm to vertically align the two plots. 
However, no offsets have been applied to the X axis. As the train wheels generally do not 
come in contact at angles shallower than 60 degrees, any wear below the point at 60 degrees 
does not matter from the wheel-rail interaction point of view. Thus, in the case of the green 
plot in Figure 6-16, the sidewear should be measured at a height of no less than 61 mm on the 
Y axis instead of 72-14=58 mm, as required by the standard 14 mm rule. If the straight edge 
is to be fitted flush at 14 mm below the top of the crossing considerable errors (2 mm) would 
affect the measurement at the crossing nose. 
6.1.5 Inspection of wing rail top wear 
The inspection of top wear on the wing rail is carried out by the application of a straight edge 
as shown in Figure 6-17. As the tread of train wheels is wider than the width of rails, the 
wheel-rail contact can occur anywhere within the two green lines. Railway crossings 
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generally suffer from excessive wear at the wheel-rail transfer area and the red spot shows an 
approximate location where the wing rail is likely to be most affected by top wear. 
 
Figure 6-17 Inspection method of top wear of wing rail as defined in NR/L2/TRK/1054 
adapted from NR/L2/TRK/1054; Courtesy and Copyright Network Rail 
Manual measurements have been found to be very difficult to carry out. As the straight edge 
and the red spot are not vertically on top of each other, the application of the stepped gauge 
can be easily tilted, giving erroneous readings. It is difficult to know the correct orientation of 
the stepped gauge. Changing the position of the straight edge towards the wing rail 
underestimated the amount of wear, compromising the measurement. 
The measurement algorithm is as follows: 
1. Calculation of the straight edge position along the Z axis 
The position of the straight edge along the Z axis was calculated as starting from the stock 
rail knuckle one metre towards and over the crossing ‘vee’. 
2. Calculation of the straight edge position along the X axis 
The width of the stock rail at the knuckle is calculated and halved to find the horizontal 
middle of the rail. This distance is in the range of 34 to 37 mm relative to the gauge point. 
Both ends of the straight edge were positioned at the mentioned distance from the gauge 
point.  
3. Calculation of height profile based on x and z coordinates 
4. Application of the straight edge over the calculated height profile 
5. Calculation of the stock rail/wing rail height profile 
The height profile of the stock rail/wing rail must be calculated close enough to the gauge 
point so that the largest amount of wear can be measured, but at the same time, far enough 
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from the gauge point so that the naturally occurring corner of the rail is not mistakenly 
measured as top wear. As a compromise, the height profile was calculated at 10 mm from the 
gauge point. 
6. Calculation of top wear 
The top wear was calculated by subtracting the stock rail/wing rail height profile from the 
height of the straight edge. 
Figure 6-18 shows the results of automatically inspecting the straight path of a 16 PTS 
crossing. 
 
Figure 6-18 Wing rail top wear measurement example (16 PTS, straight path) 
The significant difference of over 3 mm at the left end of the straight edge is due to the 
relatively round shape of the rail. Starting with the rail knuckle, the rail is chamfered, giving 
it a more square shape. However, even at approximately 1200 mm along the Z axis, the round 
shape of the rail results in measuring a two millimetre height difference between the height at 
the middle of the rail and the height at 10 mm from the gauge point. The author suggests that, 
at 1700 mm along the Z axis where the top wear of the wing rail is largest (5.5 mm relative to 
straight edge), a wear allowance should be considered to account for the slightly round design 
of the rail head. 
The location of the highest wear, as marked by a red circle in Figure 6-17, was identified at 
around 1700 mm in the case of the straight path of 16 PTS. Figure 6-19 shows the wing rail 
profile at the mentioned location.  
AUTOMATION OF RAILWAY SWITCH AND CROSSING INSPECTION: RAIL 
PROFILE INSPECTION CASE STUDY 
 
Page 164 of 199 
 
 
Figure 6-19 Wing rail profile at 1700 mm along the Z axis (16 PTS, straight path, to scale) 
As the tread of the wheel starts to leave the wing rail, the right part of the rail has very little 
wear and the left part has developed excessive wear (green circle versus red circle in Figure 
6-19). Because of this height difference (4.6 mm in this example) it was very difficult to 
measure the relative height of the red circle (in Figure 6-19) referenced to the straight edge 
(as shown in Figure 6-17). Depending on how the stepped gauge was handled, the readings 
changed by 2 to 3 mm. This measurement was found to be the most difficult and potentially 
the most inaccurate. 
6.1.6 Inspection of crossing top wear 
The inspection of top wear on the crossing is carried out by the application of a straight edge 
as shown in Figure 6-20. 
Due to some crossing ‘vees’ having a dip in the middle, the manual inspection was found to 
be slightly inaccurate if the straight edge was fitted flush in the middle of the crossing (see 
Figure 6-21). 
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Figure 6-20 Inspection method of crossing top wear as defined by NR/L2/TRK/1054 
Courtesy and Copyright Network Rail 
 
Figure 6-21 Crossing profile at 850 mm from the tip of the crossing ‘vee’ 
(16 PTS, straight path, to scale) 
The measurement algorithm is as follows: 
1. Calculation of crossing ‘vee’ height profile 
In order to compensate for the dip as shown in Figure 6-21, the maximum height of the 
crossing was used to calculate the height profile of the crossing. 
2. Application of straight edge over the calculated height profile 
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The straight edge was applied to the height profile so that a best fit was obtained for the right 
most 40 cm of the straight edge (as shown in Figure 6-20). 
3. Calculation of top wear 
The top wear was calculated by subtracting the crossing height profile from the height of the 
straight edge. 
Figure 6-22 shows a measurement example of the same crossing, 16 PTS, straight path. 
 
Figure 6-22 Crossing top wear measurement example (16 PTS, straight path) 
Some crossings develop a distinct batter at the point where the train wheel loses contact with 
the wing rail. In Figure 6-22, such a batter is visible from 1900 to 2000 mm. In Figure 6-18 
from the previous section, if a two millimetre allowance is given to account for the slightly 
rounded design shape of the rail, it can be observed that the wing rail wear starts at 1350 mm 
and ends around 2000 mm (the area where the red plot is more than 2 mm below the blue 
plot). The location of the batter on the crossing matches the location on the wing rail where 
the wear ends. This supports the hypothesis that the batter on the crossing nose is a result of 
the weight of the train wheel being moved onto the crossing nose. 
Figure 6-23 shows the transverse profile of the wing rail (XOY plane) at two different 
locations, 1800 mm and 1950 mm. As part of the blue plot is vertically below the green plot it 
can be concluded that the blue plot shows more head wear than the green plot. The scale has 
different values for the X axis and Y axis respectively, as it is easier to observe the wear on 
the rail head. The wear on the blue plot can be observed as a slightly flat area. The green plot 
however does not show any flat area meaning that the wear on the wing rail at 1950 mm 
along the crossing is likely to be insignificant. The rail profile at the two locations of 
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1800 mm and 1950 mm in Figure 6-23 also supports the hypothesis that the batter on the 
crossing nose is a result of the weight of the train wheel being moved onto the crossing nose. 
 
Figure 6-23 Wing rail profile (16 PTS, straight path, not to scale) 
The batter on the crossing nose is a frequent crossing defect in the UK which is difficult to 
measure and size using current techniques. However, using automatic crossing 
measurements, the profile of the crossing and wing rail could be analysed in more detail to 
measure and quantify the wear, identify the presence of failure modes/wear mechanisms 
(such as the batter on the crossing nose) and even calculate wear rates. Such measurements 
could help towards asset management as well as aiding the weld and grind repair team with 
valuable information. 
6.1.7 Conclusions 
Straight edge analysis of railway crossing as sub millimetre accuracy is possible using 
measurement lasers. However, the straight edge methodology has inherent issues which can 
affect the accuracy of the measurements and the results provide limited information regarding 
the failure modes affecting the asset. 
In the case of measuring crossing sidewear (i.e. see Figure 6-14), pivoting points resulted 
from lipping, metal migration and breakings can result in accurate measurements; more 
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accurate measurements should be possible if the sidewear would be measured above the area 
where lipping and breaking of the gauge corner occurs. Thus, the author proposes that the 
measurement would be carried out at a higher level such as 10 mm instead of 14 mm, or 
where the angle of the gauge corner is no greater than 60 degrees. Considering perfect shape 
conformity between the a new P8 wheel and the measured rail, the measurement would then 
take place somewhere between 95 mm and 100 mm on the horizontal axis of Figure 5-59, 
instead of over 100 mm, in the red area, where metal lipping and breakings are far more 
likely. The proposed method would also greatly minimize or eliminate the errors introduced 
by the changing shape of the crossing as shown in Figure 6-16. In this case the sidewear 
would be measured at a height of around 61 to 62 mm instead of 58 mm if the 14 mm rule 
would be applied. The chosen inclination of the straight edge can also affect the measurement 
and thus, should also be considered. 
The inspection of wing rail top wear (Figure 6-17) is potentially the most inaccurate one 
when carried out manual using a straight edge. The reason for this is because the straight 
edge is not vertically above the area with the highest wear (red spot in Figure 6-17). As the 
straight edge is placed centrally on the head of the rail and the sidewear is cheeked closer to 
the gauge corner of the wing rail, the author suggests that due to the round shape of the gauge 
corner, an allowance should be given when measuring the wear. The amount depends on the 
design specification of the crossing. In the case of the straight path of crossing 16 PTS it is 
likely to be around 2 mm. 
The use of non-contact automatic profile measurement systems could also be used to 
automatically identify wear related issues and occurring failure modes. For example, Figure 
6-22 shows early sings of battering at the crossing nose as the weight of the train wheel is 
being moved onto the crossing nose. 
It must be reminded that with the presented methodology, the measured height profile of the 
crossing is affected by the height profile of the opposite stock rail. However, the height 
profile of opposite stock rail can be considered straight when compared with crossings and 
any irregularities on the stock rail are attenuated due to the large distance of 1 m between the 
wheels that sit on the stock rail. 
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7 CURRENT AND POTENTIALLY IMPROVED 
MAINTENANCE REGIMES 
This section considers the advantages and disadvantages of adapting and using the proposed 
S&C inspection system on a measurement train, an in-service train, a road-rail vehicle, a rail 
robot, as a trolley and as a laser-based hand gauge as part of the NR inspection regime for 
S&C profiles. 
It must be noted that trains record the data while the track is loaded while lightweight robots 
(<300 kg), trolleys and handheld inspection devices record the data while the track is not 
loaded. Depending on the track loading, some measurements such as track gauge can differ 
substantially. In general, there is an interest in measuring the track parameters in both loaded 
and unloaded conditions. Thus, in the following section, the loading/unloading of the track is 
considered neither an advantage nor a disadvantage. 
In this chapter, the term “possession” is often used. This term has a specific meaning when 
used by Network Rail and railway maintenance contractors and it is with the same meaning 
being used in this work. Under this meaning, trains which are scheduled in the train timetable 
do not take track possession regardless of whether the train is a passenger or a dedicated 
measurement train. 
7.1.1 Current NR inspection regime of S&C profile 
The current maintenance regime used by NR for the management of rail profiles in S&Cs 
throughout Britain is condition-based maintenance where the profile of S&C is repaired when 
it fails the periodic inspection. Furthermore, the periodic inspection is carried out at variable 
intervals. The interval between two consecutive inspections is determined based on various 
factors which include: track category, S&C type, S&C history, outcome of the last inspection 
and whether or not it is a recent installation. Thus, each S&C has a unique due by date for the 
next periodic inspection. Depending on the due date, schedule of the maintenance team, 
available possessions (if required) and other factors, a suitable date is arranged for the next 
inspection for each S&C. Typically, an S&C maintenance team visits two sites per day and 
inspect one or two switches and/or crossings per site (e.g. two switches at one site and a 
crossing at a different site). 
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7.1.2 Alternative profile inspection strategies for S&Cs 
S&C inspection using dedicated measurement trains 
Dedicated measurement trains can accurately inspect various track parameters at high speeds. 
These trains are generally expensive to maintain and run. In Britain, the New Measurement 
Train (NMT) is used to inspect medium and heavily used paths. Generally a path is inspected 
between once a month and every few months. 
Advantages: 
• Ability to automatically inspect a considerable numbers of S&Cs without requiring 
track possession 
Disadvantages: 
• Poor correlation between the automatically inspected S&Cs and the S&Cs requiring 
inspection 
• Very poor S&C coverage in large stations (i.e. station with over 50 S&Cs) 
• Inability to record both paths of an S&C in the same run 
• S&Cs need to be clear of dirt and grease 
• If the profile of the rails are not measured close to where the train wheel sits on the 
rail, the recorded height of the switch rail relative to the stock rail may be different 
than the one in practice when the switch rail is loaded; in this case the, in order to 
assure accurate inspections, the hogging of the switch rail should be measured 
automatically by the measurement train at the same time of measuring the rail profile 
(this may be very difficult to achieve on dirty switch rails) 
S&C inspection using in-service trains 
Small measurement equipment can be installed on in-service trains to inspect various track 
parameters [7,46]. In-service trains generally run on the same route several times a day. 
Advantages: 
• Ability to automatically inspect some S&Cs without requiring track possession 
• Repeated measurements at fine time intervals 
• Low running costs 
Disadvantages: 
• All disadvantages already mentioned re dedicated measurement trains 
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• Very low S&C coverage in the case of equipment permanently mounted on the train 
(because service trains generally run on the same routes) 
S&C inspection using dedicated inspection wagons 
An inspection wagon can be used to automatically inspect a considerable number of S&Cs 
within a large station. 
Advantages: 
• Ability to automatically inspect many S&Cs without requiring track possession 
• Ability to automatically inspect many S&Cs within large stations 
Disadvantages: 
• Potentially high equipment cost 
• Inspects all S&C in the same day (incompatible with current “due date” practice) 
• S&Cs need to be clear of dirt and grease (could be overcome if cleaning is scheduled 
before inspection and lubrication afterwards) 
• Similar to the dedicated measurement trains and in-service trains, switch rail hogging 
may need to be measured automatically and this may not be possible on dirty switch 
rails 
S&C inspection using road-rail vehicles 
Road-rail vehicles can be used to drive on both road and rail. They can be fitted with 
relatively large inspection equipment and can be used to drive to the inspection site. Once 
mounted on rails they can be used to inspect long track sections. 
Advantages: 
• Ability to measure specific S&Cs requiring inspection 
• Potential to inspect a considerable number of S&Cs in a single site visit (provided 
they are all in the same area and can be easily thrown on demand) 
Disadvantages: 
• Potentially high equipment cost 
• Requires track possession 
• Difficult to use where level crossings are not present 
• Difficult to move between specific S&Cs in large stations (> 50 S&Cs) 
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• Potentially low productivity if few (1 to 3) S&Cs are inspected per site visit 
S&C inspection using on-site robots 
Rail robots can be used to autonomously measure and inspect track parameters in various 
locations within a railway site. In the context of S&C inspection, their use is more beneficial 
in large stations where many S&Cs could be measured in one site visit. 
Advantages: 
• Ability to measure specific S&Cs requiring inspection 
• Potential to inspect a considerable number of S&Cs in a single site visit (provided 
they are all in the same area and can be easily thrown on demand) 
Disadvantages: 
• Potentially high equipment cost 
• Requires track possession 
• Difficult to carry to and from inspection site (considering a weight of 150 kg) 
• Difficult to move between specific S&Cs in large stations (> 50 S&Cs) 
• Potentially low productivity if few (1 to 3) S&Cs are inspected per site visit 
S&C inspection using rail trolleys 
Measurement trolleys can be a relatively lightweight (20-40 kg) piece of equipment that can 
be used to inspect various track parameters. 
Advantages: 
• Ability to measure specific S&Cs requiring inspection 
• Potential to inspect a considerable number of S&Cs in a single site visit (provided 
they are all in the same area) 
• Easier to handle than road-rail vehicles and rail robots (due to size and weight) 
Disadvantage: 
• Very likely to require track possession 
• Potentially low productivity if few (1 to 2) S&Cs are inspected per site visit 
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S&C inspection using laser-based hand gauges 
Hand gauges (< 10 kg) are common in the rail industry and have the advantage of portability. 
Thus, they can be used on live tracks in Britain without the need to arrange a possession as 
workers can pick them up and leave the track when a train is approaching. 
Advantages: 
• Ability to measure specific S&Cs requiring inspection 
• Easier to handle than road-rail vehicles, rail robots and rail trolleys (due to size and 
weight) 
• No possession required 
• Lower equipment cost compared with any other solution 
Disadvantages: 
• Less productive if needing to carry out many inspections in different locations of the 
same S&C 
7.1.3 Conclusions 
Each inspection method has its own advantages and the efficiency of each method depends 
on how these advantages are used in the implementation of the whole maintenance regime (in 
this context efficiency refers to the amount of money spent and time needed to routinely 
inspect all S&Cs in a network). 
Referring strictly to train based inspection methods, the in-service train with permanently 
mounted inspection equipment provides the smallest throughput in terms of unique inspected 
S&Cs/month. The NMT is scheduled to run various train paths so that track sections are 
inspected periodically. It could be used to periodically inspect a relatively large amount of 
S&Cs in the rail network. This may also be achieved with an add-on system such as the RILA 
(compact measurement system that can be easily attached to the end of passenger trains) if its 
schedule is well planned. Although there is no correlation between the S&C requiring 
inspection and those inspected, due to the large number of inspected S&Cs, it is expected that 
it would significantly reduce the number of manual S&C profile inspections required. 
Wagon based inspection systems such as the SIM (Switch Inspection and Measurement) 
could be used efficiently in large stations, as up to 100 S&Cs could be inspected in a few 
hours during the weekend night break. 
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However, the use and accuracy of these systems greatly depends on the cleanliness of the 
rails. It is very likely that the properties of lubricants would have to be improved and even 
then a case study would be needed to identify the safety risks involved with the automatic 
inspection of greasy and dirty switch rails. Moreover, the hogging of switch rails has to 
automatically be measured. 
In the case of on-site inspection of S&Cs, an S&C inspection solution should ideally: (1) be 
easy to set-up and clean-up (mounting, dismounting, carrying), (2) be rapid to use and (3) not 
require track possession. 
A laser-based hand gauge would be easy to carry around and use and it would not require 
track possession. However, these gauges are relatively slow to use as many individual 
measurements need to be carried out. As a conclusion, a laser-based hand gauge is efficient in 
the context of the current maintenance regime where many workers are required to visit a site 
to inspect a single S&C (or two, but at a distance apart) and do it without track possession. 
The use of larger equipment for the inspection of a single S&C per site visit would not 
increase the inspection efficiency, as the time saved when carrying out the actual inspection 
is easily lost in the more time-consuming process of set-up and clean-up. 
The efficiency of using rail trolleys, rail robots and road-rail vehicles is dependent on many 
factors. The most important factor is the number of S&Cs that are to be inspected per site 
visit. Other factors include: the ease with which points can be thrown on demand, the railway 
layout, the location of S&Cs requiring inspection and site access facilities. Thus, it can be 
difficult to accurately establish the efficiency of these methods, however, all three solutions 
have the potential to increase the inspection efficiency in large stations. 
In comparison with rail robots and road-rail vehicles, rail trolleys have the advantage of being 
easier to set-up and clean-up, which means they can also be used by weld and grind teams 
when repairing an S&C. The benefits of using a laser-based S&C measurement trolley are: 
(a) a better and more comprehensive understanding of the condition of the S&C, (b) advice 
with regards to repair (i.e. the switch that derailed a train at Princes Street Gardens [12] was 
beyond repair when a repair was attempted; the inspection trolley could identify situations 
where repair by grinding would introduce more derailment risks), (c) re-inspect the S&C after 
completion of weld and grind work to assure the switch is safe for traffic. Table 7 
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summarises several advantages and disadvantages of the discussed current and potential S&C 
profile inspection systems. 
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Table 7 Summary comparison between various current and potential S&C profile inspection systems 
Inspection system 
 
 
Consideration 
Dedicated 
measurement 
train 
In service train with 
Dedicated 
inspection 
wagon 
Road-rail 
vehicle 
On site robot Rail trolley 
Laser-
based hand 
gauges 
permanently 
fixed 
equipment 
detachable 
equipment 
(e.g. RILA) 
Throughput Relatively high High in large 
stations 
Medium to high in large 
stations 
Low to 
medium in 
large stations 
Low 
Correlation between 
inspected S&Cs and 
S&Cs that required 
inspection 
Low to 
medium 
Very low Low to medium Low to medium in large 
stations 
Medium to 
high 
High 
Rail cleaning 
method and switch 
rail hogging 
measurement 
method 
No documented methods Potentially manual cleaning 
of rails and manual 
measurement of switch rail 
hogging 
Manual cleaning of rails 
and manual measurement 
of switch rail hogging 
Track access method Train 
timetabling 
No access method needed as 
the in-service trains are 
already timetabled 
Train 
timetabling 
Track possession Track possession or 
working on a line that is 
open to traffic 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Summary and findings 
8.1.1 Stage one 
As railway usage is set to increase, even less time will be available for the maintenance of 
railway assets. As a result the railway will need to continue to improve through more reliable 
infrastructure and better maintenance practices. S&Cs are a considerable cost driver of any 
complex railway and thus much attention is given, and will continue to be given, to both 
reducing maintenance costs and increasing availability of these assets. 
S&Cs require a wide range of inspection tasks which have been reviewed and classified into 
the six key inspection groups:  
1. Visual inspection tasks; 
2. Inspection of shape, size and position of switch rails, stock rails, crossing, wing rails 
and check rails; 
3. Geometry measurements (gauge, cant, twist, alignment and levelling); 
4. Measurement of cracks in rails and crossing; 
5. Tightness checks, and; 
6. Point machine inspections. 
The biggest challenge towards a “self-inspecting switch” is non-destructive testing for cracks, 
as, due to the non standard shape of rails, fast and accurate measurement cannot be foreseen 
in the near future. However, it has been concluded that, with the exception of crack 
measurement, the majority of S&C inspection tasks could soon be automated (in 5 to 
10 years) by using a combination of proven technologies and research/prototype level 
advancements. 
One key point is that if automatic inspection of S&C is to be introduced, S&C will have to be 
kept clean, as it is very unlikely that any advances in sensing and measurement technologies 
would be able to overcome this shortcoming. This is likely to be achieved through the use of 
better lubricants and better switch sliding mechanisms (e.g. switch rollers, dry slide chairs, 
etc).  
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Although in recent years, research on railway condition monitoring has rapidly increased and 
condition monitoring techniques have been successfully used to reduce maintenance costs 
and increase safety, these techniques have not been found to be useful in working towards the 
elimination of manual S&C inspection tasks. This is in part due to the type of inspections that 
are generally required by the inspection standards and in part due to the high inspection 
integrity required as a result of S&C being safety-critical assets. 
Network Rail S&C inspection requirements were identified and categorised in sections 2.1 
and 2.2. Relevant commercial and research solutions for the automatic inspection of S&Cs 
were also identified and classified in sections 2.3 and 2.4. The relevant solutions were 
compared against the identified inspection requirements and necessary advances and future 
challenges required to achieve a “self-inspecting” S&C have been identified and discussed in 
section 2.5. Thus, the first aim of this work was satisfied in Chapter 2. 
8.1.2 Stage two 
The activities undertaken in the second stage of this research, together with some of the 
outcomes, are summarised in the following bullet point list: 
• Identified important accuracy requirements for the automatic inspection of switch 
rails against derailment hazards: the high importance of point cloud accuracy for the 
automatic inspection of TGP8 (sections 4.2 and 4.2.2 in particular); 
• Identified causes for inaccurate manual inspection of switch rails (random errors): a 
1 degree rotation of the NR4 gauge can change the measurement result by a full unit 
on the sidewear scale (section 4.2.2); slight changes in the positioning of the switch 
rail radius gauge can change the outcome of the inspection (section 5.1.7); 
• Identified inherent issues relating to the switch inspection gauges (systematic errors): 
TGP8 gauge measurements can be inaccurate due to the poor conformity between the 
gauge and the inspected rail (section 5.1.4); the switch rail radius gauge is not able to 
identify all cases of sharp switch rails (section 5.1.7); the NR4 gauge measurements 
can be inaccurate when the field side of the inspected rail is not in a good condition 
(section 5.1.3); 
• Developed accurate automatic inspection algorithms for each of the five derailment 
hazards (section 5); 
• Developed an effective filtering algorithm (applicable only on convex data), which 
smooths the data while preserving the corners (section 5.1.2); 
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• Developed a method for accurately measuring the roll angle of the trolley when 
measuring railway crossings (section 6.1.1); 
• Identified causes of inaccurate manual inspection of railway crossings: pivot points 
and localised wear can reduce the accuracy of the sidewear measurement by several 
millimetres (section 6.1.4); the height profile of the straight edge for the measurement 
of sidewear does not follow the vertical trajectory of the train wheel, reducing the 
accuracy further by up to a millimetre (section 6.1.4); due to several reasons which 
were identified, the measurement of top wear on the wing rail can be inaccurate by 
several millimetres (section 6.1.5); the measurement of top wear on the crossing nose 
can be inaccurate by several millimetres if the straight edge is placed in the 
developing gap of the crossing (section 6.1.6); 
• Proposed several improvements to increase the accuracy of the automatic inspection 
of railway crossings from millimetres to sub-millimetre (sections 6.1.4 and 6.1.5); 
• Developed automatic inspection algorithms for the inspection of railway crossings 
(sections 6.1.1 to 6.1.6), and; 
• Developed a prototype trolley and carried out field trials for the inspection of S&Cs. 
In sections 5.1.3 to 5.1.7 several issues relating to the manual profile inspection of switches 
were identified, alternative switch inspection methods with considerably reduced human error 
were developed tested and improvements to reduce systematic errors were proposed. 
Similarly, in sections 6.1.3 to 6.1.6 issues relating to the manual profile inspection of 
crossings were identified, alternative crossing inspection methods with considerably reduced 
human error were developed and tested and improvements to reduce the systematic errors 
were proposed. 
Thus, the second aim of this work was satisfied in chapters 3 to 6. 
8.2 Limitations and future work 
As the purpose of the research was to develop an automatic method for carrying out the S&C 
inspection tasks as they are set out in the NR/L2/TRK/0053 and NR/L2/TRK/1054 inspection 
standards (for compatibility with current practice), the performance of the method is affected 
by the inherent limitations of the manual gauges. The methods can be improved at the price 
of losing (to a certain extent) compatibility with current manual practices. However, the 
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author believes that as newer and improved methods are demonstrated to have a high 
integrity level, it is expected that the inspection standards are updated. 
The automatic NR4 measurement could be replaced with an alternative measuring process 
which provides greater accuracy. The measurement result could then be converted to the NR4 
sidewear scale to maintain compatibility. 
The TGP8 measurement has serious limitations as, due to poor TGP8-rail conformity, the 
measurements are rarely accurate to +/-2 degrees. However, an alternative, accurate to within 
+/-2 degrees would fail many S&Cs which currently pass the TGP8 gauge. Thus, to maintain 
the same level of safety, the intervention limit would likely have to be reduced from the 
current threshold of 60 degrees. 
Automatic inspection against sharp switch rails can provide reliable results; however, the 
calculation considers a worst case wheel profile for each analysed rail profile. Actual wheel 
profiles may be better than the worst case, leading to a conservative inspection. The 
algorithm could be improved by establishing limits to worst case wheel profiles. However, 
the undermining of the worst case wheel profile could lead to false negatives, making the task 
difficult. 
The algorithms were tested on a limited number of S&Cs. Thus, prior to using these 
algorithms in a commercial product, they should be peer-reviewed and tested on a larger 
number of S&Cs. 
Grease and dirt can render optical inspections useless and thus are an issue in the automatic 
inspection of S&Cs. The use of grease on rails has been proven to reduce the wear rate and it 
is therefore unlikely that NR will stop using grease on switch rails. Moreover, grease is also 
used by NR to mitigate the derailment risk. Thus, the research and development of better 
lubricants could play a significant role in the automation of S&C inspection. Desirable 
properties for a grease that is to be used on optically inspected S&C are: (a) reduced 
thickness to minimise optical measurement errors, and (b) less sticky to avoid attracting dirt 
and debris. 
Portable laser based S&C inspection systems could potentially also be used to assist S&C 
repair works. New algorithms could be developed to simulate the condition of a switch blade 
after an intended set of repair actions (e.g. grind a certain amount at a certain angle). The 
algorithm could then alert the user if the intended repair can lead to the creation of a 
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derailment hazard. If such a system would have been used, the derailment in Glasgow [11] 
may have not happened (the repair work introduced a derailment hazard 2 while removing a 
derailment hazard 1). 
Repeated profile measurements on the same S&Cs using in-service trains could be used to 
carry out trend analysis and failure prognosis. Such information could prove very valuable 
when used to improve the planning of S&C maintenance and renewals. 
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2. The use of laser based trolley for railway switch and crossing inspection, International 
Journal of Condition Monitoring and Diagnostic Engineering Management, October 
2013 (VOL. 16 NO. 4, ISSN 1363 - 7681). 
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APPENDIX B: LEADS TABLES 
Table 8 NR/L2/TRK/001/D01 leads table 
Leads to: Relevancy: 
GE/RT8000, Rule Book. NA 
NR/L2/TRK/001/A01, Inspection and maintenance of permanent way – 
Inspection. 
R 
NR/L2/TRK/001/B01, Inspection and maintenance of permanent way – Rail 
management. 
NA 
NR/L2/TRK/001/C01, Inspection and maintenance of permanent way – 
Geometry and gauging. 
R 
NR/L2/TRK/001/E01, Inspection and maintenance of permanent way - 
Installation requirements, maintenance limits and intervention limits. 
R 
NR/L2/TRK/0053, Inspection and repair procedures to reduce the risk of 
derailment at switches. 
L 
NR/L2/TRK/3011, Continuous welded rail (CWR) track. NA 
NR/L2/TRK/2049, Track design handbook. NA 
NR/L3/TRK/1202, S&C systems – Flat bottom full depth switches – 
Management of fixed stretcher bar assemblies, lock stretcher bar assemblies, 
fastenings and associated defects. 
NA 
NR/L3/TRK/1202/A, Action Tables. NA 
NR/L3/TRK/1202/B, Patrollers Action Table. NA 
NR/L3/TRK/3001, Ordering of switch and crossing components. NA 
RT/CE/S/037, Requirements for maintenance of trackwork in depots by Depot 
Facility Operators. 
NA 
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RT/CE/S/054, Inspection of cast crossings and cast vees in the track. L 
NR/L3/TRK/003, Index to track engineering forms. NA 
 
Table 9 RT/CE/S/054 leads table 
Leads to: Relevancy: 
RT/CE/S/056 Rail testing: non-ultrasonic procedures NA 
RT/CE/S/057 Rail Failure Handbook NA 
RT/CE/S/103 Track inspection requirements D 
 
Table 10 NR/L2/TRK/0053 leads table 
Leads to: Relevancy: 
NR/SP/TRK/001 Inspection and maintenance of permanent way D 
NR/SP/TRK/0132 Maintenance arc welding of plain rails and switches and 
crossings 
NA 
NR/WI/TRK/001 Track Inspection Handbook D 
NR/SP/CTM/011 Competence and training in track engineering NA 
TEF/3008 Welders work return – switch repairs NA 
TEF/3029 Detailed switch inspection report (053) NA 
TEF/3042 Hand grinding record form (HG1) NA 
TEF/3054 Switches and crossings welding assessment / replacement form NA 
UIC Leaflet 716R Maximum permissible wear profiles for switches NA 
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APPENDIX C: SWITCH INSPETION REQUIREMENTS 
Please turn to next page. 
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APPENDIX D: LASER SCANNER “SENSOR ACCEPTANCE 
REPORT” 
Please turn to next page. 
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